The Turkish Passage
Ghassan Charbel Al-Hayat - 28/04/08//
Turkey looks at the region and becomes anxious. Its Iraqi neighbor wallows in the midst of a bloody storm; occupation, terrorism, resistance and sectarian conflict. Any permanent disintegration in Iraq would carry the Kurdish fires into the Turkish house. Iraq's unity controls the limits of federalism and curbs Iran's ability to pull the strings in Iraq. This is why Turkey has an interest in a united and democratic Iraq with no room on its territories for a small independent Kurdish state or for the tiny state of al-Zawahiri.
Turkey looks at the region and sees Iran addressing the world and the region through its attempt to control two cards: threatening oil security and threatening Israel's security. Iran's ambition to lead the region is no longer a matter of assumption or speculation. Tehran is present in the daily details of Iraq, both on the security and political levels. The "July War" successfully confirmed its presence on the Mediterranean. But this expansion depends on a visa through the Syrian border. A nuclear Iran will not be good news for Turkey, even if the latter comes under the NATO umbrella.
Turkey looks at Syria and feels relieved for the improvement in bilateral relations over the past few years. However, with its alliance with Iran, Syria strands at the center of the conflict with Israel. At the same time, it clashes with Bush's America in Iraq and with the US, Europe, and major Arab states over the situation in Lebanon. Turkey has no interest in seeing Syria go all the way in its political adventure with Iran. Nor does it have an interest in another Iraq at its borders.
A simple comparison reveals the differences in calculations, methods and means of creating roles. When Mahmoud Ahmedinejad visited Damascus, many wondered about the timing of the next war in South Lebanon and whether its fires would spill over beyond the Lebanese courtyard. When Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Damascus, he officially announced Turkey's mediation to resume Syrian-Israeli peace talks.
The Turkish appearance culminated years of meticulous calculations. Turkey has wisely dealt with the post-September 11 world. It specifically benefited from the coexistence within state institutions between a party with Islamic roots and an army that guards the secular heritage of Ataturk. It went to Afghanistan in its NATO uniform and to South Lebanon with the will of international legitimacy. It also benefited from Damascus' need to counterbalance its Tehran alliance with strong ties to Ankara, as if Syria was aware of its need for the Turkish passage.
In the sick and turbulent region, Turkey has been preparing itself for a regional role whose cards it has gathered. It is a NATO State with close US ties that did not prevent it from opposing the US invasion of Iraq. It is a state that dreams of the European club though it is equally planted in the Middle East. Hence, it made sure to maintain the ability to talk to all sides, including Israel, to exercise the capacity of delivering messages later.
Erdogan's mission is not easy. It may even be described as tedious. It is difficult to believe that Olmert's government is capable of making a decision as big as withdrawing from the Golan Heights. It will not be easy for Syria either to reformulate its regional role on the basis of peace with Israel. The American accusations against Syria over the nuclear reactor are not to be taken lightly either. Betting on the next American administration is not guaranteed. A complete withdrawal from the Golan, even if it is realized, would represent a major shift in Israeli politics. The price of retrieving the Golan represents also a significant change according to the Syrian dictionary on the domestic, regional and international levels.
By welcoming and encouraging Erdogan's mediation, Syria has tried to open a window that protects it from international isolation. However, the ability of the Turkish passage to open the American gates may require another window which Syria can open to retrieve the losses suffered by its Arab and European relations. This would be facilitating the election of General Michel Suleiman and encouraging its allies to walk though the passage of the Arab initiative.
Erdogan's mission is not an easy one. It concerns nearby and remote capitals. It concerns Ahmedinejad, Hezbollah and Hamas. It also concerns the US administration, as it packs its bags and leaves huge crises and numerous battles behind for its heir.
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