Musharraf's Head to Stop the War on Terror
Abdullah Iskandar Al-Hayat - 11/08/08//
Numbers have nothing to do with the measures undertaken by the Pakistani coalition government to dismiss President Pervez Musharraf. Even though the constitution provides for the potential dismissal of the president with the approval of two thirds of senators and MPs; even though former prime minister and crucial member of the coalition government, Nawaz Sharif, is exceptionally intent on taking his revenge on the president who dismissed and imprisoned him in 1999 then sent him to exile; even though the constitution bestows upon the president an honorary position more than that of a leader, the current president and former army commander reflects all the current elements of the Pakistani rift. Accordingly, the dismissal measures become a trial of forces that does not only involve the coalition government but also all of the civil, military, and security Pakistani parties and institutions.
The issue goes beyond numbers in the legislature that came to power after Musharraf's defeat in the recent elections. It also goes beyond the accusation that the winner levels at the president, claiming his presidential mandate is unconstitutional. The results of these measures are therefore hard to predict, since this matter exceeds the constitutional scope and involves the country's overall balance.
If Musharraf's supporters warn from a potential catastrophe that will befall the country in light of such government steps, there are fears of a lengthy trial of forces and conflicts, as long as the army, the "mother institution" that guarantees stability, has not taken a specific stance yet.
The ruling coalition groups forces that allied themselves with the government without really sharing a unified political vision. It includes the secular, liberal, Islamic, and tribal trends in addition to the voters influenced by the military and security establishment. In the background of elections and democratic process lurk fundamentalist movements and groups that operate inside Pakistan and on its borders with Afghanistan. Some wage a direct war on the regime and threaten to spill Musharraf's blood - particularly after the invasion of the 'Red Mosque,' while others fight the armed forces on a daily basis in the tribal areas where regional demands mix with the hard-line fundamentalist stances, and where the trans-border cards with Afghanistan are reshuffled and bases for Taliban and Al Qaeda are re-established.
Cards were reshuffled too in Kashmir, where tensions were renewed with India after Musharraf sought a peaceful solution there. Explosions rocking India are on the increase and are blamed on fundamentalist groups with ties to the Pakistani military intelligence services. The bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul has apparently constituted a turning point in the Pakistani crisis, after Afghanistan, India and the US directly accused Pakistani intelligence services of having a hand in these bombings in cooperation with extremist groups active on the Pakistani-Afghan borders.
Such a role becomes more questionable when linked to the difficulties the Western coalition in Afghanistan and the Islamabad government face in dealing with Pakistan's fundamentalists. Equally questionable are the Pakistani role in the war on terrorism and the dismissal of Musharraf who engaged his country in this war in both its Afghan and Pakistani aspects. This is not to mention the military efforts to fight fundamentalists and the security attempts to track them down, capture them, and deliver them to the Americans.
Musharraf's policy in the war on terror may be behind his waning popularity at home. When he resorted to unconstitutional methods to keep Pakistan engaged in the war on terror and tighten his grip on power, he deepened the gap with his voters. The time has perhaps come for the security establishment to restore the lost relations between the power and the state by disengaging Pakistan from the war on terror. The price is Musharraf's head.
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