Israel and Hezbollah Are 'Losers' in an Incomplete War!
Raghida Dergham Al-Hayat - 22/08/06//
New York - The war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon is not over yet. This is just a temporary, not permanent, phase of ceasefire. Thus, all the talk about the victory of any party is just propaganda, and is premature. What may be said now is that there are two losers in this war, if it is in fact complete, but if it resumes it will make Lebanon the big loser, because the war will double the devastation of Lebanon and its people. The road to ceasefire and permanent solutions are clear to the direct belligerents and the sponsoring parties, the foremost of which are the US, Iran and Syria. However, there is also a burden on the Lebanese government, as well as the international community, because there is no room at this juncture to escape or disregard commitments. The implementation of Resolution 1701 is the key to victory for all players if it is implemented with courage and transparency so as to make use of the available opportunities in this Resolution. The alternative, however, is an Israeli war on Lebanon - not only on Hezbollah, as the Israelis threaten. This will result in the victory of Iran, Israel and Syria over the dead bodies of the Lebanese.
There is no victor in this war so far, because victory is supposed to defeat another party to the degree of subjugation. Neither Israel nor Hezbollah has subjugated each other. Hostilities have ceased because both needed salvation. This means that both of them are losers in an incomplete war.
Israel is a big loser, because this war exposed it and depicted it as a weak country begging the international community to rescue it from the pawns of an organization. Most important, Israel did not dare go to war with Iran, which provided Hezbollah with missiles and funds, or with Syria, which facilitated Hezbollah's access to the missiles and weapons. Israel lost because this war exposed its cowardice and fear of opening war fronts with the countries sponsoring Hezbollah's war, even though it challenges them explicitly.
Some consider the description of the situation as 'raring to go', referring to potential surprises, different from what happened in the first round of the war, if resumed. These people believe that the deduction that Syria would be exempt from accountability and confrontation is completely erroneous, as there are influential bodies in the US which are trying to push Israel into resolving the issue militarily with Syria, as it is the weakest link politically and militarily.
The lessons of this war are many. Israel should give up policies that are abysmal and devastating for it and the region. Its threats to wage war on Lebanon - rather than what it called the war on Hezbollah in Lebanon - prove that it flexes its muscles at the weak when it is unable to confront the strong or afraid to open several fronts.
Intransigence of the Israeli government with regard to the Shebaa Farms has blinded it. It is now completely rejecting the proposals of Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, in the Lebanese Seven-point
Plan, which was met with unanimity. This plan provides for Israel's withdrawal from the Shebaa Farms to put them under the auspices of the UN, pending demarcating the borders between Syria and Lebanon and determining whether they are Lebanese or Syrian.
Israel refuses on the grounds that the waiver in Shebaa is a reward for Hezbollah and sends a wrong message to Iran and Syria. This proposal is extremely unwise and myopic, and requires challenging the US administration and the UN.
The refusal to respond to Siniora's plan actually means that Israel wants to strengthen the position of Hezbollah, which justifies resistance since Israel still occupies the Shebaa Farms. As for its argument that the question of the Shebaa Farms is a Lebanese-Syrian issue that can be settled by demarcating borders between the two countries, Israel intentionally gives Syria a 'veto' right and authority to manipulate Lebanon, as it can continue to reject the demarcation of borders in order to keep the Shebaa Farms as a 'pretext' for the continuation of resistance.
Even if this war ended in clarifying Lebanon's ownership of Shebaa Farms and an Israeli withdrawal from the area, this will not be a victory for Hezbollah, as it is also a loser in this war. This is because the Shebaa Farms is just a pretext fabricated by Syria, which refused to hand over documents and maps to prove Lebanon's ownership. Damascus may discover, after Israel withdrawals, that the maps and documents prove that the Farms are in fact Syrian. Then, Hezbollah would discover that it launched a war that destroyed the infrastructure of Lebanon, displaced over one million and killed more than 1000 people (half of them children), for the liberation of the Syrian Sheba. Even if the Farms are Lebanese, the price was very exorbitant.
Hezbollah is also a loser, because this war has shown its willingness to sacrifice Lebanon and its people for bankrupt Arab-Islamic readiness for resistance. There is no such readiness. Had there really been an urgent Arab desire for resistance, volunteers would have been rallied on the Syrian-Israeli border and they would have called on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to open the Syrian-Israeli front for resistance, which he likes to place above the State, but only when it applies to Lebanon.
If the resistance is not in need of 'permission from the State', according to al-Assad, then there is no need to ask his permission in his country. So peoples can head for Syria and cross its borders, because they do not need to ask 'permission' from al-Assad and his government. Here we will see the view of the Syrian President in the role of the Arab 'resistance' in his country without the permission of the Syrian State or government.
President Bashar al-Assad is confident that the Arab peoples cannot be included in the resistance ranks. He also knows well that his military establishment is weak and completely incapable of going to war and resisting. As for the 'victories' that the Syrian President alleges Hezbollah has achieved, they expose Syria's incompetence, no more.
The exaggerations made by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Syrian counterpart Bashar al-Assad, and the leader of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah were mixed with flavors of exploitation and threat, not to Israel, but rather to Lebanon. Al-Assad attacked the figures of the March 14 Forces, which is considered another violation of Resolution 1559, which asked him to desist from interfering in Lebanese affairs. Moreover, his threats to witnesses interrogated in the investigations into Rafiq al-Hariri's assassination would definitely result in accountability.
The two regimes in Iran and Syria may be in the forefront of those who seek to spoil Resolution 1701, since the cessation of hostilities in Lebanon does not satisfy them, and because they consider that a permanent ceasefire in the region would spoil their project in the region. The other reason for their opposition to the Resolution is the fact that it calls on them in particular to comply with it.
