Reverse Success
Hassan Haidar Al Hayat - 03/04/08//
Is the testimony of the Syrian officials themselves, as well as that of the Lebanese "Nasser Kandil, Michel Aoun and Wiam Wahhab" chorus, enough evidence of the "success" of the Damascus Summit? Both before and during the summit, Syria has made strenuous efforts to give the impression that it was at ease with the proceedings as well as the results; that it had achieved a "great victory" by breaking its isolation; and that it is mainly concerned with "reinforcing Arab solidarity and stimulating joint Arab action" and other habitual clichés. Such a success could only be ensured by Syria's attempts to obscure the issue of Lebanon and to make it seem merely an internal crisis that should not be overrated.
But Syria's lack of concern did not manage to conceal the truth: that Lebanon and Syria's approach to its crisis were in fact the chief concern of all those present, and of all those absent as well. If Lebanon's crisis is indeed a local one, then why did most of the major Arab leaders stay away from the summit? According to Syria's reasoning, shouldn't Beirut's decision to boycott it have lifted the burden off the summit's shoulders and allowed it to take place under normal circumstances? In the light of the discontent of the two most prominent Arab states and the rest of the moderate states, isn't Damascus' attempt to contain Lebanon's crisis within its borders an unintentional acknowledgment that the real problem lies with Syria itself, and with its regional policy?
Egypt and Saudi Arabia have tried hard to convince Syria that, after having withdrawn its troops from Lebanon under wide popular pressure after the assassination of Rafic Hariri, it had become, by virtue of proximity and relations, one of the players on the Lebanese scene, but not the only player. No one is denying that Syria has strategic and security interests in Lebanon, but such interests should not be used as a pretext to threaten Lebanon's security and stability. Syria's interests in Lebanon can be preserved through normal relations, as they exist between any two Arab States. But Syria has insisted on dealing with Lebanon as a "backyard" under its complete control. Syria considers that the future, and perhaps the fate, of its regime lies in its ability to contain the "blow" that withdrawing from Lebanon represents, with the development of a majority popular movement demanding Syria to establish peer relations and to stop interfering in Lebanon's domestic affairs.
By such standards, one may say that Syria has "succeeded" with its intransigence in obstructing the balance sought by the Arabs in Lebanon: a balance between efforts to rebuild Lebanon and save its economy, and attempts to maintain it as a "hostage on demand" used to pressure this or that state, or as a bargaining chip in negotiations and tradeoffs. Syria has rejected Arab and international advice to stop "fighting" Israel by proxy from Lebanon, as it has for the past three decades or more, a policy it has abided by since discovering in 1973 that it was unable to win a traditional war against Tel-Aviv.
The story of Syria's monopoly of Lebanon is an old one, as old as its first intervention in 1975. Soon after the first bullet of Lebanon's civil war was fired, the decision was taken to form an Arab Deterrent Force. Within a short time, with the help of threats and bombings, the ADF had transformed into a strictly Syrian force, taking orders from Damascus alone. At the time, the Arabs decided not to confront Syria, who pretexted the demands of its own security, as well as the "strategic balance" with Israel, to impose its control over Lebanon and mass weapons and troops on Lebanese soil, despite continued Arab attempts to curtail its ambitions. Today, Damascus has ruptured the concept of Arab Solidarity itself by putting its capabilities and its influence in the Arab world at the service of Iran's growing influence, as in the case of Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as in Iraq. By so doing, not only does Syria threaten the Arab system and the mechanisms of its action, it also purposely relinquishes an Arab immunity it may need as the date of the International Tribunal draws near.
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