english.daralhayat.com | 17:24 GMT - 07/09/2008

An Israeli Concept of a New Role for Syria

Mostafa Zein     Al-Hayat     - 29/04/08//

The James Baker Institute issued a study in 2000 on Syrian-Israeli negotiations, which were almost crowned by a peace agreement between the two sides. But at the last minute, the then-Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who is now defense minister, pulled back for many reasons. Most importantly, he was facing Benjamin Netanyahu in an upcoming election and was unable to sell the idea of an agreement among settlers and the extreme right political parties.

The study was written by the head of the Israeli negotiating team, General Uri Saguy, while the former US ambassador in Damascus, Edward Djeredjian, wrote the introduction. The Syrians say today that the negotiators cleared 80 percent of the obstacles to the agreement. A few months ago, they were even asking for a resumption of the process, based on the results that were reached in 2000.

In the study, General Saguy said that the conditions for signing an agreement with Syria had become ripe. Damascus was convinced that an all-out Arab war was no longer realistic, after the exit of Egypt and Jordan from the equation. It was also convinced that Israel was an invincible regional power, while Damascus shared common interests with Arabs, most importantly confronting radicals (who have now become Islamic extremists).

Saguy, after his description of these ripe conditions, moved on to discuss the necessity of signing a Syrian peace agreement that would return the Golan Heights, with Israel retaining sovereignty over water sources. For this purpose, he proposed the 1923 borders (of the Mandate) instead of the 1967 borders, since the latter are "unrealistic." In his view, Syria would agree to this, in exchange for Tel Aviv and Washington's acknowledgement of its tutelage over Lebanon. He saw this tutelage as being important during a time of peace, because it prevented extremist movements from acting against the two states.

Many things have changed since the 2000 negotiations. Syria has continued to support the resistance. It has altered its domestic equations. The elder Assad, who could have sold a peace agreement, is gone. Lebanon, which was a strong card in the hands of Damascus, may become a card to be played against it. Israel withdrew from the south and fought a losing war against the resistance, which has become practically a regular army, with a considerable capacity to take on any confrontation. Iran has entered the war game. It has strong influence, via Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine as well. The US, which was the sponsor of the negotiations, now rejects even dialogue with Syria. Therefore, what has prompted the government of Ehud Olmert to agree to Turkish mediation in resuming the negotiations at this time?

Israel believes that it can now get Syria to make important concessions, in exchange for a withdrawal from the Golan. Some of these concessions are in line with US demands, such as breaking the ties between Damascus and Tehran, which in Washington's view, has become a real threat. If an all-out Arab war against Israel has become practically impossible, due to the absence of any Arab solidarity, the Syrian-Iranian alliance poses a new threat if Syria remains outside the equations drawn up by the US administration. The July War of 2006 demonstrated that a comprehensive war without the Arabs is possible if Iran, Syria and Hezbullah, not to mention Hamas, take part. More importantly, peace with Syria, and its joining the moderate camp in the region, would keep the specter of fundamentalist movements away from Israel, as Damascus would take up the task of combating such groups, with this alliance.

In 2000, Barak preferred withdrawal from Lebanon over forging peace with Syria. This put Syria before two choices: support the resistance or confront the Lebanese. Damascus took the side of the resistance. Today, Barak and Olmert are trying to use negotiations with Syria to split it off, along with its allies, from the Palestinian issue. However, domestic conditions in Syria and Damascus' own image of itself and its role do not indicate that it is prepared for such a change.

 

 


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