Syria: Between the Brink of the Abyss and "Constructive" Ambiguity
Abdullah Iskandar Al-Hayat - 11/06/08//
It seems, perhaps for the first time since the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in February 2005, that Syria has moved away from the "brink of the abyss" policy that it has adopted as part of its defiance strategy, whether in Iraq or in Lebanon, in inter-Arab relations, or in its focus on the special strategic ties with Iran. During this period, Syria was openly and practically determined to engage in wide scale confrontation through domestic tools in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. It was also involved in verbal war with the international community, especially with the tight American-French alliance and with the majority of Arab countries, hence the low level Arab representation at the Damascus Summit last March. For a while, Syria appeared alone in its commitment to a form of escalation that almost brought down all the fundamentals of joint Arab policy and evolved into a regional military confrontation.
Since the Annapolis Conference for peace in the Middle East last November, and more specifically since the election of General Michel Suleiman as president on 25 May, Damascus has ambiguously and vaguely transformed its management of the inflammable regional issues. To retrieve unprecedented diplomatic activity in Arab and international directions, and since Annapolis, Syria has suggested that it is pursuing the mainstream peaceful path as expressed in the Arab peace initiative. With its mere attendance at the conference, it signaled that it did not object to pushing the Palestinian-Israeli track forward with American sponsorship. Then came the revelation of the indirect Syrian-Israeli negotiations with Turkish mediation to show that Damascus was not maneuvering over its peace choice with Israel. With the election of a president in Lebanon, Syria was showing responsiveness to the general Lebanese, Arab and international calls to end political void in the land of cedars and to allow institutions to play their role in resolving domestic conflicts.
While no one will risk offering a decisive interpretation of Syria relinquishing the brink-of-abyss policy, it is still difficult to predict how far the new Syrian approach will go, especially that Damascus has yet to offer a new reading of this approach while it confirms the continuity of its policy and indicates that change - in case there was any - was the result of a change in behavior on the other side. This ambiguity in the "new" Syrian positions is most likely intended to preserve the mobility and flexibility required in the coming period. Similarly, ambiguity is maintained with respect to changes in decision-making positions in Damascus in concurrence with the Syrian diplomatic offensive.
In this context, it is significant, at least for Syria, that President Bashar Assad is a guest in several Arab capitals, if only in his capacity as the head of the Arab summit which demands action to handle general Arab issues. All this precedes a foreign tour for President Assad, a tour for which the Syrian diplomacy is mobilizing all efforts in an attempt to highlight its significance.
At the time when Washington still attempts to keep Syria under siege, calm preparations are underway for a French-Syrian summit in Paris, even if it only came on the sidelines of the Mediterranean Union Summit next month. France, which had until recently severed any contacts with Syria, is interested in returning to normal relations with Damascus on the eve of assuming presidency of the European Union. This move has upset Washington which has announced that it will seek an explanation from Paris over this change in position.
The diplomatic siege surrounding Syria has been broken. Yet, basic questions have yet to find convincing answers. How far will the talks with Israel go given the expiring presidential term in the US and the political instability of Ehud Olmert's government? How far will Damascus go in encouraging the internal Palestinian dialogue? Will it pressure its Palestinian allies to offer the necessary concessions to ensure the success of this dialogue? How far will Damascus go in translating into actions its declared concern over domestic peace in Lebanon and interest in normalizing relations there? Will it utilize its relations with its Lebanese allies for this purpose? Most probably, the ambiguity in responding to all these questions is more a part of the new approach rather than a change in the positions over these issues. Ambiguity is a necessity for the policy of keeping the door ajar, which has allowed Syria to partly break the imposed siege.
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