Questions for the Opposition
Ghassan Charbel Al-Hayat - 15/05/08//
Let us assume that a prominent Lebanese opposition leader agreed to receive a neutral journalist. Let us assume that the journalist wants to help his readers understand the background and outcomes of what was a fatal week for the Lebanese, a week which - by the way - revived the memories of previous wars and some of their most horrific atrocities. The questions he would ask would be as follows:
If the Lebanese government was said, in light of the two decisions it took, to have erred in assessing the sensitiveness of the issue and the gravity of the timing, then can't it be said that the opposition, with the first shot it fired in the streets of Beirut, has poorly assessed Lebanon's sensitive structure, a mistake tantamount to a fatal sin?
Was the decision to clamp down on West Beirut taken by consensus? What were the stances of Speaker Nabih Berri and General Michel Aoun?
Was the decision to clamp down on Beirut the only choice available for the opposition? Why did the opposition not resort to a million-strong demonstration and to armless pressure, especially that the government is in no position to implement the majority of its decisions, particularly when the matter has to do with a sensitive issue described by the resistance as directly related to its arms and the security of its officials?
Did the opposition believe it could besiege Saad Hariri in Kraitem without triggering a feeling of siege among the Sunnis? Did it believe it could besiege Walid Jumblatt in Clemenceau without sparkling a similar feeling among the Druze? Does it think that it can besiege Samir Geagea in Meerab without making the Maronites feel their community is besieged with him despite our appreciation for "our friend in need," General Aoun?
Did the opposition believe it could break the will of the majority leaders without breaking the will of communities and regions? Did it postpone the zero hour to move on to Meerab for fear such move would instigate sensitivities or undermine Aoun's popularity, as the community in the area would believe Aoun covered up such a move, something that he cannot tolerate?
Does the opposition believe that Hariri's popularity has suffered after a week of fatal disturbances? Or does it deem the operation counterproductive? The same questions can be raised with respect to Jumblatt.
How does the opposition explain the evident embarrassment sensed in the statements of Salim Hoss, Omar Karami and Talal Arslan among other figures known for supporting the resistance?
Was the decision to expand the operation to the mountain wise or did it practically constitute a gift to Jumblatt and the March 14 camp since it made it clear that the attempt to break the balance and wills would drown the whole country in a full-scale war and that communities and regions have an exceptional ability to resist even though they lack the basic arsenal to lead a long strife?
How does the opposition assess this week's repercussions on the image of the resistance outside the Shiite community? Was it necessary to pit the resistance's image against that of Rafic Hariri on the Lebanese and Arab fronts?
Can we say that the opposition is willing to go as far as deposing Prime Minister Siniora by force, disintegrating the Lebanese army and driving the international forces out of the South? Can it confront the danger of declaring Lebanon a failed country prey to Arab and international isolation?
Was the timing of the first shot based on domestic calculations or equally linked to the weakness of the American administration as it prepares to leave? Does the clamp down operation in Beirut underline the atmosphere of escalating confrontation between the camps of defiance and moderation in the region?
Could it be said that what happened was nothing but a rehearsal of the knockout scenario that could be applied in a coming round and at a more appropriate timing? Can Lebanon tolerate knockouts and what about former experiences in this respect?
These are just questions that a journalist dreams of asking as a favor to his readers. I believe that only Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah can answer them. Can we claim that he answered when he spoke of a new phase in his last appearance? Speaker Nabih Berri can offer answers with his eloquence and ability to devise formulas and postpone parliamentary sessions. General Michel Aoun can risk answering, he who has a history of taking risks.
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