Lebanon's Battles in Light of the Struggle for Regional Domination
Raghida Dergham Al Hayat - 16/05/08//
Dubai - Hezbollah's coup in Lebanon is one of the episodes of a new regional order in the Middle East, one that is imposed by the Islamic Republic of Iran through the language of weapons pointed towards the interior to insure local domination. The suggestions made by Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, calling for the major powers to "put concrete proposals on the table guaranteeing the security of Iran and ensuring Iran a worthy, equal place in talks on resolving all problems in the near and Middle East", represents another essential episode in shaping the new regional order.
The Qatar-led Arab mediation to address the developments in Lebanon, resulting from Hezbollah's use of its weapons against the Lebanese last week, is reminiscent of mediations led by Qatar's Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem following the July war two years ago, when Hezbollah launched the first round of calculated battles within the strategy of imposing a new regional order.
Israel's silence, over turning Lebanon into what is almost an Iranian base through Hezbollah's weapons, is very suspicious and has deep implications. It indicates a calculated policy to sustain the strategic truce-based relationship between Iran and Israel. This relationship, according to the ideology of the new regional order, requires the formation of a qualitatively different relationship between the United States and traditionally prominent Arab countries. This raises fundamental questions: What are the perspectives of a deal, or a confrontation, for the new regional order? Has the shaping of major agreements with Iran really begun, or is this just a page in another chapter from a book of failed attempts to impose a new regional order unilaterally?
At least two schools of thought have emerged, in the analysis of the events that took place in Lebanon last week, as Hezbollah took over Beirut airport, besieged Beirut, raided Mount Lebanon, and attempted to draw the Lebanese into a sectarian war with the pretext of protecting the weapons of the "Resistance" and the aim of overthrowing the Lebanese government.
One school claims that Hezbollah has lost no matter how victorious it may be, as it has exposed itself by using its weapons against the Lebanese interior, and as the model it is importing to Lebanon from Iran has proved a failure. This is because the Lebanese are no fertile ground for the rule of mullahs, Iranian arrogance, or the patterns that traditionally characterize Iranians, especially those who are in power today. Consequently, even if Lebanon is a mere link in an international or regional strategy, be it American, Iranian or Israeli, Hezbollah's victory will not last, because the party will be rejected by the Lebanese on the long run, as a result of the fundamental contradiction of its ideology and belief system with the Lebanese individual and environment.
The other school claims that Hezbollah's continued possession of its weapons, as well as the arrogant way in which it has kept these weapons away from the national dialogue and from the formation of the new rule it seeks to impose in Lebanon, is in itself an extraordinary victory. The simplest interpretation is that the militias have achieved victory over the state, at least in this particular battle. Similarly on the regional and international level, Hezbollah was able to score a victory par excellence for the axis of extremism that includes it along with Iran and Syria. It was also able to show contempt for UN Security Council resolutions, by relying on the US administration's weakness during its last few months in office, known as the "lame duck" phase.
Today, a new defensive strategy is being shaped resulting from Hezbollah's weapons, which come from Iran through Syria. The basis of this strategy is twofold: on one hand it involves the formulation of scenarios of agreement with Israel, and on the other it involves securing positions and preparing for bargains to reach agreements. This requires escalation here and there to improve terms. As for using Hezbollah's weapons in a direct military confrontation with Israel, it is unlikely as long as the decisions to wage new wars have not been made in Damascus and Tehran. Currently, the proposals made vis-à-vis Hezbollah's weapons represent Iran's "entry" into Lebanon without a large number troops, contrary to what Syria did when it marched its armies into Lebanon with the aim of protecting it from itself, turning the Arab force that came to Lebanon under its leadership into a force of Syrian occupation and hegemony over Lebanon.
Iran today stands at Lebanon's borders as a result of the presence of Hezbollah's weapons within Lebanon and the constant flow of weapons from Iran. Syria is the major link between Iran and Hezbollah's weapons but the strategic decisions are made by Iran's leadership while Syrian leadership can only jump the wagon. And Iran is making strategic decisions to create a new regional order.
Such a strategy may require Hezbollah to give up its weapons as a military organization or militia and to put it in the service of the Lebanese state. Hezbollah's Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah will have to find a face-saving formula. If such a strategy is chosen, it would necessarily require the triumph of Iran, Hezbollah and Syria's vision for the model of the Lebanese state according to the trio's definition. In other words, Hezbollah's weapons would be handed in only after all guarantees are made to ensure that the Lebanese state will be in the full possession of the tripartite alliance.
There is a theory which calls for submission to such a new reality, resulting from the fundamental disturbance in the balance of domestic and foreign powers in Lebanon, both on the military and political level. Submission here is in the sense of accepting today's reality but not surrendering to it. In other words, the political and military reality in Lebanon gives the popular majority, the parliamentary majority supporting the government in parliament, and Siniora's government itself, a new label. Following the victory of the so-called "opposition", its seizing of power, and the integration of its militias in the army, today's majority may become the opposition, which can then work strategically and patiently to return to power.
