American-Iranian Partnership in the New Regional Order
Raghida Dergham Al Hayat - 13/06/08//
Based on the stances of the Islamic Republic of Iran over the security agreement between the US and Iraq, one can conclude that Tehran has begun to use Iraq as a bargaining chip in strategic maneuvers to shape a regional security order that grants it regional leadership, with acknowledgement from and in partnership with the US.
It is now up to current President George W. Bush, Republican candidate John McCain and Democratic candidate Barack Obama to decide whether long-term US interests in the Middle East require conforming to Iranian demands for the security order which Tehran wants, or whether these interests require a new regional order at the levels of security, politics and economy, on the basis of interdependent and concurring interests that include Iran without however allowing it to assume sole leadership. This requires complete firmness in informing Iran and acting accordingly, that the regional order that it seeks and plans for will not be possible. It is time for both American presidential candidates to do more than issue worn-out statements about who was right and who was wrong in their attitudes towards the war in Iraq, at the beginning or in later stages.
Barack Obama has already begun to break out of the cage he built around himself with his demagogic and simplistic statements on how to pull American troops out of Iraq. As for John McCain, he has begun to comprehend the effects of his blunders and statements about staying in Iraq for a hundred years, which have frightened people, especially when linked to his tendency to lose his temper particularly when addressing issues of national security. However, if Barack Obama is committed to getting out of Iraq within a narrow timeframe, having concluded that staying in Iraq will be increasingly costly and that escape will come at a lower cost at this junction, he has to put forth a comprehensive "exit strategy". Such a strategy should include a clear description of the regional and international role of the US after withdrawal, and of his perception of Iran's role in the regional order. And if John McCain plans to stay in Iraq until "victory" at any cost, on the basis that retreat in the midst of battle undermines American credibility and offers victory to extremist organizations and states, it is his duty to put forth a "staying strategy" whose benefits should be explained, alongside the roles of active regional parties, including Iran.
If Iran and Syria have the desire, drive, passion and contributions to carry Obama to the US presidency, there is much concern and fear in Iraq of his reaching power. The reason is not that Iraqis dislike the internationally popular young man, who has broken taboos and become a phenomenon of much inspiration and leadership. The reason is that Obama seems unaware of the complications of Iraq's situation, including the confusion and dilemma of the Iraqi government between its necessary allegiance to the US forces which brought it to power and upon which it still relies, and its necessary and natural allegiance to Tehran, as Iran has vast influence in Iraq today, and as many of the rulers of Baghdad are in its debt. A debt Tehran expects them to repay in the future.
Barack Obama and John McCain's mission, along with George W. Bush, is to fully consider this dilemma/predicament rather than get involved in verbal sparring and political maneuvers tainted with the politics of distrust and American preoccupation with narrow interests at others' expense. The makers of long-term American strategy are required to carefully examine the meaning of American-Iranian partnership in a new regional security order wished by Iran, which will bring the relationship from conflict to partnership, as had previously occurred between the US and the Soviet Union, with one fundamental difference: the survival of the Iranian regime and its gaining control of regional influence, in contrast to the decline and fall of the Soviet Union.
If such a partnership in the security order becomes the American choice, decision makers will have to consider how to formulate American-Arab relations in light of this partnership, as well as the implications of exporting the ideology of the Iranian Islamic Republic to other countries of the region and beyond. That being said, perhaps it is useful for such an outcome to be clear for the Iraqi leadership, to comfort it and relieve it of its dilemma and confusion, and allow it to reconcile and/or choose between two opposing allies who disagree ideologically, politically and strategically on every matter. Yet, prior to all of this, perhaps someone should explore the reasons behind Iran' leaders setting up leaderships in the region through tools of Iranian influence such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the various militias in Iraq, especially when it comes in the form of admitting weakness after an arrogant display of power.
The solution does not lie in a confrontation between the outrageous arrogance of the Americans and the placid arrogance of Iran, revealed by the seasoned patterns of sarcasm and superiority. Nor does it lie in avoiding scrutiny in the implications of Barack Obama and John McCain's attitudes towards Iraq and Iran.
The security agreement to which Members of Congress and the US media awoke this week represents a significant starting point for scrutiny, not only because of its importance in itself, but also because of Iran's public rejection of it, while secretly seeking to influence it and use it as a bargaining chip.
The administration of George W. Bush attempted to reach an agreement that would tame Iraq US-wise after the expiry of the UN mandate. It also sought to exercise blatant hegemony over Iraq with permanent and mobile bases, immunity from judicial persecution, control over oil resources, and a domination that takes away any sense of sovereignty which Iraq seeks to retrieve once it is free of UN Charter Chapter Seven. Having later rethought its position under pressure, it now puts forth a better draft.
