Lebanon and the Two Tracks
Zuheir Kseibati Al-Hayat - 05/09/08//
The French branding of the next round of indirect Syrian-Israeli negotiations, sponsored by the Turkish godfather, that it will be conclusive after reaching the minute details of border issues does not bode with warning by Syrian President Bashar Assad that Israel may wage a war against Iran that may reach Lebanon and perhaps even Syria, unless one were to believe that this war, in its last chapter, will include a response from Minister Ehud Barak for Damascus's rejection of some final settlement over the Golan Heights.
It is more realistic to consider the Iranian confusion and obsession about how far Damascus will go through the gate of discussions which will probably transform into direct negotiations that will be co-sponsored by the Arab godfather with its non-Arab (French) partner who has received delegation from the Republicans in the US for the transitional period in which the American is preoccupied with domestic issues in preparation for the presidential elections.
Perhaps even more realistic is the assessment by a few Europeans who warn about a devastating war which Barak is said to be preparing against Lebanon under a banner that does not distinguish between Hezbollah and the government which has endorsed its political program. The actual translation of this possibility will mean, as the likelihood of the Israeli scenarios can be understood, a renewed but different attempt to neutralize Hezbollah's power before striking Iran's nuclear facilities. This would be rather than starting with Iran and risking the price of revenge which Hezbollah explicitly warned about (with 11,000 missiles ready to be launched).
Hence, the new Syrian track with Israel and the military track with Tehran - or at least with Hezbollah and its state as dubbed by Olmert's government - constitute two flanks through which pressure is imposed on Iran which is confused and uncertain about the effective ability of its alliance with Damascus, not to prevent any war against it, but to distribute potential roles in case it decided to seek revenge, and to stir the Lebanese scene if it decided to throw the entire region into confusion and to implicate all sides.
Naturally, Paris cannot prevent any strike against Syria or Lebanon, but the same applies to Ankara which today participates in the French-Syrian-Qatari-Turkish summit in Damascus and continues to seek a regional role, the need for which is recognized by the US and France to limit Iran's ability to play with the various cards of the region.
What worries Iran is the suffocating isolation while the Frenchman relieves Damascus of its own isolation, regardless of the excuses he gives to justify his rushing to the Syrian gate in search of private interests. Clearly, the Iranians do not trust the intentions of President Nicholas Sarkozy whenever he speaks about testing positive response in Damascus, starting with the calming of Lebanon's crises. To illustrate, a renewed old hypothetical question must be asked: what if the Syrian-Israeli negotiations succeeded and Damascus announced normalization with the Jewish State? What will be the fate of its alliance with Tehran? In fact, how will Khamenei and Ahmedinejad justify that normalization when the latter continuously insists on wiping Israel out and continuously expresses his compassion for Lebanon?
The question is raised again on the eve of the decisive round of indirect dialogue between Syria and Israel, especially as Iran does not seem to have found answers for its confusion and anxiety about the possibility of standing alone in a war whose consequences the Bush administration and the Jewish state have repeatedly warned about. That anxiety probably includes Hezbollah as well, since Iran may not be able to rely on Hezbollah's activation of its war front, especially if it joined the Lebanese dialogue table to the positive end, thus conclusively deciding on a Lebanese strategy.
Assuming that one of the goals of responding to Damascus's call for and hosting a quartet summit today was to dig more trenches along the peace front with Israel, hence again shaking the Syrian-Iranian alliance and reminding Hezbollah that the Syrian ally is going all the way toward the choice that leaves no need for arms or for the propositions and continuity of the resistance…none of this cancels the need to define Lebanon's positions within the priorities of this summit.
The need for Lebanon as a battlefield is still on the regional and international waiting lists. This conviction may be concealed by a few politicians who do not explicitly recommend having modest hopes for a French role that may save the country from its crises, especially from a devastating Israeli war or small sectarian wars, or even from the exaggerated reliance on ready-made solutions coming from abroad.
When asked about the position of the country at the quartet summit, a Lebanese political source is surprised that anyone believed Lebanon was on the French political priorities during the era of Sarkozy who aspires for a bigger role as he heads the European Union while events force him to embrace more modest ambitions.
When a French source says that the Lebanese parliamentary elections next spring will be the basic criterion for testing Syrian positive attitude, this does not cancel the anxiety of the Lebanese not only over the fate of the elections, but also over the fate of a country whose stay on the waiting list gets longer every time it is taken hostage by the winds of foreign interventions.
Between the rushing of a godfather and the concern of an ally, how anxious should the Lebanese be?
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