The Alliance between the Authority and the Forces of Moderation to Fend Off the Growing Islamic Extremism Tide
Raghida Dergham Al-Hayat - 08/12/06//
Dubai - Neither the denial of the Other nor dialogue will succeed in resolving the basic differences in the Arab perception of the self or the role of religion in politics, the legislations, or the concept of surrendering to the Iranian domination of the Middle East on the basis that Iran stands for a resounding response to Israel.
Arabs are now faced with a choice between two evils, as the rift is clearly deep and the political rhetoric is about treason, blasphemy and mutual accusations.
Since the battle is decisive, it requires a frank and constructive dialogue among the intellectual pillars of the Arab region to reach proposals that spare the region further deadly clashes and steers it instead, toward identifying the roots of the divergence in a civil and civilized manner, while preserving the right to the peaceful expression of anger and disapproval.
This column has previously called for rethinking the origins, circumstances and terms for bringing about change in the region; whether or not we have the leverage to bring about such a change.
The fundamental question was posed: "What are we to do?" Many intellectuals, writers and commentators have joined the debate in 'Al-Hayat'.
Today, this column extends a new invitation for a workshop of Arab thought to decide on the direction, identity, and fate of this part of the world. This workshop should also come to a decision over the Arab obligation with regard to the challenges in Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, Somalia and Sudan.
This idea came during the "Arab Strategy Forum" held in Dubai this week, attended by an elite of professionals and thinkers from all walks of life, and which also was addressed by Iran's chief negotiator in the nuclear file, Ali Larijani.
Inside and on the sidelines of the symposiums, in lobbies, and at dining tables, most of the discussions consisted of civilized disagreement, yet the disagreement was profound, even among those who agreed, upon raising the question: how can we deal with the situation and what are we to do?
It is the opinion of the author that at the current stage of congestion, dialogue becomes a useless exercise, as people's perceptions of issues diverge, deeply. The question is about identity and affiliation, where religion, sect, politics and ideology are closely entangled.
Therefore, the rift is not superficial, it is deep-rooted. This is absolutely ordinary, since it is an important aspect of the necessary distinction at the level of Arab identity and personality at a juncture dominated by inquiry and self-misgiving, marred with feelings of shortfall, shame, and a secret sense of disgrace over what is being called the reality of the Arab nation.
Primarily, at this stage of history, the talk about an 'Arab nation' is tantamount to misleading one's self and others. Even the collective talk of 'We the Arabs' lacks the motive and basic element for strategic requirements needed to produce a tangible change, even if the expression is positively emotional.
It is a stage of change, in every nation, country, and structure at a time.
Who divided the Arabs; who drove a wedge between them; and who reduced them to mere marginality? Who conspired and colluded against them?
These recurring questions raised by every Arab citizen, be it a farmer, professor, businessman, or even leader, find an answer stemming from knowledge and perception. At the current stage, however, these questions neither relevant, nor primary.
What is primary, however, is the need to admit that change will not come to the region collectively, and that it is only possible via one State at a time.
For the war for establishing an identity and the right to self-determination is now being fought in separate battles throughout the different Arab States.
We are no longer in the era of waiting for a response from the Egyptian street or leadership, or other major Arab States, since Egypt is no longer in a position that would allow it to exert any actual or decisive influence, nor does it have a strategy for thinking except that of searching for 'frameworks' for solutions and upholding the language of mediation and mediating in the establishment of coalition or unity in the Arab World's hotspots.
It is a State of a past regional influence and a present engrossment in national priorities. It is incapable of dictating a change in the Israeli policy toward Palestine, as it did not and will not produce any radical change in Iraq, unless it decides to rise up to the occasion and become at the forefront of an Arab readiness to join the Arab drive by sending troops to replace the US occupying forces in Iraq.
What the Egyptian State can influence, however, is what is taking place within Egypt and how to deal with challenges, particularly those posed by the Islamists seeking power, and the changing of legislations and laws to fit their convictions.
One of the Islamists' gravest mistakes in the Arab region is their adoption of the dictatorship ideology that resembles those of oppressive regimes in the Arab region.
Such compulsion intimidated the ranks of moderates that oppose the regimes, arousing fears from the Islamic alternative to the regimes the moderates seek to change.
