The Possible Settlement of the Sahara Problem
Mohamed Ashab Al-Hayat - 07/12/06//
The saying, 'something is better than nothing' applies to the Saharans in terms of their reaction to the self-rule proposal called for by the Moroccan capital, Rabat, as an alternative to the continuation of a conflict that has gone on for too long, and which has negatively impacted the Moroccan march toward construction, as well as Algerian-Moroccan relations.
The West Saharan conflict has also become linked with the existence of refugees that, on the surface at least, represent an economic, political, and social burden on the country that has been accommodating them for over 30 years, even if it does not openly state it and consider it a commitment of principle.
Therefore, perhaps the most important aspect of the proposed formula is that it addresses the balance among roles and interests toward placing the Sahara under the Saharan self-rule, and acceding to the rules agreed on by all concerned parties.
For indeed, if this were the most prominent of the mutual benefits, hoped to dissipate the heavy clouds that conceal the essence of the conflict and its backgrounds; the North African region represents a precedent in openness to modern systems of identifying and consolidating native characteristics, and jurisdictions among provinces and population centers. The same trend may be seen in advanced models that enabled European countries to make the leap into the advanced nation class, by consolidating the systems of self-rule in Spain, Italy, Germany and others.
As a matter of fact, the French were able to arrive at the best and most plausible formulas to deal with the affairs of Alsace and Lorraine, in the same way the Spanish dealt with Andalusia and the Las Palmas islands. Remarkably, the Spanish have also not neglected the needs of the Basques, who are adamant on preserving their cultural characteristics and upholding their utopian visions.
The European's ability to find shortcuts to the most effective methods of realizing the objectives of development and unity does not, however, have an equivalent awareness on the southern side of the Mediterranean, despite this region's insistence on catching up with the European bandwagon.
History can testify to the fact that the Maghreb States were frontrunners in searching for the roots of unity and means of achieving power since the 1950s. These States were not successful, however, in fending off the threats of disintegration and isolationism. The ongoing Sahara conflict is still is only one aspect of these threats which carry with them a costly price. Accordingly, any attempt to abort the march toward unity would reveal the intentions that could jeopardize the future.
The self-rule proposed by Morocco may not meet all the conditions hypothetically laid down by the Polisario Front in an attempt to arrive at an acceptable concept of the issue of self-determination.
The mere fact, however, that there is a fostering of dialogue among the Saharans on their prospective endeavors, tendencies, and ideological and political attributes indicates an enablement of this segment of the population toward exercising its rights to democratic choice, by listening to them, their criticism, and their demands.
Thus, the Polisario should not miss this particular train, because it represents their last chance to secure the international community's support. The Polisario should also seize the opportunity to grant its affiliates the right to self-determination.
The democratic nature of the Saharans debate of their Cause cannot, at any rate, be overshadowed by the fact that some of them seek self determination and independence. This is not because relevant UN Security Council Resolutions have rejected previous proposals that have been proven ineffective in finding a permanent and acceptable solution acceptable to all parties' concerns, but also because the foundations and principles of self-determination are being violated by being tied to independence under an established set of circumstances in which the masses have no say in.
The horizons, revealed by the prospects of self rule that have acceded to the right of the native population - which represents a majority according to the census of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) - to assess legal, political, and administrative existing circumstances, point to an inclination to transform the Sahara Cause from a regional crisis into a democratic process in line with the universal drive to consolidate the concept of the democratic resolution of problems and conflicts.
A deeper aspect of the current self rule formula which stems - at least as far as Rabat is concerned - from the full comprehension of the concept of political settlement called for by the UN Security Council in its recent resolutions, is that this formula has emanated from the side that won the war in times when the language of weapons was the most dominant during the Cold War era.
Such military victory granted the victor the right to decide on what was to be implemented. However, Rabat's opting for the methodology of dialogue with the native population may be considered as a message to the other parties in the conflict. That is to say, Rabat does not seek to impose any settlement not accepted by the local population, a stance identical to that of the UN Security Council, which also said it does not seek to impose any settlement that does not enjoy the acceptance of the concerned parties, and which is to be reached through open-agenda negotiations that exclude prejudice and prerequisites.
Negotiations, however, require the establishment of some common grounds, and this was borne in mind of key UN Security Council member States, the US and France, which urged Rabat to accelerate the submission of the self-rule plan.
This may be the first time that the inhabitants of West Sahara are to play any significant role in reaching a settlement that takes into account the fact that members of the same family or the same plan can always seek common shelter against the perils of dispersion and Balkanization.
The only thing that rivals the monumental nature of the responsibilities now on the shoulders of the Saharans is the extent of support they are expected to receive from principal partners in the stake for democracy in the region.
In this context, Moroccan King Muhammad VI has warned against more serious dangers to peace, security and stability in the North African region and the Sahel-Saharan countries by arguing that planting an illusionary entity will only lead to trouble, and will call on the UN at some point along the way to make a choice between stability and chaos.
King Muhammad's call suggests that that the international organization is better off searching for real partners to accomplish the mission that was the reason for wasting so much of the region's energy in conflicts that increased the rift between their European partners across the sea and that led to further errors.
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