Syrian Complexities
Hazem Saghieh Al-Hayat - 24/12/06//
Before the Baker-Hamilton report came out and with the outbreak of speculations about the ' US dialogue with Syria', Damascus, its friends and followers cheered. Schadenfreude was self-evident: here Washington is obliged to speak to us. At the same time they concealed other facts, one of which is that Israel , too, showed the same willingness. They also said nothing about Baker's conditions on Damascus, and the non-binding nature of the report.
The latter, at least relating to Syria-Lebanon, is praiseworthy. Syria's eventual retrieval of the Golan Heights is a good thing. If such retrieval leads to Syria's turning away from Lebanon , it will definitely mean another realization of right. The spirit of the report, if it really works, is in stark contrast to the arrogant policy of disregard, which characterized the administrations of George Bush, Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert. Such disregard has incurred a heavy price on the Arabs, the Americans and the Israelis.
Hence, there is a basket of potential gains endorsed by two other facts:
- That Syria , in contrast to its ally, Iran, agrees to the principles of 'land for peace' and the 'establishment of two States living side by side on the land of historical Palestine '.
- And that Syria, through its war against the Israelis via Hezbollah, gained relative benefits whose cost was paid by Lebanon and the Lebanese. Thus, the summer war may be considered, with regards to Damascus (and Tehran), as a mini-October War, which may be considered as a good starter to launch negotiations.
But the questions, which are desired to be covered up, are bigger and more complicated than these simple introductions.
Does Syria really want the Golan Heights, which would entail losing the 'case', including Lebanon?
We know that the regime in Damascus, given its military and minoritarian nature, only feeds on 'issues'. The normalization of public life and compatibility with the logic of international relations threatens the regime with death and atrophy. If it is possible to blame electoral considerations and chauvinistic inclinations for preventing four Israeli prime ministers from returning 100% of the Golan Heights, through indirect negotiations between 1991 and 2000, something in Syria prevented receiving 98% of the Golan Heights.
This 'something', which increased the doubts about what we now know, after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, is that the Damascus regime used the conflict with the Fouad Siniora government and the aligned forces to expand its base. It also increases the doubts about our long-held conception of the Syrian regime as an oriental despotic regime whose policies are not affected by its economic crises. The economy, according to those who studied the Baathi power, was the most hated and neglected issue by Hafez al-Assad during his three-decade reign. This, in turn, did not prevent the deification of the late President!
Moreover, the cost of a settlement with the aforementioned regime is something that the 'West' cannot pay, unless the settlement means offering Lebanon to Syria , with an instant replay of the scenario between 1991 and 2004. If we put this settlement aside, we will again be faced with the nature of the regime: the formative crisis of modern Syria, which plunged the country into successive coups, wars and the 1958 unification (with Egypt ), was 'solved' only through the massive centralization of power in 1970 under Hafez al-Assad.
This 'savior' regime, which was established three years after the loss of the Golan Heights (in fact, winning the 'Cause' of the Golan Heights and the liberation), can not co-exist with a small neighbor that receives political refugees from Syria and allows for the freedom of the press. Such characteristics are considered a 'conspiracy against Damascus', which raises one of the most complex problems: if it is true that democracy in Syria is not on the agenda, which in all cases is not the business of the Lebanese or anyone else, it is true, in turn, that the military regime in Damascus does not accept less than changing the regime in Beirut. That is to say, the 'Arabism of Lebanon', according to the Syrian interpretation, which is the condition for the survival of this regime, would mean deterring the Lebanese from developing their system into a democratic one.
If we add the developments that have been taking place since the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri, including setting up the International Tribunal, which has become a main issue of domestic policies of Lebanon and Syria, as in the regional policies, we will be fully aware of the fact that Baker might not be able to remedy what has been damaged throughout years and decades.
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