This is the way of democracy, according to the proponents of this theory. The "beauty" of this theory is what may result from the integration of Hezbollah's military force in the Lebanese army, which effectively means self-disarmament by Hezbollah.
This theory reveals an interesting point of view. However, what the strategy of the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah trio is aiming at is to effectively turn the Lebanese army into an auxiliary of Hezbollah's militia. This is exactly what the three powers really wanted when Hezbollah led its military coup last week.
There is another scenario, in Tehran to be specific, suggesting an alternative explanation of the causes behind the escalation in Lebanon through Hezbollah's coup. According to a senior Arab official, with traditional insight into the thinking in Washington and Tehran, said that the most likely explanation for the events is that Iran fears American air strikes against it this summer, and that a move by Hezbollah of such intensity was therefore a preemptive one.
The communications network, which reinforces Hezbollah's infrastructure within the Lebanese state, represents a fundamental element of Iran's expansion into Lebanon, which is why it was absolutely off-limits. Hezbollah's control of the airport was also a fundamental issue within the strategies of confrontation, in case it becomes necessary, according to the Iranian line of thought. In this sense, the confrontation is American-Iranian, involving American air strikes against targets inside Iran that are countered by escalatory responses inside Lebanon to reinforce Iran's regional assets.
The proponents of the theory of confrontation between the US and Iran, both over the nuclear issue and as a result of Iran's challenges in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine, believe that the worst is yet to come in the region. They claim that the Americans are frustrated by the growth of Iranian influence, and that the Arab states which oppose Iran's expansion are terrified by the triumph of its influence in Lebanon and its deepening presence there. They also claim that both the US and the Arab states are waiting for one another to take the first step.
What almost everyone agrees upon, in their analyses and available information, is that President George W. Bush will not invade Iran, land the Marines on the Lebanese coast, or bomb the fundamental link, Syria. What observers disagree about is whether Bush will stand and watch all these challenges, because he is a lame duck, or whether he is waiting to conclude his visit in the region before issuing surprising decisions from Washington.
The anticipated escalation, which may be represented by measures sponsored by Iran in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine, may backfire. This in the case of a failure of the grand settlements, which Russia seeks to lead, in an effort to secure its strategic position and interests in the Middle East, and to avoid any bargains at its expense.
The Russians remember the neoconservative "geniuses" who came up with the "preemption" theory to guarantee America's unprecedented supremacy by linking oil and Israel through a Shiite belt led by Iran in the Gulf or the Middle East. These sought to insure American monopoly and came across the miserable idea of establishing a strategic relationship between Persian and Jewish nationalism to contain and dwarf the Arabs.
The Russians have no interest in fighting a war for Arab dignity or anything of the sort. They want to be part of the grand deal, especially as they have invested heavily in the past few years, especially following the war in Iraq. They have invested in the strategic relationship between Iran and Syria, having in mind the building blocks of the new regional order on the basis of truce with Israel.
If grand agreements and the ultimate deal will lead to a peace with Israel which will turn the region to concerns of human development, knowledge, and respecting others and others' choices, they are certainly welcome. In that case, let Iran wear the crown of regional leadership if this means it will shed its theocratic model. But it will not.
Since Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution some thirty years ago, Iran's leadership has sought to export its model and to dominate the region with its radical ideology. It opposes the protection of the Middle East from wars, even if it implicitly allies itself with Israel for reasons regarding the core of its desires to achieve hegemony and impose a new regional order.
Lebanon's battle is merely one battle in the grand war being waged upon the culture and the choices of the Middle East. At the level of the people and the media, the Americans lie in deep slumber as they entertain themselves with the trivialities of their presidential elections. The Israelis, at the official level and in some of the public opinion, continue to evade radical solutions to the Israeli occupation and believe that the strife between Sunnis and Shiites serves the interests of the Jewish state.
The timing of Sergey Lavrov's proposed package to seduce Iran into the grand deal has radical implications. It comes in the midst of Hezbollah's coup, not only in Lebanon, but also against international resolutions which Russia has participated in formulating. The proposal sent the message of allowing political gains to result from the use of weapons and terror, and from Iran's unequivocal refusal to implement international resolutions.
It would be acceptable if Lavrov is interested in offering security guarantees to Iran as part of a radical approach to the American-Iranian relationship. However, to say that the major powers should ensure a more prominent role for Iran in negotiations over Palestine and the future of the Middle East sends the Arab parties a simple message: it is time for you to take the backseat because Russia has decided to support the new Iran-led regional order.
What will the Arab response be? What will the US decide to do under this president or the president to-be? Even the concerned leaderships do not have an answer.
Evidently, sad is the day when the Arabs submit to Tehran's model of thought, ideology and authority, while they behold Dubai's model of openness to pluralism and the building of intellectual institutions with the ideology of moderation. Sad is the day indeed, but it is only one day in a path that will take many years. The next phase calls for the forces of moderation, both governments and leaderships, to take the steps required by a successful strategy for their values, aspirations and future, away from the decrees of Iran's mullahs for the new regional order. This is but a page, and it is a long book.
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