Arabization, Internationalization and Hell
Zuheir Kseibati Al-Hayat - 24/04/08//
When Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Moallem admits that he and Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa do not belong to the same "school of diplomacy," the other meaning of his complaint is that the Secretary General does not belong to the minister's school even when his country heads the current session of the Arab Summit. Although this dispute became public for the first time during the "Friends of Lebanon" meeting, the indirect skirmishes noted in Kuwait between Moallem and Minister Bernard Kouchner reinforce the pessimism surrounding the prospects of any solution to the ongoing Lebanese crisis, especially with the widening gap between Moallem and the French schools of diplomacy.
Along the persisting crisis, it is possible to speak of a conflict between internationalization and Arabization - even when there is no such conflict - and of an Egyptian-Saudi disagreement with Damascus's interpretation of how to implement the Arab initiative, in addition to Syria's adamant commitment to the March 8 camp's insistence on a "complete basket," such that the election of General Michel Suleiman can only happen after resolving the national unity cabinet and the new electoral law paradoxes. The other effects of the crisis are known, since they are nothing more than necessary tools to keep the tug of war and paralysis imposed on the Lebanese and their constitutional institutions.
Damascus committed an error by refusing to attend the "Friends of Lebanon" meeting in Kuwait as it sought to avoid the embarrassment of coming under Arab and international pressures which may have tested its promises to facilitate ending the crisis, to respond to Lebanese demands and to protect stability in their country. At the same time, however, the meeting sent a double message: First, it says that Arabization (Arab League initiative) intersects and moves along with internationalization, or else it would have been meaningless to remind of Security Council resolutions, especially resolutions 1559 and 1701. Meanwhile, reminding of the Taef Accord demands no interpretation to explain its legitimacy as a guarantor of balance in the Lebanese political system.
On the other hand, the factors motivating Minister Kouchner, the godfather of the meeting, to explain his "school's" vision that the internationalization of Lebanon's crisis has become a reality (since the issuing of resolution 1559), may now encourage protestors and opponents to realize that what they refer to as "the Americanization of the solution" no longer deludes anyone with the slogan of defiance and its relevance, and no longer suffices to ignore the fact that major powers, including Russia and a few influential Arab states have supported Security Council resolutions.
Yet, expecting opponents to be convinced remains as weak as relying on the stability of security in Lebanon, a matter that still concerns Lebanon's friends and brethren, especially that al-Qaeda may surface again to play the tune of security, just as it did during the bloody war waged by Fateh al-Islam to initiate its "state" in congruence with "Iraqization."
It is no exaggerated pessimism or discouragement of the Arab League Secretary General's efforts to admit that the chances of the League's initiative are desperate. The same despair is felt among the Lebanese who realize the difficulty of implementing the initiative given the state of bitter divide between the March 14 and March 8 camps, and between the Christians - especially when former deputy prime minister Michel Murr found no expression other than "a bridge for the Shiites" to describe General Michel Aoun's coalition - in the light of growing sectarian tensions which barely calm down before the warnings of strife and its effects are heard whenever skirmishes take place in the alleys.
Given all this, one of the priorities of the "Friends of Lebanon" who met at the borders of the Iraqi fire, is to ensure that this fire does not extend to the nation-taken-hostage by regional power conflicts which besiege Arabization without frustrating internationalization. If the predictions are right about extending the Lebanese crisis to the spring of 2009, then the majority and opposition leaders may be better off reinforcing a political truce that will not collapse under the fires of accusations and insults or else Lebanon will be dragged into al-Qaeda's trap and its desire to extend its "state."
When Ayman al-Zawahiri reaches the conclusion that the "Mujahideen" are caught between two fires in Lebanon, he leaves no doubt that he is inciting them against both the majority and the opposition at the same time, nor does he leave any doubt that his promised project for both sides is nothing less than hell: sectarian fires to complete the displacement of the Christians (the Iraqi way) because Lebanon is an Islamic stronghold, and confessional fires to burn the temple on everyone before reaching Palestine.
Al-Qaeda wishes for hell, but before it gets there, Resolution 1701 should be brought down by "expelling" the UN forces. It is a project to incinerate Lebanon….or North Palestine.
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