Next Iraqi Government and Shiite Militias
Hamed el-Hmoud Al-Hayat - 20/04/06//
There are indications that the biggest challenge the central government in Baghdad faces over the coming months or years, is how it will be able to rid Iraq of militias. The leadership of the central authority in Iraq and Shiite militias converge in terms of sectarianism and partisanship. But as a central authority, it aims to control Iraq as a whole, which will be impossible in light of the influence and leverage these militias have.
While the Iraqi Army and security forces, by means of US forces' support, move into high gear to eliminate the rebellion in Baghdad, Western Iraq, Baqouba and Mosul from rebellious factors which includes Takfiris (Islamic extremists rejecting major aspects of mainstream Sunni religion) and former Baathists; leaderships of the Iraqi security forces find their relation with Shiite militias frustrating, with respect to the duality of loyalty between many of the new Iraqi army personnel, security forces and these militias.
The Basra Police chief recently told The Guardian in striking despair that only 20% of his officers obey his orders, while 80% take orders from Shiite militias. There are at least six military organizations in Basra: 'Badr Troops' affiliated with Abdel Aziz Al-Hakim's Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), 'Mehdi Army' of Muqtada al-Sadr, and other troops affiliated to 'Daawa Party', 'Al-Fadhila' (virtue), 'Hezbollah' and 'Thaar Allah' (Allah's Revenge).
Given the existence of these militias, of which their intensity has reached the extent of internal conflict, and taking into consideration the absence of loyalty to the central government, police personnel in Basra are vying with each other's loyalty to SCIRI and 'Mehdi Army'. Therefore, some police cars have stickers of either Abdel Aziz al-Hakim or Muqtada al-Sadr on their rear windscreens.
These militias managed to impose conduct and regulations that have nothing to do with the Baghdad central government, such as: enforcing hejab (veiling), and prohibiting the retail of alcohol. But their main role lies in finding the means and the outlets to provide funds for these militias, by putting pressure on leading figures in state institutions to provide jobs for members of these militias and their families.
To make matters worse, these militias play a blackmailing role to provide funds for these organizations and their cadres.
Residents of the regions where these militias have strong presence have noticed that many of these militias had sworn loyalty to the former regime and have simply replaced the picture of Saddam Hussein with Imams and religious slogans after the fall of the regime.
Indeed, these armed militias do not carry their weapons with the intention of entering a war with the army or security forces, which are under the influence of Shiite parties, but as a means of intimidation if the need to achieve political and economic goals arises. We can therefore sum up the goals of these militias as follows: First, collecting funds for these organizations via:
1. Allying with influential parties to obtain import and reconstruction contracts from the government.
2. Getting a percentage of religious shrine visits' revenues.
3. Taking part in smuggling oil and its products, which amounts Iraqi exchequer losses to 5 billion dollars per year, according to oil experts.
Second, the alienation of the Iraqi people, or rather, Iraq's Shiites from Iraqi nationalism by:
1. Reinforcing sectarian orientation of Iraqi Shiites to the detriment of national affiliation.
2. Intimidating citizens by imposing behavior like the enforcement of hejab, segregation and the prohibition of alcohol, which have led to the spread of even more harmful drugs.
3. Preventing a national Shiite emergence with a national affiliation that overtakes sectarian affiliation.
Hence, these Shiite organizations have worked, since the fall of the loathsome totalitarian regime, on altering Iraq into a Husseiniya (Shiite assembly hall) or a large obsequy clad in black flags, as if sadness and blackness are the quest of millions of Iraqi Shiites who have suffered much from the former regime.
Such behavior has harvested resentment from Shiites, including Shiite clerics who were known for their long struggle and sufferings in the Saddam regime - those whose conscience and values did not allow them to become militia leaders, like erudite Mohamed Bahr al-Uloum, who warned Iraqi Shiites in remarks published in the April 12 issue of al-Qabas newspaper, against isolationism that had controlled the emotions of a great number of them:
"We behaved like Shiites, when we are the masters, thereby contradicting ourselves. One of the shameful mistakes we unknowingly committed is that we have turned diverse Baghdad, everybody's capital, into a Shiite Husseiniya, dressed in black on both religious and non-religious occasions. All of this is bad behavior that harms others. Shiites behaved in this way out of their heart, not their mind. In Iraq, we are a majority, but we are a minority in the Gulf, Arab and Islamic world. The world is not on our side. Therefore, Iraq cannot be isolated from these three regions and confined in sectarianism and be content with it. This would definitely be suicide."
Given the remark by the Basra police chief to the effect that only 20% of his officers take orders from him, we do not know what the police chiefs of Baghdad, Nassiriya, Amara or Kut would say. Undoubtedly, the authority of the government is surpassed by the authority, influence and prestige of the Shiite militias.
For this reason, the state does not exist, but is still evolving. The completion of its evolution relies on the extent of its ability to rid of these militias.
Eradication or dissolution of these militias does not mean transferring its members to the police or army, otherwise next year the police chief will announce that only 5% of his officers are obeying his commands.
Al Jaafari's government pretended to forget, and perhaps the next government will also pretend to forget, this challenge aimed at the central government by Shiite militias. In this way, it will do away with the greatest part of its responsibility by monopolizing violence and applying the law.
It is therefore evident that even in the absence of anti-government insurgents, followers of extremist groups and the collapsed Baath regime in areas where Shiite militias spread; this doesn't necessarily mean less security deterioration than other areas of Iraq.
The people of Iraq complain of plunder, looting and kidnapping, with no party in which a citizen can put their trust and follow up their complaint. Citizens are frequently hesitant on choosing which party they will go to lodge their complaint, whether to go to the police station, the Daawa Party, Badr Brigades or the Mehdi Army Headquarters.
These Shiite militias have returned the state of Iraqi society to what is was prior to its establishment. They have worked on forming a socio-religious realm, in which they only see themselves and their beliefs, in an age that encourages forgiveness and tolerance.
But now transcendental beliefs constitute the fundamental behaviors. The hostile attitude of Muqtada al-Sadr toward the presence of the US forces in Iraq, not only on the basis of being occupation forces, but also based on his remarks during his latest visit to Kuwait, that they (the troops) entered Iraq in order to prevent the arrival of 'The Promised Mehdi'.
Amidst this terrorist atmosphere imposed by Shiite militias on the people in southern Iraq, it is difficult to guess how satisfied or desperate these people are with their presence.
Without a doubt, there is a silent Shiite majority unable to give full vent to their feelings and who cannot express opposition to a scolding or violent action from these militias. The absence of protection from the central authority provides silence as the only means of survival.
The next Iraqi government's mission is clearly difficult. It will represent either the bridge that reunites the emotions, views and minds of Iraqis, or the gate to a slope that leads Iraqis to more warfare.
If it limits its security responsibility to no more than the removal of insurgents and extremists in Western Iraq - without ridding Iraq of Shiite militias and their sway - it will lose its legitimacy as a central authority and will push Iraq further into the abyss.
*Kuwaiti Writer
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