Withdrawing from Iraq: An Opportunity for a New American Strategy
Raghida Dergham Al-Hayat - 13/07/07//
A strategy for a US exit from Iraq does not require timetables, phased withdrawals, or bowing to Iran and Syria in exchange for a quid pro quo, but the opposite. The time has come to adopt a strategy that secures an effective momentum for the withdrawal itself, so that it can have an impact on the stances of Iraqis themselves and neighboring states. What local and regional players have in common is their hopes for the continuing presence of US troops in Iraq, and each party has its own reasons and goals. The Americans - Republicans, Democrats and independents - should not fall in love with the Baker-Hamilton Report as if it represents salvation from upon high, since most of its recommendations are, in fact, nonsense and fakery. There will be no honorable US withdrawal if bargaining and deals are concluded with countries the US has classified as sponsors of terrorism, and there is no room for a gradual withdrawal from Iraq.
Americans are running away from confronting the bitter reality, which is that a traditional military victory in the Iraq war necessarily requires two things: a draft or forced conscription, and raising taxes to cover the astounding costs of the war, which have reached $10 billion a month. What they want from as stance such as this, in practical terms, is an "honorable defeat" that guarantees extrication from the Iraqi quagmire, even if this means a stain on American honor.
This obsession with withdrawal has begun to blind, simultaneously, those who oppose it, and those who call for it. Meanwhile, it is possible to render the withdrawal useful, so that the US can re-occupy the driver's seat, reshuffle the strategic deck, and see itself, the only superpower, retain its standing. In order for the withdrawal to be part of the solutions involving a well-studied, integrated strategy, it should be a central and necessary item on the road to these solutions. If this strategy is to be intelligent, decisive and handled proficiently, it requires that the regional and international parties take part in it, so that the project to exit Iraq will be a group effort, as opposed to the US' unilateral decision to enter the country. As the former Saudi ambassador to the US, Prince Turki al-Faisal, said during a seminar at the World Economic Forum at the Dead Sea, moderated by this reporter, "It is time to send a call for the exit of the US from Iraq."
Seven months ago, at the end of last year, I called in this column for a "complete and immediate" US withdrawal from Iraq, as opposed to what those in love with the Baker-Hamilton Report call for, namely a gradual, phased withdrawal. I previously wrote that "Another option is the total and immediate withdrawal from Iraq. Such an action would make the country a very frightening neighbor for Iran; it would leave an Iranian predicament in Iraq. The invasion and occupation of Iraq represented a valuable gift from the US to Iran, especially since the US occupation authorities have dismantled the Iraqi army after toppling Saddam Hussein's regime. They have also strengthened Iran's allies inside Iraq, and have turned several Iraqi areas into safe havens for Iran to exercise its absolute influence. Nevertheless, if American forces withdrew from Iraq as quickly as possible, Iran would be left in a deadlock, while the US would free itself from the Iraqi quagmire and regain its dignity and grandeur. The US administration could then take more strict positions regarding Tehran, without fearing any Iranian reprisal against US forces in Iraq."
The same article called for a withdrawal from US naval bases, since the US fleets and aircraft carriers are so superior (China needs 20 years to match them), as well as a blockade of the Straits of Hormuz to enforce "deprivation" in oil wars, should this become necessary. In other words, the US doesn't need to attack Iran to compensate for its loss in Iraq in oil-related considerations. It would be cheaper to withdraw from Iraq and establish a sea blockade that would paralyze Iran and limit its regional and nuclear aspirations, if the US wants to decisively confront Iranian escalation.
Thus, an America withdrawal to the sea will free US forces from the grip of al-Qaida and similar groups in Iraq, while preventing America from being a sitting duck in Iraq's numerous wars. Of course, there is also the option of withdrawing to US military bases in the region, whether these are big or small, or currently active or dormant. This is in addition to the strong desire by Iraq's Kurds to entice the US to take on a big and primary military base in Kurdistan, which will act as a safety valve, especially if the situation deteriorates to the point of partition, following fragmentation.
US President George W Bush needs to make the withdrawal a basis of a new strategy that puts him in the driver's seat, militarily, diplomatically and politically. This requires him to look at the withdrawal from Iraq as an opportunity for a new military strategy, and not a retreat. This could come from doubling the number of aircraft carriers in the region and working to create a huge naval base with never-before seen fleets that are able to wage a war of attrition against terror and trim the ambitions of Iran and Syria. These two states will inherit a threatening neighbor after they sowed terror and allowed volunteer fighters to cross into Iraq, to fight US forces there.
George W Bush was right when he said, "We're at war," but he erred when he fiercely fought the idea of withdrawing from Iraq; the policy has earned him enmity and hatred, even the ranks of leading Republicans. A withdrawal represents an opportunity if Americans come to a logical understanding about it, leaving behind the grandstanding of a presidential election season, and decide that the withdrawal should be immediate - as realistically possible - in order to redeploy to US fleets and naval bases.
There are those who call for dialogue with Syrian and Iran, but a firm, strategic dialogue is only possible if there is a withdrawal from the Iraqi quagmire, which will give the US the greatest amount of strength.
