Tactics for Dangerous Issues
Hazem Saghieh Al-Hayat - 20/12/06//
What is the common denominator between Hezbollah's victory in the war last summer and the Lebanese M.P Nasser Kandil? The answer: the two were pulled, instantaneously, from circulation. Nonetheless, the withdrawal of a former deputy is one thing, while the withdrawal of the 'divine victory' is something else altogether. It is strange that this war, which had been bestowed with epic and holy qualities, promising to be an 'unprecedented' turning point in Arab history, is now in limbo after a number of months that are fewer than the fingers on one hand? Still, we can say a lot about this peculiar forgetfulness, and we can find many reasons for it in our political and cultural heritage. But what is beyond doubt is the hidden magic of Lebanon's composition. Here, initiative and daring go hand in hand with frustration brought on by the limits placed by this composition. This is what emerges from the impasse of considering the success to be absolute, while seeking to exploit this victory to the very last drop. Let us remember that a few weeks passed between what Kamal Jumblatt used to describe as the falling of 82% of the population and 75% of the land into in the hands of the 'National Movement', and murdering Jumblatt himself and the fading away of the 'National Movement' that never rose up again afterwards. Let us remember that another few weeks separated the selection of Bachir Gemayel as President of the Republic, the outcome of the largest invasion of an Arab country, and the first invasion of an Arab capital, and the death of Gemayel that paved the way for the demise of his political team in the Mountain and Beirut, and elsewhere. In face of this 'law', it is not useful to ideologize decisive victories, or what is at least described in those terms. This is because the Lebanese condition is, both fortunately and unfortunately, the wall which 'the support of the Palestinian Cause' crashes into, just as the hasty rush to reconcile with Israel does. There is no reason to assume that what applies to the 'divine victory' is not applicable to the protesting. Here, also initiative and frustration coexist in an 'authentically' Lebanese garb. It may be argued, with genuine or fake sincerity, that the demand for a 'national unity government' is much too modest to be considered decisive. But what is the meaning of decisiveness, according to the conditions of the Lebanese, if not a political challenge to the status of one of the communities for the first time, by the public following of another community, as a prelude to a resolution? What does decisive resolution mean when the objective is to circumvent the intended International Tribunal that will investigate the assassination of a national and sectarian symbol, or reconsidering what decision 1701 has settled on when it comes to the international borders? The situation is that resolution in Lebanon does not consist of taking over authority, as is the case in countries with homogenous populations. Even if Kamal Jumblatt and Bachir Gemayel could complete their successes, none of them would have been able to govern the country without some kind of partnership with the other sectarian communities. Closer to the truth, consequently, resolution in Lebanon means success in the disruption of authority and deterring it from exercising its authority, as the situation was precisely, for example, with the imposition of the Cairo Agreement in 1969. How harsh and bitter the game of reality and ideology in Lebanon is. For the most important Palestinian symbol in Lebanon to stand up in a trench opposite to the trench of Hezbollah, which is a party that does not stop emphasizing its support for all things Palestinian. This truly is replete with meanings; meanings that hold up the specter of imminent danger. Unfortunately, the fact is that the same applies to Palestine, as we can see nowadays between 'Fateh' and 'Hamas'.
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