For Whom Will the Christians of the Metn Vote?
Hazem Saghieh Al-Hayat - 02/08/07//
There might be dozens of reservations about Amin Gemayel on the part of many people from the Metn, and even more Lebanese. Certainly, the language of "this parliamentary seat belongs to our family" is pretty poor stuff; it is also the kind of village-based attitude that makes others nauseous.
Nonetheless, Sunday's by-election in Metn is a special affair; its impact transcends the district's geographical borders. The election is taking place after the assassination of MP Pierre Gemayel, Amin's son, to fill this vacant seat. This means that voting for a candidate who follows Gemayel's path, whether or not it is the father, represents a rejection of the assassination and the "policy" of murder. Logically, it follows that a defeat for this political path means accepting murder and trying to control Lebanon through car bombs and guns.
However, do the majority of Christian voters in Metn support this "option"?
This is a key election, not just because it's taking place due to a political assassination, but also because the Metn has a special social, political and educational standing (the president of the Republic is also from this region). Thus, voting in this district does not represent the wishes of marginal Christians, but expresses the feeling in one of their decision-making centers, and this center is divided at a time in which Lebanon is facing truly frightening scenarios.
Voting that provides absolution for murder is dangerous, in this sense, as it will come from the majority of Christians, among whom many are influential and active. They will be saying that their priority is something other than responding to murder and "the policy" of murder. What is this other thing that they would be voting for?
Answering this question are the speeches and statements of Michel Aoun, linking his opponents to Qoraitem, i.e. Saad al-Hariri, after a connected campaign against Lebanese Sunnis and their striving for the "Islamicization" of Lebanon.
The Aounist line is not content with changing priorities in a suspicious way, but chooses hatred as an entry-point to "politics" and antagonism as the best form of expressing this. First of all, this springs from the victory of communitarian and sectarian awareness among pro-Aoun Christians, over any possibility of a uniting patriotism. When no consideration is given to the "political Lebanization" that has affected the Sunni community, the most recent sign of which being the sect's stance on the Lebanese Army, Christians prefer to "remain alone, even if wrong," to "standing with others and being right." Instead of welcoming a change such as this, one that brings the Sunnis close to the traditional Christian position, we end up seeing an affirmation of the Christian monopolization of this position, while others are prevented from exercising it. This behavior leads to seeing Lebanese patriotism-nationalism either remaining a sectarian good, with exclusive ownership, or not existing at all.
This stance passes over the fact that what unites the Future Movement goes beyond accepting a sole Lebanese state apparatus and the state's monopoly on force; it includes a wide vision of regional and strategic matters with which Lebanon is concerned, through its links, in terms of the economy, services and job opportunities, with the Arab world, and particularly the Gulf. Moreover, the Christian and Sunni elites share an acceptance of a degree of modernity in the public and private realms, which might not be sufficient, but are necessary to guarantee a separation between public and private life, on the one hand, and the resorting to religion and fatwas, on the other.
One might disagree by saying salafist and jihadist Sunni movements are a danger to Christians, and that some of these elements occupy the rear lines of the Future Movement. While this might be relatively true, it does not do away with the fact that these groups have no leading role in their community. Cornering them will only be achieved by opening up to the majority Sunni current, which is not salafist or jihadist. In fact, laying siege to the Sunnis will only lead to weakening moderate Sunnis and strengthening the other elements; these elements will rule over their sect in the way that Hizbullah does among the Shiites.
This, in turn, means that the memorandum of understanding between Aoun and Hizbullah serves as evidence of Aoun's non-sectarianism only in
as much as it serves as evidence of the non-sectarianism of Hizbullah. Here, we confront two radical and antagonistic visions, which cancel each other out. The only thing that unites them is delusion on the part of Aoun, and the above-mentioned strategy of Hizbullah: is it reasonable that a group whose horizons are restricted to a few villages in Mount Lebanon can dominate the "understanding" of a force that is part of a project stretching from Gaza to Tehran, with Damascus, as usual, serving as its "beating heart"?
If Christians go to the polls on Sunday in Metn, they will be voting on their image of themselves, their awareness, and their future in this region, before anything else.
|
