Reconciliation in Central Iraq
Abdullah Iskandar Al-Hayat - 26/06/06//
The National Reconciliation Initiative, which Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Malki intends to announce today before the Parliament members, may not be enough to tackle the worsening situation in Mesopotamia. The issue is not related to the initiative itself as being ideas, a program, ambitions or intentions. It also has nothing to do with the government's desire, under increasing US pressure, to expand its responsibilities, especially security, to withdraw marines or mobilize them to minimize losses. The initiative is also not associated with the Iraqi government's efforts to break up the Arab diplomatic isolation after the Arab countries agreed to deal with the Iraqi government and to consider it a legitimate authority. Nonetheless, the appropriate security situation is awaited to allow sending delegations to Baghdad. The main problem in any Iraqi reconciliation project is that it always centers on the capital and perhaps on central Iraq, where violence is the government's greatest challenge, and where the majority of Sunnis live.
In the north, the Kurds have established an autonomous rule that does not recognize a centralized government, except where it benefits from it on the security, political and economic levels. In the south, the Shiites seek a similar situation that is still being obstructed because of different loyalties and interests. The Kurds clinched recognition by all those involved in the political process because they apply the conception of federal rule. Therefore, they are not keen on reconciliation, except within the framework of an acknowledgement of their special status. President Jalal Talabani's talks with Resistance parties are among his efforts to engage them in the political process, without encroaching on the Kurd's gains agreed upon and established in Kurdistan by the two parties.
In the south, the situation is not yet based on federalism, as in Kurdistan. The region has not been brought under the control of those concerned, chief among them Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution. The violence Basra and other southern regions witness conveys, at some levels, a struggle coupled with federalism hailed by other Shiite groups, mainly the Al-Sadr movement. Sistani's authority has not taken a definitive stance until now.
In his initiative, Al-Malki, regardless of his intentions, will not be able to exceed Kurdistan's status quo or the Supreme Council's, a basic party in the coalition that brought him to power. Furthermore, he cannot remain in office without the Council's support. Until one party concludes the conflict in the south in its favor, there will be, inside the coalition, and especially in the Supreme Council, opposition to the conciliatory steps taken by Al-Malki to release detainees, the majority of whom are Sunnis allegedly imprisoned as terrorists. However, some of those who are to be released faced no charges at all. Given this attitude of freeing innocent detainees, we can understand how reconciliation with militants, who fight the occupation forces, is rejected.
This tense political situation produces an increasingly deteriorating security situation. All the reasons for using violence, in addition to fighting foreign forces, will continue to exist, ranging from civil crimes to sectarian murder. Several forces, with unprecedented sadism, will take part, including foreign terrorists, Iraqi organizations, street militants and the state's security and military forces.
The state is justified in its use of force in the face of the terror and crimes. However, it will not be able to control the long-term effects of sectarian fighting, as its forces are concentrated in one region, not deployed throughout the country. Baghdad and central Iraq's problems cannot be solved by freeing militants or increasing the Sunnis' quota in the Cabinet. The problems are also related to the status quo in the north and south. No suggestions will establish national reconciliation unless they are supported, not only by Baghdad and central Iraq, but also by the forces controlling the north and south regions.
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