Al-Hakim's Iraq and Sadr's Iraq
Mostafa Zein Al-Hayat - 16/04/08//
When Democratic Senator Joe Biden embraced a plan in September 2007 to partition Iraq, and Congress approved the measure, Shiite leader Muqtada Sadr and former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi were at the forefront of the opposition. Meanwhile, Kurdish leaders and the other Shiite leader, Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim, resorted to silence in a silent indication of their approval of the partition under the pretext of preserving the text of the federalist constitution, the same texts that divide the Iraqis on ethnic and sectarian bases.
While the Kurdish position over federalism is understandable, especially since they have exercised "sovereignty" over northern Iraq throughout the sanctions period of the 1990s and after "liberation" of 2003, al-Hakim's position can only be understood in the context of his relations with Iran.
Statements by a few leading figures inside al-Hakim's party, the Supreme Islamic Council, shed light on these ties. The Council's spokesperson, Ali al-Adib, considers that the culture of the entire region is Islamic, written in Arabic. In other words, al-Adib denies the existence of Arab culture, except in the framework of Islamic culture. When he talks about this culture, we understand that he only means its inherited sectarian component. Thus, ties with Iran go beyond politics, in terms of interest, and are deeply cultural and historical as they bring both sides together.
The danger of such remarks is that they dwarf culture down to the sectarian perception. It is as dangerous as the perception held by the "jihadists," namely that their totalitarian type of thought is universal. Both sides cast out from paradise anyone who opposes them. Both sides have a unilateralist view of culture. They do not take into consideration the fact that any type of thought, whether or not religious, in any language, is based in its historical and cultural framework, and can have an impact on the environment in which it develops and by which it is influenced. In this sense, European Christianity is not Eastern Christianity, and US-Zionist Christianity is not the Christianity of Christianity. In this sense, moreover, the culture of Christian Arabs becomes part of the Arab cultural space, including Islamic culture.
In any case, this is not the place to elaborate al-Hakim's "theory." What concerns us here is that while he builds his relationship with Iran on a sectarian basis, he sees the interest of Iraq only from this angle, Iran sees this relationship only from the angle of guaranteeing its interests as a state with a history dating back to pre-Islam and its sects. Perhaps the most recent confrontation in Basra between the government and the Sadrists is the best example to support this premise.
Tehran sided with Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and al-Hakim against al-Sadr. Iran had bet on both sides for a number of reasons. The most important of these reasons is that al-Hakim was and remains the most enthusiastic supporter of federalism. He did not object to the constitution that sets out a federal identity for Iraq, made up of sects and ethnicities - "The Arabs (in Iraq) are a part of the Arab Nation". On the other hand, al-Sadr opposed the constitution, federalism and the division of the country's wealth, and this naturally is not in Iran's interest.
Iran's support for al-Hakim and Sadr, prior to and after the war, eventually had to reach the point of making preferences, especially at such a critical period. The upcoming provincial council elections will determine the future of Southern Iraq and the relationship of the periphery to the central authority. It is in Iran's interest for al-Hakim to wield influence in this region which borders Iran. However, if the Mahdi Army wins the elections, which is highly probable, and continues to maintain its position unchanged, Iran will lose its long-term bet on a weak and divided Iraq. Moreover, even if al-Sadr himself supported federalism, his Movement would suffer divisions as it is constituted of diverse groups, some with Arabist and others with Islamist orientations. Consequently, this explains the repeated official and American announcements that al-Sadr is not personally targeted and that all he needs to do is to lift the political cover off al-Mahdi Army and become involved in the political process.
Biden managed to win congressional approval for his plan to partition Iraq. The new Iraqi Army, in cooperation with the militia of al-Hakim and US forces, started the implementation phase in Basra. Iran, on the other hand, awaits the opportunity to reap the gains and will have no qualms over sacrificing al-Sadr and his friendship.
|