Since there are fears of a collapse in stability in the region as a result of a US withdrawal from Iraq, the big powers, like China and Russia, might realize the necessity of filling the vacuum, with joint awareness and joint action, in order to prevent a lack of stability from leading to a collapse of the world economy. Such a collapse would have a direct impact on the interests of Russia and China, as well as Europe, Japan, India and other countries. Therefore, the US administration has an opportunity to begin a discussion that is qualitatively and strategically different with Russia and China, which has alliance-type relations with Iran, for strategic and oil-related reasons.
The US has an opportunity to turn the withdrawal into a device whose consequences can be used to frighten, instead of a something that leaves the impression of retreat and flight from Iraq. At the same time, it is a vital decision advanced by the US administration, put forward as an initiative that is based on humility and the true readiness to admit the errors of keeping Russia distant from Iraq, and the errors of the failed strategy of "preventative" action. One of the most important objectives of this was to remain the only superpower and prevent competition from China, at any cost.
This discussion could take place on a bilateral level, accompanied by a wider discussion among permanent members of the UN Security Council and leading states in the Arab region, most prominently the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Ban-Ki Moon, the secretary-general of the UN, could undertake a strategic role to gather the international community regarding Iraq, beginning with behind-the-scenes understandings among the big players to pave the way for a new strategic thinking. Increased US pressure for a quick withdrawal in the near future will give the secretary-general the opportunity to speed up thinking about a role for him that will serve the cause of dialogue in a regional and international system produced by the US withdrawal from Iraq. Ban-Ki Moon must help Iraq by offering new thinking that transcends the bitterness of what happened when the Bush administration gambled with an illegitimate war opposed by the Security Council and the gloating over the war's scaling back of the US and its arrogance. Moon must convince all of the influential countries that the challenge today requires throwing a lifeline to Iraq and the region, in the interest of these countries themselves, since the coming US withdrawal will eliminate the resistance to throwing the US a lifeline due to its Iraqi quagmire.
In Iraq and the region, a US withdrawal will leave a vacuum that frightens some. The states that surround Iraq as neighbors do not want a collapsed state in that country; they fear the flight of volunteers, takfiris and terrorists who were summoned by George W Bush to his war in Iraq. These countries fear the flight of these people to their own territory and therefore must create an integrated strategy to deal with the insurrection, terror and volunteers from Iraq during a post-withdrawal phase.
The responsibility for Arab states is greater, wider and more profound than merely thinking about how to protect themselves from the US withdrawal's repercussions. They are called on to think about a post-withdrawal Iraq and what they can do to prevent further attrition.
The secretary-general of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, must now give the topic of Iraq his full attention and make it his priority - he should devote himself to this issue instead of working on it from time to time. Just as Moon is called upon to set in motion and host a dialogue of one kind, Moussa should do so, exclusively on the Arab front. He is not being asked to produce initiatives, but rather urge the important countries to take initiatives in which the Arab League would have a role, in one way or another.
What is needed is to produce an Arab strategy for the post-US withdrawal phase, and this should be done in with seriousness and a sense of urgency.
Furthermore, regional and international organizations should take part, as they have never done before, in a integrated process that matches the US preparations for a withdrawal from Iraq. The Organization of the Islamic Conference is qualified for such a role, as is the European Union, provided that they do not weigh down their tasks with traditional bureaucracy. There is an available window of opportunity, as required by the withdrawal process itself, in order to set down a political, intellectual and practical framework for shuttle diplomacy, in various directions.
A US withdrawal will also pave the way for a dialogue within Iraq and the effort to safeguard Iraq from partition, according to Iraqi expert Yahya Saeed, the director of the Oil Income Monitoring Center at the London School of Economics. A united Iraq will provide security guarantees to all Iraqi parties, even those that seek independence, if they feel that there is a strategic benefit from remaining a part of Iraq, which will provide them with security cover and a strategic security dimension." Said believes that it is a mistake to believe that Iraq's Shiites have "a desire or readiness to submit to Iranian hegemony," and he points to Basra as an example - all of Iraq's oil is being exported from Basra, where 80% of the country's reserves or surface discoveries are located. It might seem logical that Basra would be the biggest beneficiary of a partition. Realistically, Basra "is less enthusiastic about the rest about independence and partition, because people there know that they will be preyed upon" if the country is partitioned. Said believes that "Iraqi sovereignty is what will prevent Basra from joining any of its neighbors." Thus, the unity of Iraq is a "strategic necessity."
Even Muqtada al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army might fear a US withdrawal from Iraq, because it will create a vacuum that will force the Sadrist movement to fight in order to fill it; today it is a quasi-ally of the government "and represents the biggest mass movement in Iraq, but without a compass," as Said puts it.
Iran and Syria claim that they want a US withdrawal, but in reality both are frightened of the prospect. First of all, it will put them in direct confrontation with both the known and unknown forces of insurrection, rebellion and terror on their borders with Iraq, with no shield from the Americans, who waged a war on these states' behalf at times, and against their affiliated mercenaries at others. Second of all, if America frees itself of Iraq, this will provide this US with options to deter Iranian and Syrian adventurism, while allowing it to adopt decisive policies against both Iran and Syria.
A US withdrawal from Iraq is part of a integrated and cohesive strategy whose benefits outweigh the continuing presence of US troops in an Iraq that has been fragmented by the adventurism of George W Bush and the neoconservative clique that got the US into the Iraqi quagmire. A desperate increase in American military forces will bleed the US; therefore, it must either conduct a serious war that involves the draft and an increase of hundreds of thousands of troops, or withdraw to military bases and formulate a new strategy.
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