Mediated Talks between Morocco and Algeria
Mohamed Ashab Al-Hayat - 14/12/06//
Spain's Prime Minister, José Luis Zapatero, is in Algeria, while his Moroccan counterpart, Idris Gato, is in Paris: two events connected by a coincidence and drawn apart by interests.
As the natural arrangement of spaces, which aims to establish bridges of cooperation between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, takes place, political complexities, led by the conflict over the Saharan issue, emerge.
Algerian President Abdul Aziz Bouteflika asked the Spanish visitor to use his influence over Morocco to return the proposed settlement back to the referendum.
Meanwhile, President Jacques Chirac is urging the Moroccans to speed up the holding of negotiations to add momentum to diplomatic efforts. This means that instead of diverging by virtue of geography and fraternity, dialogue between Algeria and Morocco is converging in the direction of being administered through the Spanish and the French, the conventional power brokers of the North African region.
Between harmony and conflicting interests, the sides involved in the Saharan conflict are trying to prepare for the outcome of the UN Security Council's expected discussion of the issue under the current mandate of the UN Mission for a Referendum in Western Sahara, MINURSO. Paris and Madrid's tendency to favor one side or the other does not seem very different from trying to seize the reigns of control over the administration of the Sahara desert.
For while the French influence still holds by virtue of France's permanent membership in the UN Security Council, the Spanish influence stems from Madrid's position as the former colonial power in the Saharan region, not to mention the key economic and trade ties with both Morocco and Algeria.
In contrast to former Spanish Prime Minister Aznar, who pushed the Spanish-Moroccan relations into a dark tunnel, current Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero managed to normalize positive relations with the Moroccan capital, Rabat, making it highly unlikely for him to overlook such an advantage.
Accordingly, the objective of Zapatero's visit to Algeria is to achieve a consolidation of a delicate balance, so that the visit does not come in the interest of Morocco at the expense of Algeria, or vice versa.
It is the same state of affairs for France, whose relations with Algeria were restored by Chirac, while at the same not losing Morocco, even if it came to the consternation of Algeria over statements by Morocco's ally, who once considered the Sahara as one of the 'southern provinces' of Morocco, which unleashed criticism and calls to reopen the pages of the past.
Both the French and the Spanish adhere to strategies based on principals in their relationship with North African nations. Socialist PM Zapatero succeeded in reshaping the policies of Madrid in the direction of upholding Madrid's European affiliation, in contrast to Aznar's aspirations for a preferential relationship with Washington.
In dealing with the Saharan issue in particular, this shift in policies breathed life into the French-Spanish axis, especially as Madrid was never content with handing over the keys to sponsoring a political settlement of the Saharan conflict to Paris and Washington within the framework solution laid down by the former mediator, James Baker, prior to his abandonment of this file.
The emergence of a common French-Spanish understanding toward the Saharan issue seems likely to remain a top priority, especially in light of international developments that proved the validity of the French approach toward the Iraqi war dilemma, the Middle East crisis, and the American's ambitions in the African arena.
Therefore, it was no coincidence that the UN envoy to the Sahara, Peter van Walsum, was keen on visiting both Madrid and Paris each time he needed a sense of direction.
Both the French and the Spanish are applying increasing pressure toward a speedy settlement of the Saharan conflict, and to this end, they are well aware that the gap created by the slowing down of the drive to reach a settlement will be in the interests of the Americans, who seek to find a foothold in the region.
This is becoming increasingly apparent taking into consideration the fact that notions of political and economic partnership, which was previously exclusive to the European efforts to foster relations with the nations of North Africa, are now becoming the language used by the Americans, as well. Threats to the peace and stability of the Sahel-Saharan countries have also been on the forefront for US analysts.
The only absentees in these arrangements are the nations of North Africa themselves, who are showing little or no concern in face of the looming challenges. The most immediate outcome of such a lack of concern may be seen in the fact that the Saharan conflict continues to simmer today. It was supposed to have been settled 30 years ago through means of dialogue, international legitimacy, and significant mutual compromises, instead of insistence on bringing up scrap issues that were behind exhausting the region and obstructing its march toward building a future.
The deteriorating consequences of the conflict on the region dwarf any hoped for or needed incentives in the direction of the continuation of this conflict: whether in terms of the increasingly deep-rooted relationship of caution and mistrust between Algeria and Morocco, or the diminishing odds for the Moroccan developmental bid, which has become no more than a blurred dream; or in terms of dialogue among the partner nations in the region, characterized by dealing with each of these nations separately and individually.
There is, however, a misconception that whoever emerges a winner from this conflict will have the first and final word in the regional decision-making center of gravity.
The drive toward swaying European capitals, however, contradicts the futuristic perspective of the independence concept of the decision-making process, since until not too long ago, the capitals of North Africa have been resorting to economic and political influence in their attempts to forge a partnership with European allies.
Some of these capitals complied with the conditions on structural reforms and competition standards, while others chose to strip some of these European partners of the privileges of trade monopoly, while others, still, chose to accept demands without even reading them.
However, the concept of interests that develop into competitive partnerships is no longer within the scope of any limited regional nation, as unity has become the only requirement for achieving power.
One thing is being overlooked with regards to this tendency: the goodwill of the French and the Spanish is indeed necessary by virtue of these two countries' roles, significance and leverage.
It would be, however, more feasible for the crisis to be handed over to the UN Security Council, and before that, for the disorder of dialogue between Morocco and Algeria to be smooth, not obstructed by mediators.
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