The objective of Iraqi-American dialogue was to first reach a bilateral "security partnership" which would reassure the Iraqi interior and send a message to neighboring countries, in particular Syria and Iran. Such a security partnership was aimed at regulating the American-Iraqi relationship on the basis of the need for a bilateral relationship, rather than leaving the regulation of Iraq's relationship with countries participating in the UN mandate in the hands of the Security Council, to determine the prerogatives of these forces and the length of their term. In other words, the primary objective was to free Iraq from Chapter Seven and to formulate a long-term security agreement that would relieve the pressure for a scheduled American withdrawal, even a gradual one. The main idea was to include a security partnership that would regulate the relationship by allowing the redeployment of American troops, whether in camps or bases all over Iraq, and the withdrawal from Iraqi cities, accompanied by the building of Iraqi military institutions, both land and air forces.
Once again, American mistakes have raised suspicions and objections, and provided arguments against the agreement, leading to the possibility of postponing its ratification until next month, and of the Iraqi government retracting its declaration that it will not be in need to renew the mandate of the multinational forces at the Security Council which will expire at the end of this year.
However, no American mistake justifies Iranian reactions, at the highest levels, as if Iraq was some commodity in the hands of Iran's leadership. Iran has the right to understand the nature of the relationship of its neighbor Iraq with the United States, but it has no right to dwarf Iraqi sovereignty and grant itself the authority to dictate. Nevertheless, it has done so and continues to do so. This is what American decision and policy makers should study to understand the limits and the "prerogatives" of Iranian influence in Iraq and to become familiar with the mindset of Iran's leaders regarding the formulation of the American-Iraqi bilateral relationship.
The Iraqi government is trying to foster American-Iranian partnership. Its wish is that Washington and Tehran reach an agreement over a regional security order that spares it having to choose between the two. Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh believes that retrieving Iraq's full sovereignty and freeing it of Chapter Seven, which he considers a threat to world peace and security, would qualify it to become "part of a regional and international order that would be safe for all". However, the leadership in Tehran has no intention of seeing a regional order in which it would be just another player. It wants regional leadership in the new regional security order with complete authority for the Al-Quds Brigade, affiliated to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and whose leader directly reports to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic Ali Khamenei. It is that same Al-Quds Brigade which rules Iraq through the militias there and tries to gain control in Lebanon through Hezbollah.
When Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki was able to challenge Muqtada Al-Sadr's militias in Basra, it was only because Iran allowed him to do so. Had Iran not implicitly approved of his step, he would not have succeeded, and perhaps not even have tried, to seek a decisive confrontation with the likes of the Al-Mahdi Army and its leader (who is currently leading a campaign against the security agreement).
The question is: why did Iran make such a decision and what does it want? It is almost certain that the age of militias, a basic of Iranian strategy, has neither ended nor will, at least in the coming few years. Just as the US has invested in the war on Iraq at very high costs, Iran has also made massive investments to organize, equip, finance and arm militias in Iraq and Lebanon.
Hence, what is behind the tactic of helping Al-Maliki defeat Tehran's ally, Al-Mahdi Army? Certainly, there is the goal of "investing" in the American presidential elections, wagering on Barack Obama to lure him to the "courtesy" that Iranians can exercise, or warning McCain to make him understand that the means of Iranian influence within Iraq are enormous and can be utilized both positively and negatively. However, there is also a strategic dimension that has to do with the mindset of Iran's leaders for Southern Iraq in the long-term, in peace or in war.
Iranian leadership does not only protest issues that it considers an exploitation of Iraq as a starting base for American military action against Iran in the security agreement. It protests its "bilateral" nature by principle. It considers that Iraq has no right to ratify a bilateral agreement with the US because the government in Iraq, from Tehran's point of view, is its subordinate. It wishes to share Iraq with the United States, whether by peaceful means or by intimidation, as the situation demands. Iraq is a card in Iran's sleeve, according to Tehran, and Iran has no intention of neglecting it in its negotiations with the United States, which it would rather hold with Barack Obama than with John McCain.
The burden now falls on the two US presidential candidates, for each to formulate his strategy and message to Tehran. If either of them or both have any interest in that grand deal, they would do well to take into consideration the fact that Iranian strategy is based on buying time until a new status quo, whether nuclear or militia-based, imposes itself in Iraq or in Lebanon.
The real battle between the McCain and Obama camps is over McCain's belief that victory in the Iraq war is a fundamental issue for America's interest, greatness, pride, dignity and credibility, whereas Obama believes that these matters will be obtained by recognizing the war on Iraq as a mistake and retreating now.
There is a huge difference between the strategy of staying and the strategy of withdrawal. What is missing in either strategy is the profound examination of the implications of both in the new regional security order, in the wake of the Iraq war, a gift both to Israel and Iran.
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