Hence, the Islamists lost a valuable opportunity for an alliance with the forces of democracy, who seek changes that include safeguarding the rights of Islamists themselves.
The forces of moderation have grown to realize that the Islamic alternative is more threatening than the oppressive current situation in many Arab States. They realized that the security crackdown is essentially temporary in nature, while oppression stemming from politicizing religion and from a sense of religious superiority and the exploitation of religion as a means to introduce constitutional and legislative changes is a permanent type of oppression that constitutes a deadly blow to democracies and civil rights.
Debating this issue, especially among Islamic extremists and those in favor of a civil society and civil laws, amounts to a waste of time. The debate might be more fruitful between Islamic extremists and other religiously devout Muslims, because in the event of an understanding being reached between the ranks of the religiously devout and the ranks of extremism, and the latter were able to protect and maintain rights and uphold laws instead of curtailing them, they might eventually mobilize the civil powers.
This is very much hoped for, since there is now a desperate need for the impetus of the forces of religious devoutness that can challenge and defy the tendencies of compulsion, diktat and oppression upheld by the Islamic extremist forces.
In reality, there is no place in this dialogue for the forces of moderation. There are those who believe that dialogue is the only means of reaching an understanding, but this is only true if denying the Other is totally ruled out.
Denying the Other should indeed be absolutely rejected. Furthermore, it is practically impossible to deny the Other. Yet, at this particular juncture, dialogue itself becomes impossibile, as each side only fights for itself.
This means that pragmatic and rational thinking calls for governments to reshuffle their cards, since the confrontation with the Islamic radicals has become the moderates' and the civil advocates' battle, and is no longer a battle between the Islamists and the authority.
This in turn, calls for forging an alliance between the authority and the ranks of moderation to fend off the tide of Islamic extremism. This proposal will certainly provoke objections, and will hopefully incite a deep reflection about available strategies.
Just as the forces of religious devoutness can impact the ranks of Islamic extremism, forces of moderation are expected to inspire the authority to induce the seriously needed, fundamental and radical reforms that safeguard and uphold the right to take part in the decision-making process. It should also establish permanent constitutions that protect against oppression and the stifling of freedoms.
Among the opportunities arising from such an approach is the opportunity to consolidate the structure of the State, as opposed to consolidating anti-State elements and militia members funded and backed by external forces, and which defy the authority of the State.
This column in the past two weeks carried a title that read: 'Either the State or the Militia'. The repetition is warranted since the healthy eventuality and destination of nations lies not in the domination of the militias, nor can it be realized by armies of a State within another State, but through upholding and consolidating the structure of the State.
The concept of the State necessarily entails firmness in exercising the authority of the State in all fields from education to security. When a State is born within a State, as in Lebanon's case now, for example, a party like Hezbollah formulates its own educational platform, hoists its own flag, and equips its militia and army with Iranian missiles supplied through Syria to serve its own objective, rather than nationally agreed-upon objectives.
Such a state of affairs represents dissidence and is an invitation for an uprising against the State as a State, and not against the government in power.
The question that now needs an answer is: what does Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, want? If he is for a State in Lebanon, then it is he who should return to the State and demand that the State honor its obligations to him through the State itself, and not against it and in defiance of it.
If, however, he wants it to continue existing as a State within a State, then his real target would be the destruction of the State of Lebanon, and to impose another regime in its place that might be an extension for Iran toward realizing ambitions for regional hegemony, or toward a Syrian pretext to evade key obligations.
Nasrallah may be playing a Narcissist role in which he sees himself as the leader of Arab aspirations to liberate Jerusalem; he may also be committing a historical blunder not only against Lebanon, but against the entire Lebanese Shiite population.
What is important is that under the leadership of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah is currently upholding the principle of denying the 'Other'. It refuses to return to dialogue, and either seeks domination and control of the sovereign will of the Lebanese State, and by doing so, to acquire all means of domination, or eliminating the State and the Lebanese 'Other' from the decision-making process. But to no avail.
It will not succeed because Hezbollah will eventually lose, whether victorious or not. It will fail because it will not be able to manage its 'victory' in its war with the people of Lebanon. In parallel, it will not be able to explain the 'defeat' to those idolizing it in the Arab and Islamic milieu.
