Fatal Adventures
Ghassan Charbel Al-Hayat - 12/05/08//
Targeting the media is both dangerous and condemned. It reflects the desire to eliminate the eyewitness. It reveals the desire for worse commissions. It expresses the decision to silence the other, to cross out its right to expression, to eliminate its voice and role as a prelude to its complete annihilation. No one from the media, regardless of the institution he belongs to or the orientations he holds can accept such a vicious practice. It contradicts the most basic customs and traditions. It is a blatant violation of Lebanon's nature which rejects the practice of eliminating the other and reinforcing a single voice. In the darkest hour, Lebanon has resisted the attempt to murk its multiple colors and impose a single color. An only color can only be gloomy regardless the identity of who stands behind it.
Targeting the media is dangerous. Kidnapping is dangerous. Terminating the kidnapped; shooting at funerals and gatherings; targeting passersby; eradicating party offices; cleansing areas; breaking wills; and falling to the temptation of knockouts are all dangerous. They all exceed Lebanon's point of tolerance. They make every victory similar to a victory on a holed ship. It will not be long before it sinks with all the quarrelers on deck, even if some manage to push others into the water before others. Three days were sufficient to assure that Lebanon has fallen captive to a bloody adventure that can only beget losers.
Yesterday's practices reminded me of what I heard a few years ago from a man who was involved in the previous war, climbing the stairs of its horrors and was murdered at the time of peace. That man is Elie Hobeika whose name requires no effort to remember and explain. I jokingly asked him if he could claim innocence. He boldly replied, "Civil war is a sea of dirt. This is its nature. No one who swims this sea can come out clean. He starts as an idealist or clean but the events of war force him to become dirty."
Thousands of kilometers away from Beirut, I felt grave fear; fear of the ability to commit murder and suicide. I saw young men swing the coffins of their comrades. They were shooting their guns and chanting slogans more dangerous than bullets. The events of the past three days indicate that the strife is not only present, but also mobile. They indicate that slipping into Iraqization will be quick, and that the climate in the provinces outside the capital is also ready for warring. The lines of demarcation will be far more complicated and much scarier than the case was in the last war. I had a feeling that the crisis is worsening; that exiting it is becoming more difficult; that the parties have become captives to positions whose expensive prices they are willing to pay rather than retreat. I felt that more force could deepen the dilemma rather than end it, and that victories will further drown the winner and the loser together.
Urgent questions crossed my mind. How long can the Lebanese army stay united and coexist with skirmishes that it is supposed to stop or practices that it should prevent? Can the March 14 forces stand a mass confrontation over Lebanese territories after it became evident that they were not prepared for such a scenario? What will the forces now in charge of Beirut's streets do if Prime Minister Siniora insisted on staying inside the Serail, the last fortress of the current state's legitimacy? Would the opposition forces risk an invasion of the Serail and what would the army do in this case?
Other questions emerge in the same context. Hezbollah can register military victories and guarantee Amal by its side, but can its allies in the March 8 camp tolerate the war? Can former minister Talal Arslan watch Hezbollah achieve victory in the Shouf and Aley? What about former Prime Minister Omar Karami if the Sunni-Shiite strife escalated? Can General Michel Aoun tolerate seeing the opposition forces led by Hezbollah disciplining the supporters of Dr. Samir Geagea in their hinterland after disciplining the supporters of Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblat? By the way, the assurances distributed by the General the day before yesterday were kind, sweet, fast and hasted, appearing closer to tranquilizers and bandages despite the fact that his actual expertise lies in the areas of escalation and agitation.
It can e said that the season of adventures began when the presidential palace in Baabda became vacant. I think of General Michel Sleiman. Does he take a risk by maintaining the army's neutrality which bears the danger of its disintegration or does he risk an attempt to bring the clashes under control when he knows the dangers of such a step? Or will he venture by leading a coup which would exceed the capacity of the army and the country? I fear that the adventures Lebanon is currently living will lead to realizing the expectations of an Arab politician that the situation in Lebanon will be so bad that the Lebanese will decry Emile Lahoud's era.
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