Egypt and Hamas: The Frontiers of Crisis
Mohammad Salah Al-Hayat - 14/04/08//
The quick and angry Egyptian reaction to the statements by some Hamas leaders about another breach of the Gaza-Sinai frontier reflects the degree of Egyptian anger about this "headache." It is a headache that may turn into a chronic disease on both sides, and Egypt and Hamas should coexist with this situation.
Egypt is also suffering from another anxiety-inducing domestic headache, but in this case Egypt has found the ideal way to deal with the situation. It seems that successive Egyptian governments have settled the relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood and adopted a policy based on delivering abortive blows from time to time against the organization. The governments have also dried the sources of the organization's financing and have excluded it from every political competition. This followed the 2005 parliamentary elections when the Brotherhood leapt to the fore and scored a notable success by winning 88 seats. All evidence and various political activities that have taken place since then confirm that such a development will not be repeated. The evidence also confirms that what happened in the Shura Council, and later in the local elections, in addition to the "funding of the Brotherhood" issue that the Military Tribunal is examining, along with dozens of campaigns targeting Brotherhood activists, are all paving the way for a climate aimed at sidelining the Brotherhood in the 2010 parliamentary elections.
However, things are different when it comes to managing the relationship with Hamas. It is no secret that Egyptian officials monitor the behavior of the movement and the rhythm of its operations, whether aimed at Israel or Egypt. They believe that the fingerprints of Syria can no longer be hidden when analyzing statements issued or actions taken by Hamas leaders.
Cairo finds itself in an extremely difficult position. It always tries to engage Hamas in any formula to solve the Palestinian issue, as well as in other cases: in the debate over the dispute between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority and its president, Mahmoud Abbas; in efforts to calm things between the Palestinians and Israel; and in talks of a final settlement of the Palestinian issue. The Egyptians have always affirmed that Hamas has become a reality that must be dealt with, and that others must coexist with the movement even with the presence of different visions over the group's ideas, principles or behavior. At the same time, Hamas' intentions and its direct or indirect relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood remain suspicious. There is the danger of exporting Hamas's ideas to Egyptians in Sinai, hence inflicting harm to Egypt's national security with an impact on tourism in the peninsula. There is also the matter of the repeated threats to storm the Gaza-Sinai borders. Egyptian officials find themselves obliged to deal with all of these problems using security-minded approaches more than political ones. The relationship between Egypt and Hamas has remained a good one until Hamas took over the Gaza Strip last June.
The terrorist attacks that took place in Sinai, which some Egyptian officials tried to link to Hamas militants in Gaza by talking about the ties between radical Egyptian fundamentalists and some Hamas leaders inside the occupied territories, did not harm the relationship. However, the deterioration in Egyptian-Syrian relations as a result of the Lebanese crisis has taken a toll on this relationship. Cairo has come to believe that Hamas is deliberately trying to "heat up" the situation to reduce pressure on Damascus at times or put pressure on Cairo at others. The prevailing belief in the Egyptian capital is that Hamas behaved calmly prior to the Arab Summit in Damascus to help Syria see the event through without incident in the absence of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and the King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. A few Egyptian officials engaged have linked Egypt's stance on the Arab Summit and the launching of threats to re-breach the Gaza-Sinai border. It appears that the coming weeks will witness considerable pressure on Egypt's relations with Hamas. There seems to be no quick solution to the Lebanese crisis on the horizon, and there is little hope of Egyptian-Syrian agreement to resolve the contradiction in the stances of the two countries on the Lebanese issue and on Iran's role in the region. Moreover, the domestic confrontation between the Egyptian government and the Muslim Brotherhood is headed for escalation. All of these issues increase the possibility of a heightened tension between Egypt and Hamas. Cairo has promised decisive steps in response to another breach of the border. Based on all of these factors, it appears that the break-out from Gaza will be repeated, but the reaction will be different this time, since the "frontiers" of the crisis go beyond the mere borders of Gaza.
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