What Lebanon is being dragged into calls on, not only the people of Lebanon, but also all the intellectual circles within the Arab World and in the US as well, to abandon the attempt to understand and rationalize the phenomenon of Resistance in terms of unrealistic and divergent perspectives. For the issue is very simple and consists of self-evident steps that begin with the instance on the Syrian demarcation of borders with Lebanon, so that we can find out whether the Shebaa Farms are a truly Lebanese or Syrian territory.
If it is established to be Lebanese territory, the State, along with Hassan Nasrallah, who is supposed to back the State with his enormous military capabilities as a pledge of allegiance, is required to lead a battle to liberate this occupied Lebanese territory.
If the Farms are established to be Syrian, Hezbollah, the Palestinian factions, Arab masses, and the Iranian regime can always mobilize resistance against Israel from the Syrian front, not only to liberate the Shebaa Farms, but also the occupied Golan Heights.
This means that it is time to stop paying lip service to the Arab masses and for these masses to stop buying sweet talk to lull the feelings of its incapacity, weakness, and indulgence in blaming others, particularly the US, for its failures.
While the US's mistakes in the region are sizeable, and the intentions lack honesty, the Americans have never claimed to be stricken by love and affection for the Arabs.
Therefore, it is still unclear why the Arabs continue to chide the US into a love-hate relationship.
Russia, as well as China, is a nation that is not motivated by its affection for the Arab region or Iran, as it is a country that forges alliances and seeks to maintain its interests.
Russia and China's relationship with Iran is an oil and strategy relation, as Arabs have marginalized themselves internationally and strategically by not expediently employing their resources and capabilities. Instead, they yielded to imported security from abroad, squandering wealth and generations.
There might be an opportunity for them in the US' yearning for an exit out of Iraq that does not come in the form a mounting death toll, without incurring a loss or defeat, and still maintaining bases in Iraq and in the Gulf.
George W. Bush is not keen on adopting proposals to embrace neither Iran as the lifeline for an exit from Iraq, nor Syria as a means to facilitate an honorable US exit. Therefore, major Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt must come up with alternative approaches to those made by the US neo-pragmatists to prepare an effective and concrete contribution in Iraq in the form of troops, funds, and political and religious influence. For today, Iraq has become an Arab responsibility, regardless of the fact that it was a victim of American mistakes and Iranian ambitions.
Iran seeks to use Iraq as ammunition for its hatred against the US as it exploits and extorts the Palestinian Cause only to emphasize the Arab weakness, since it does not furnish the Palestinians under occupation with any means of peaceful salvation from the occupation, nor with the means to fight and vanquish the occupation.
Iran does not hide its exploitation of Hezbollah to destabilize Lebanon for sabotaging ends and to protect its Syrian ally from the International Tribunal that will try those behind the political assassinations in Lebanon.
How, then, can Iran be dealt with from an Arab, not an American, perspective? This is a question directed to Arab scholars, to contemplate the means for strategically responding to the Iranian strategy that seeks hegemony over the region, which is to be achieved through a foreign partnership with Israel and the demeaning of the Arabs.
The answer, however, does not lie in the Arabs' choice between Israel or Iran, since this carries a great deal of self-contempt and abysmal deterioration.
The answer lies in the courage to embark on non-conventional alternatives, like refusing to bow to intimidation and salvaging some self-confidence and the ability of self-determination and the defining of a unique identity.
The model of the Islamic Republic of Iran was never an inspiring model that appealed to Arab youths. The rulers or Iran, just like the Jihadist destroyers, have never come up with peaceful or military solutions to the Palestinian Cause, but only sought to hijack it as a vessel for Arab sentiments.
They also hijacked Iraq, and dominated it following the US invasion and the occupation of Iraq. They are using it to achieve their regional hegemony.
A small degree of an Arab awareness is warranted. A small degree of self-confidence, despite the Arabs' mistakes, committed by the masses or the governments is also warranted. Salvation does not lie in slipping further into the Iranian fold, nor into the fold of Islamic extremism. It lies in the courage to diagnose the disease and embark on a new kind of dialogue.
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