Paragraph 15 of Resolution 1701 is similar to Chapter 7 of the UN Charter as per which the Security Council 'decides' that all States should take measures to prevent "the sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related materiel of all types", as well as "any technical training or assistance", except for what is authorized by the government of Lebanon or by the UNIFIL.
Also, paragraph 14 "calls upon the government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel". Paragraph 11 "assists the government of Lebanon, at its request, to implement Paragraph 14".
It delights some to interpret the phrase 'at its request' as if the whole matter is left to the Lebanese government without accountability or control of the international community. Of course, this is not true. The phrase is meant to respect the sovereignty of the Lebanese government as a means of supporting this sovereignty, but it does not absolutely mean that the Lebanese government is free to determine whether to implement the Resolution or not, or that it will not be brought to account. This is the Security Council's decision. When talking about the military embargo, it uses the term 'decides', which is generally used under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The same is applied to the 'disarmament' of Hezbollah. Resolution 1701 does not leave the matter to Siniora's government or to himself, but it simply gives him the opportunity to guarantee Hezbollah's co-operation to disarm, upon a pre-consent from Hezbollah and before it backtracks on supporting the government's plan.
Currently, Siniora's government gives a time off to redress the issue of Hezbollah's arms with political means, realizing the results of confronting it by force, and admitting that neither the Lebanese army nor the international force could disarm Hezbollah by the force of arms. This, however, does not mean that there is international readiness to accept the notion of Hezbollah's withholding of its arms. The fact is that Israel is using the period of time available as an opportunity for a political treatment of Hezbollah's arms issue as a means to re-equip itself militarily to wage a war that it will not lose. Israeli officials say in closed-door forums that the response to the failure of the Lebanese government and the international community to disarm Hezbollah will be on Lebanon, the sense that it will be a war against Lebanon and not a mere war on Hezbollah.
This Israeli government will not take revenge on Iran or Syria because of their roles in enabling Hezbollah militarily, but rather it wants to rely on the international community and international forces to secure the Lebanese border with the Lebanese army to prevent the flow of weapons and materiel to Hezbollah. It believes that the isolation of Syria by the international community is an effective tool. It also thinks that Syria can be deprived of the reward by containing it diplomatically and involving it in the circle of negotiations and talks. As for Iran, it is outside the circle of retaliation and confrontation of the Ehud Olmert-led Israeli government.
This does not mean that there is a cause for satisfaction in Damascus and Tehran, particularly as there are signs indicating that Olmert's government would be overthrown to be succeeded by a violent figure like Benjamin Netanyahu to lead the country during the next stage. If the Olmert's government is weeping, lamenting and avoiding firmness and decisiveness, Netanyahu's government would opt for war.
Now, the Israeli government is putting all its eggs in one basket of the implementation of Resolution 1701, as if it suddenly realized the importance of the international community. In fact, it has concluded that dismantling Hezbollah is a task that it could not carry out through the war it waged on Hezbollah in Lebanon, and that no choice other than a conventional war between the two countries - Lebanon and Israel - in case Hezbollah refuses to disarm.
There is a significant common denominator between Hezbollah and Israel. Both use the Lebanese government to justify their options and stances. Hezbollah holds the government responsible for its insistence on disarmament using direct threat. Israel also holds it responsible for the consequences of its inability to reach an understanding with Hezbollah to disarm.
Both sacrifice Lebanon and its people, and make it a ransom and price for their strategic ambitions and their failure to achieve a definite victory in their wretched war.
Both are intending to overthrow Fouad Siniora's government, each in its own way, purpose and well studied calculations or miscalculations. The interests of Iran and Syria require the achievement of the goal of overthrowing Siniora and his government. The responsibility of George W. Bush and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan requires forestalling the common goal between Damascus and Tehran and between Israel and Hezbollah.
This requires enabling Siniora's government with more than passing resolutions, dispatching international forces, raising funds, and commitments of rebuilding Lebanon, despite the importance of these stances and measures. The matter requires that the US administration inform Israel that its arrogant and dictating acts do not suit it, as it is the country that failed to make war or peace: it has not won the war with Hezbollah and, at the same time, it fears a weak country like Syria. Accordingly, Washington has a rare opportunity to dictate Israel for the sake of US national, as well as Israeli, interests in the end.
Resolution 1701 has many life jackets for many that are drowning, including Israel and Hezbollah. It also authorizes UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to work with the parties toward permanent solutions. The Israeli intransigence in refusing to deal with the Shebaa Farms issue requires that Washington take a firm position and stop Israel from considering its occupation as a right. The cost of withdrawal from the Shebaa Farms is less than the cost of insisting on remaining in it strategically, practically, regionally and internationally.
The Shebaa Farms have become a banner raised by Hezbollah to move Arab and Islamic emotions to back the Resistance and to belittle Israel and its military prestige in the face of the Resistance. Israel's retention of the Shebaa Farms will make Hassan Nasrallah a great protagonist in the minds of the Arab and Islamic masses. This is because the liberation of Shebaa will turn into a cry of anger and hatred and a means of mobilization against the US and Israel: a determination to conquer and force them to retreat. It should not take much consideration to lead the US administration into putting pressure on the Israeli government to realize the urgent need for new policies regarding the Shebaa Farms and Palestine, especially the Palestinian Authority.
Otherwise, disaster will befall Lebanon. Disaster in Palestine will remain in the foreground. Syria may not survive the disaster. Hezbollah will certainly be a devastating part of the disaster that will befall Lebanon. Iran may be the only 'victor' in the end. Hezbollah may receive a 'thank you' note in Persian for destroying Lebanon.
|
