The Priorities of American Politics for the Coming Two Years
Munir Chafic Al-Hayat 2005/02/14
The answer to the question about the expected changes during George W. Bush's second administration starts from the analyses of the new cabinet, the State of the Union Address and last but not least U.S. Secretary of State Dr. Condoleezza Rice's visits to Berlin, Paris, Ankara, Palestine and perhaps Sharm El-Sheikh. The center of American politics for the coming months or perhaps for the coming two years will focus on the Iranian nuclear weapons file. The U.S. will attempt to exert pressures on Iran in order to end its ambition of nuclear acquisition even if the U.S. had to resort to direct military confrontation or through Israeli jets.
It is true that this goal was the center of American politics during the past few months, but it was only in the context of provocations required for the American presidential elections, not to mention the Iraqi elections. Today, this goal has become a strategic priority in American politics. This is very clear, even to the smallest American expert on strategy. The Americans claim that the control over Iraq and Iran and the subjugation of the Arab system severs the strategy of confrontation with the major power centers by controlling the oil "faucets" of the region. However, this claim deserves justifications, as it is taken for granted that this claim is meaningless if it is not proven by the experience which yielded the opposite results. The proof is that the events during the past three years increased America's international isolation, impaired its financial situation, increased its budget deficit and decreased the value of the U.S. dollar vis-à-vis the Euro. Accordingly, the major U.S. competitors gained more time in order to develop their affairs, while the U.S.-Arab and Islamic relation gravely deteriorated.
In his State of the Union Address, Bush gave priority to the Iranian nuclear file and associated it with terrorism. Therefore, Rice's visit to Europe had the purpose of rapprochement of relations with the Europeans, reducing the crisis with Russia, comforting Turkey, in addition to rallying American support against Syria and Iran. Perhaps the soothing of the situation in Palestine, and what Bush referred to in his State of the Union Address about indirect pressures against Saudi Arabia and Egypt could be placed in this context. All what Bush mentioned in his speech about freedom, democracy and terrorism served the sole purpose of the mobilization against Iran, and in a broader sense, Bush was actually supporting the Israeli programs in the Arab and Islamic region.
However, the success of this strategy will not end the "mother of all troubles" for America. It would be a step to encourage Israel to impose its conditions on the Palestinians, the Lebanese, Egyptians, Saudis, Syrians and the Iraqis. The Iraqi experience proved that there are other files to deal with, and each file requires many battles. Moreover, the events in Palestine, especially with regards to what is required from the new Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas are additional proof.
Experience during the past three years has proven that the policy of avoiding confrontation of American pressures is useless. Bush's America knows exactly what it wants, and the Arab states should realize that the compliance with all the American demands would lead to internal partitions. It is unreasonable for the Zionist program to become a policy advocated by the official Arab governments. Therefore, our only response would be to enhance the Arab unity starting with the refusal of the pressures and threats against Syria. Whoever links between reform and the evasion of American pressures is mistaken, because such association tacitly means a misunderstanding in the objectives of these American attacks. Foreign challenges can only be met with Arab unity and an internal Arab unity, not by succumbing to these American pressures which are veiled behind democratization and reform.
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