Syria is Not Iran
Walid Choucair Al-Hayat - 24/06/06//
It is natural for Syria to want to open up to the influential Arab states at this stage. The question that is mostly raised in the Lebanese and Arab arenas is how far Damascus is willing to adapt to the possibility of a settlement or a deal between the US and Iran; an adaptation which would be a corollary to the US-European package of incentives. This package deals with the Iranian nuclear file to guarantee that Tehran will use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, not to possess nuclear weapon.
If the basic issue is still about how successful the Iranian-international negotiations will be despite the positive signals from Iran, speculations on the possibility of the success of these negotiations, even after some time, lead to some hypothetical questions on Syria's position on the Iranian-international dialogue. These questions cover several angles. The most important are: Will Tehran view Damascus as a partner in the Iranian-international dialogue, and, consequently, seek to make it a party to a possible settlement? The second angle is: Will the US-European alliance be ready to accept Syria in such a settlement, or will it prefer to separate between the possible settlement with Iran and a presumed one with Syria? Finally, is it in the interest of Syria to be content with a dialogue that opens up compromises with Iran? Or is it better to have a parallel dialogue that may make the optimum use of the first, while dealing specifically with Syrian-Western relations?
All these questions on Syria's position were raised as a result of a general impression of senior officials in the West and Arab countries, who repeat that Syria has become Iran's puppet. Gone are the days when Syria's relations with Iran were a card the Syrians could play with the West and the Arab countries during the era of late President Hafez Assad. This impression affected the behavior of Washington, Europe, Riyadh and Cairo toward Damascus, which has become in very close contact with Iran since last autumn due to Iran's support for Syria against the pressures applied on it.
This impression and the very close Syrian-Iranian ties stunted many initiatives by Riyadh, Cairo, Washington, Paris and other capitals related to Damascus. These initiatives revolved around the Syrian role in Lebanon and Iraq.
The efforts exerted by these two countries, whose conditions concern the influential Arab countries and the international community, did not bear fruit, according to the conclusions reached by those who discussed the issue with officials in the aforementioned capitals.
Although the Arab leaders, who are keen to maintain good relations with Syria, did not abandon their bid to persuade it to change its role in Lebanon and Iraq, they share a feeling with the leaders of the West: disappointment with Syria, which they have dubbed 'boredom'. The reason is that they have repeatedly asked Syria to take a new direction to normalize relations with the international community.
Syria, instead of playing a role in the relations between Tehran and the Arab countries, as President Hafez al-Assad had done, a glimpse at Iranian-Saudi and Iranian-Egyptian contacts made publicly in the last two months, shows that they were more than the Syrian contacts with Cairo and Riyadh. This is not to mention the declared and secret contacts made between Iran and the Gulf States held basically for the security affairs of the Gulf, but which also touched on the latest developments in Iraq and Lebanon.
Although the Tehran-Damascus cooperation accords, including the most recent one on defense, are reassuring to the latter in the case of a possible settlement between Iran and the international community which does not ignore Syria, a small circle in Damascus expresses fears and concern. These fears are the result of reports of a US-Iranian dialogue on Iraq that excludes any Syrian role.
It seems that Damascus now needs to distinguish itself from Tehran with regard to its regional policy in order to regain some of its political roles in the case of a settlement. To what extent can Syria reconcile this distinct role with the degree of its dependence on Iran's support?
If Syria has already sent signals that it will play a distinct role in Iraq, will it do the same in Lebanon?
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