A Feast in Baghdad
Zuheir Kseibati Al-Hayat - 04/07/08//
It had never occurred to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas that Iraqi President Jalal Talabani would walk the path of normalization with Israel when he encouraged Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak to shake hands with him at the Socialist International Congress. Just as it was natural for Barak to remember the dream of normalization with Israel's neighbors, and to desire it with Baghdad, the Kurdish leader did not forget that he holds the position of Iraq's head of state, and that such a handshake would have to be justified as "social behavior".
This, however, is not the dilemma that preoccupies Baghdad today. Whereas rejecting the "suspicion" of collaborating with Israel has become part of the collective subconscious of Iraqi Kurds, they are ready to use it as an asset when justified by peace in the region, as it would no longer be "taboo".
Far from Barak's dream, Talabani is able to claim success in seeing the light at the end of Iraq's tunnel. Restoring the Iraqi state and its unity is a realistic dream, one whose fate is not separate from the battle of negotiating the security treaty with the US to organize the relationship with what remains of the occupation, following the onset of withdrawal of US troops. Similarly, the project of the state is not separate from the fate of the war against terrorism, death and violence, or of the war against what Talabani refers to as "criminal resistance", a term which brands the Shiites infidels.
However, the dreams of Iraq's president lack facts, some of which are certainly bloody, as they regard the issue of dealing with the weapons of militias and the killing practiced by what remains of Al-Qaeda, while others regard sharing interests within Iraq, as well as with the American "outsider".
Under the US-backed Talabani-Maliki partnership, Baghdad can insist on the success of the approach of eradicating violence by force, as shown by the decline in the number of victims and mass graves of civilians, which allows President George Bush to claim his only accomplishment in Iraq since the invasion. However, upon leaving the White House, President Bush will not be able to announce the "victory" he promised the American people, one which bears the cost of thousands of American lives. Such a pitiful state of affairs goes beyond the bitterness in Baghdad, as the war against Al-Qaeda continues to ebb and flow, despite the seeming defeats suffered by the organization and its supporters, which have helped restore cohesion to Iraq's army and security forces.
Naturally, the only accomplishment that will allow the "lame" US administration to conceal its distress over Al-Qaeda evading its final defeat will be none other that the security agreement, which George Bush is dying to obtain from Baghdad during the last round of US presidential elections. The alternative for George W. Bush is to come out crippled, which both Talabani and Maliki would hate, albeit for Iraqi considerations. The first surely being their awareness that the forces of legitimate authority in Baghdad are still too weak to confront the various agendas, some of which are hidden and may only emerge once US troops retreat to their bases in Iraq. Baghdad and Washington therefore share a mutual need. However, one may still speculate that the difficulty of overcoming the severe predicament, which continues to plague negotiations over the strategic security treaty, is in fact the timeframe of the presence of US bases on Iraqi soil, as well as "hospitality rights".
The mutual need is with a lame, but not crippled, Bush. Meanwhile, the changing winds of romance between Baghdad and Tehran conceal chronic Iraqi fears from Iran's ambitions. Such fears only worsen when Iran plays the tunes of Iraqi provinces, now that Muqtada Al-Sadr has been rendered harmless, especially if provincial council elections prove too difficult.
Perhaps many Iraqis are hoping for an "honorable" agreement with Washington. Talabani has brilliantly defended such an agreement, as he insisted on rejecting pressures and sought to neutralize the narrow timeframe suffocating the American "lame duck", in the hope of hastening the birth of the agreement over US bases. The first is well aware of the consequences of a c-section, while the second is counting the days… The first fears the appetite of its Iranian neighbor, along with many in Mesopotamia who have not forgotten that the chapter of the Algiers Accord is yet to be closed, while the Shatt Al-Arab remains a field of landmines.
There are some who worry of the function of US army bases and have serious concerns that the "guest" may turn into a partner in resources and sovereignty at home, once the phase of occupation and explicit mandate is over.
Everyone in Baghdad is aware that, behind the scenes of the secret negotiations over the security treaty, it is impossible for the American "lame duck" to accept either paid partnership or an assignment to guard the borders, as a gift to the "democracy" of the new Iraq.
…in Baghdad there are fears of a feast, one which will stimulate the appetites of both the neighbor and the "custodian".
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