"Rearranging" Iraq
Hassan Haidar Al-Hayat - 10/04/08//
It has been five years since Iraq was invaded and Saddam Hussein's regime toppled. Yet the task of "rearranging" Iraqi affairs is still ongoing. The last in the series of its victims is Muqtada Al-Sadr, who has made many unforgivable, lethal mistakes. Unfortunately, such mistakes are only the declared reasons of the decision to eliminate him. In coordination between Washington and Tehran, this decision is being applied by marginalizing his political role and gradually stamping out his "Mahdi Army" militia in repeated military confrontations.
The young Shiite leader's sin is that he did not find out from the start, and perhaps still has not found out, how Iran used him to deepen the sectarian divide in Iraq, despite his moderate stance in this respect. His pursuit of revenge from the "Baathists," the followers of Saddam, who killed his father and uncle, has turned into an out of control, generalized campaign of sectarian eradication. Iran's objective for adopting, arming and financing Al-Sadr's militia was to create a "balance of terror" with Sunni dissidents seeking to defend their position and interests in the new system. Consequently, the "Mahdi Army" that grouped fighters from every impoverished region of Iraq, including some criminal gangs, turned into security groups led, controlled, and directed by Iranian intelligence, which took advantage of decades of social and political oppression.
It is also Al-Sadr's sin not to have discovered how the Americans used him, when they turned a blind eye to the arming of his "Army" and allowed its activities to widen to the point where he could no longer control its decisions and operations. Their objective was also to "enlist" the Sunnis in the blazing, unannounced civil war, and convince them that their only option is to "participate" in the imposed political process. The Americans have managed to sweep the carpet from under the feet of the Sunni political façade, when they convinced the clans to form, arm and finance the "Awakening Councils" then cooperate with them in order to protect their areas from the influence of "Al-Qaeda," which has gone too far in its use of violence against the Iraqis themselves.
The reception of Ahmadinejad as an exceptional guest in Baghdad's "Green Zone," with its Iraqis and its Americans, signaled the end of the phase in which Iraq formed the frontline of defense against the spread of Iranian influence. It has become necessary to get rid of the last Shiite voice opposed to federalism and to dividing Iraq into three provinces, at least two of which are guaranteed to fall under Iran's sway, thereby achieving the objective of keeping Iraq weak and divided, both in its politics and economy. This is why Iran had withdrawn its political, and even its religious support of Al-Sadr. He has left Qom, where he went to "study." He has been deceived by the Najaf religious authority; his allies in the Iraqi government have turned against him, and the Americans have engaged their forces against him. Hence came the Battle of Basra, the imposed condition to dissolve the "Mahdi Militia," and Iran's direct condemnation of the militia's activities against the Americans.
As the US presidential elections draw near, regardless of who succeeds Bush in the White House, "rearranging" Iraq becomes urgent. So the Americans and Iranians prepare for a new round of negotiations to redraw the map of their respective influence, a collusion that the statements by General Petraeus on "Iran's destructive role" fail to conceal.
Every phase, every battle, has its heroes and victims. Muqtada Al-Sadr thought that his growing and diversified popularity would be a powerful asset for him. Yet he has discovered too late that it is in fact a weakness, being now successfully used against him.
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