Washington and Russia's Display of Power
Elias Harfoush Al Hayat - 18/08/08//
"I don't see any prospect for the use of military force by the United States in this situation. Is that clear enough?" That was the "clarity" with which US Defense Secretary Robert Gates commented on questions about the odds of a military confrontation between Russia and the US over the events in Georgia. Adding even more clarity, President George Bush certified that the United States seeks good relations with Russia and does not wish to return to the Cold War era. However, Bush announced his position while at the same time accusing Russia of "terrorizing" the Georgians and damaging its international standing with its military intervention in Georgia.
Secretary Gates' comment aroused surprise in western capitals, where it was considered tantamount to an invitation to Moscow's leaders, and perhaps to others, to take their ease in areas within reach of their artillery, without fear of any US military response. However, Gates' comments represent a realistic expression of the Bush administration's view of this conflict and of how to deal with it. It takes into consideration other areas of conflict which exceed, in strategic terms, the importance that Washington gives to the conflict over a province in the Caucasus which, a week ago, required a detailed map of the world for its location to be determined.
America's role in the recent Georgian crisis is an example of what the US can do when it must take into consideration the need to satisfy its allies, or those it has taken under its wing, and at the same time avoid harming the interests of its rivals, as long as it needs them. The Bush administration's Secretary of State took an entire week to arrive in Tblisi and check up on her ally, Mikheil Saakashvili. One week was sufficient for Russia's leaders to teach the Georgian president a lesson and return South Ossetia and Abkhazia to the strategic situation that Moscow has always wanted, namely that of complete separation from Georgia, and of eligibility to once again join the Russian Federation. As if to reaffirm the role of "observer" played by Washington, Rice brought along the draft agreement reached by French President Nicolas Sarkozy with both sides of the conflict. Such a settlement represents a compromise, and Rice has been pressuring Saakashvili to sign it. The other role played by the Bush administration was that of a humanitarian organization, rushing to send food and medical supplies to disaster areas. However, this time the supplies were brought aboard US warplanes.
Washington is observing the crisis in the Caucasus while keeping an eye on international crises that are more acute and more important vis-à-vis its interests, most prominently of course the crisis with Iran. In this kind of situation, it is difficult to imagine that Washington will risk losing Russia's support on resolutions over sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council, to support the Georgian president's reckless military move. After all, the Americans themselves had pledged to the Kremlin that their ally would not do such a thing. One can thus imagine the extent of American concern regarding Saakashvili's attempt to divert the world's attention away from a crisis that has become a source of great economic and security concern in the Gulf and in the Middle East in general, namely the Iranian crisis, and towards an issue that is considered local by every measure, and that does not affect the international balance of power. Furthermore, the crisis that Saakashvili has brought upon himself, and on western powers along with him, has allowed Moscow to once again display its military power in a region where there had been no need for such an exercise, as no one is ready to enter into a confrontation with Moscow over it.
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