Berri, Jumblatt and Barak's "Phantom"
Zuheir Kseibati Al-Hayat - 27/11/08//
None of the Lebanese parties, especially inside March 8 and March 14, may jump to embracing the claim that the Doha Accord has been shaken as a new title for the new phase, a period of elections par excellence…at least on the surface. The renewed debate which goes beyond the enmity between the two "camps" and revives the war of words between the "partners" in the accord will serve no purpose other than exhausting the momentum of the calm, even if the grand purpose was letting the parliamentary elections in the spring of 2009 pass.
The "spring" of the Doha Accord is seemingly on the verge of a very hot winter. According to some sides concerned with maintaining the calm, this will exceed the narrow electoral calculations to reach regional and international variables that have accelerated after the American presidential elections which had previously forced all sides in the region to wait.
Despite the piling evidence that certain parties are no longer convinced of the possibility of extending the calm to coexist with the Lebanese dialogue table and its necessities, anxiety is once again building rapidly over the end of the regional phase of waiting, a phase whose end will be accomplished or attempted by having the Lebanese sides review their positions before adapting to some "major event" that is yet to come.
The "event" before the international tribunal and its initiation is in a race with the elections, making it the center of questions. Hence, what were "tabooed" whispers are now raised as serious possibilities. The same possibility raises anxiety over security shocks and repercussions. When the concerned parties are asked about how serious the threat of returning assassinations is or whether such warning is simply related to the Lebanese elections, the responses are not assuring as they allude to "surprises" or a regional dimension of the event.
Between the Lebanese interior and the regional-international dimensions on the outside, it once again becomes clear that the Doha Accord cannot hold on its own without the capacity of the parties to the national unity government to anticipate the consequences of any erroneous or misleading reading of the post-waiting period. The UNIFIL presence in South Lebanon cannot on its own ensure the complete implementation of Resolution 1701 or at least protect whatever has been implemented. The Accord does not guarantee the spring of Lebanese elections if the exchanged charges and accusation campaigns are renewed, nor will the resolution which Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak loathes prevent any plans to strike Lebanon at the core, including the state which Barak believes to be sponsoring Hezbollah's program.
In a quick analysis, when Speaker Nabih Berri says that Israel may be targeting the conciliation attempts among the Lebanese and warns of the consequences of undermining the waiting period on the domestic level "until the white thread can be distinguished from the thread of the black day"…and when Deputy Walid Jumblatt recommends caution because March 14 is in danger and Barack Obama's administration will give up on the diplomacy of engaging Damascus; and when Hezbollah warns against what it considers possible Israeli calculations that intersect with Lebanese elections, informed Lebanese circles conclude that the current stage is one of renewing regional lines. They also realize that the warning by the chief of the Democratic Gathering suggests that the elections are unlikely which also coincides with the position of former President Amine Gemayel on the Taif Accord, a position that seems to have confused the March 14 forces.
Perhaps a few Lebanese still remember the "negative" attitude that March 8 was accused of before the Doha Accord. The question is whether the confusion which satisfies MP Michel Aoun is simply a passing error or an attempt to attract Christian voters, even if this comes at the expense of March 14 unity.
Even farther, and going beyond the concern of Israeli Defense Minister with the outcomes of the Lebanese elections - if held - Barak is pushing harder and expressing his displeasure with what he believes to be Hezbollah's growing missile arsenal. Perhaps the minister believes that his party will win the Israeli elections if he avenges the July 2006 war. Apparently, the price of revenge will not destroy Lebanon without a corresponding price, and Barak is certainly aware of that, but what raises more concern is the fact that Ehud Olmert, in his last days in power, is trying to end the American veto on the scenario of an Israeli military strike against nuclear Iran. Even if the former's intentions to "neutralize" Syria in the event of a confrontation were true and the last barrier facing Barak's Phantom planes was removed, this leaves the more likely probability of a hot winter in the transitional gray phase in Washington.
The war of reshuffling the map of defiant players in Lebanon may be the first battlefield, especially if the Obama administration rushes to activate the recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton commission to end the engagement with Damascus and break the link between Syria and Iran. The only opposite to all this is if the noise made by Israel's Barak is nothing but electoral dreams and the promises of the American Barack for Israeli security are nothing but lies…and this is what no one will believe.
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