Round One
Hassan Haidar Al Hayat - 15/05/08//
The ambiguous political and security results produced by Hezbollah's military "coup" suggest that the efforts initiated yesterday by the Arab League ministerial delegation may merely allow for a cease-fire in the renewed Lebanese civil war. Such a cease-fire may soon be ended by another round of fighting, one which may target areas other than those that were invaded, areas that still defy the opposition's demands and point of view in regard of defining the role of the state and its institutions.
The government's compliance with the request of the Army's high-command to revoke the two decisions, regarding Hezbollah's communications network and the removal of the head of Beirut Airport security, may not change the fact that the unrest resulting from the resort to arms has not reached the point of placing the country's political decision-making process in the hands of the allies of Syria and Iran. This will perhaps allow for the retraction of more important decisions the present government has taken in the past, notably the special tribunal for Lebanon and the UN Interim Forces (UNIFIL) deployed in South Lebanon.
In addition to the many doubts now being raised about the credibility of the Resistance, its reputation and image, which it and its leadership have made sure to spread, the invasion of Beirut by the force of arms has bottled up confessional strife, which is difficult to contain. The "patriotic" depictions that the "victors" made of themselves, as well as the accusations they leveled against the Future Movement, the main representative of the Sunnis in Lebanon, failed to conceal the vexatious practices and the sectarian and confessional coercion. Coincidentally, shutting down media institutions is a measure which even the Israeli forces did not take when they invaded Beirut in 1982. The "victors" have also failed to hijack the political decision of the Sunni community, eliminate its role and subjugate it. On the contrary, the Sunni leaders who, until a few days ago, were standing in the ranks of the opposition and defending it, were forced, under popular pressure, to modify their stances and join those who defended Beirut and its inhabitants. Moreover, the uprising in Tripoli, in reprisal for the capital, as well as the fierce resistance in the Sunni North and Bekaa also played a part. Perhaps this is why Hezbollah rushed to withdraw, at least visibly, its gunmen from the streets of Beirut, and to allow for a wider deployment of the Lebanese Army, in an attempt to soak up the resentment.
As for the Druze mountain, it has succeeded in fending off the attack of Hezbollah fighters and their allies; we can even say in defeating them, despite the great discrepancy in terms of military capabilities. Here also, the mistake made by the attackers played the main role in unifying the Druze behind their actual leader Walid Jumblatt, in defending their villages, despite the political disputes. It was clear, in fact, that the premeditated attack on the Barouk area from the Bekaa was a Shiite attack against the Monotheist Sect, and not a struggle between two political projects.
Hezbollah and Amal have failed, despite their alliance with Michel Aoun and despite their colorful little appendages, to convince the Lebanese, the Arabs and the world, that they represent a national project, not a sectarian one. They have failed to convince them of the "innocence" of the Syrian military and political support and of the Iranian funds spent on arming them. And since he who has lost a thing cannot give it, an organization based on sectarian purity, both in its leadership and constituency, cannot claim to have an all-embracing national project.
We can say that phase one of the coup did not succeed. In fact, we can even consider that Hezbollah's leadership has failed at the test of understanding the Lebanese formula and its history, and of grasping the lesson that no confession can impose its vision and its program upon the other communities. But because Hezbollah is bound to a package of external goals beyond its internal position, one must expect it to resume its attempt to impose its choices on the rest of the Lebanese, even if the cost is the termination of Lebanon itself. Perhaps this was one of its goals.
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