Childish Bet In American Circles to Win Over Syria and Iran
Raghida Dergham Al-Hayat - 29/04/07//
American intellectual and academic institutions are mistaken if they allow their rage against US President George W. Bush's war on Iraq to make them disregard the necessary roles they have to assume in formulating a correct, reformative and intelligent US policy toward the Middle East. Some of them promote 'winning over' as a recipe for the US forces' withdrawal from Iraq, criticizing the US President for his refusal to engage in charming Syria and Iran, in particular. Others totally overlook the requirements of establishing a partnership with the government and popular moderation ranks to form the most important sequence of defeating the extremist forces and terrorism in Iraq, as well as in the Arab and Islamic World. The advocates of this stance instinctively refuse anything that would put Israel under scrutiny or expose it to inevitable pressure if the US is serious in fixing its relationship with the Arab and Islamic World and protecting its national interests.
They invent every pretext and excuse to exempt Israel from accountability for its violations and discharge it from the requirements of peacemaking. Some others resort to activate bilateral negotiations between Syria and Israel to ease the international pressure meant to achieve a breakthrough in the Palestinian-Israeli track and forestall the Arab Peace Initiative, which has brought the Palestine issue to the fore.
There are some who deliberately turn a blind eye on the crucial importance of the establishment of an international tribunal to put an end to the impunity era that shaped the political assassinations trend, thus striking their own morality. The establishment of such a tribunal is the key to democracy, accountability and transparency, not only for Lebanon but also for the entire Arab region, contrary to what is perceived or alleged by think-tanks, experts and politicians that the war on Iraq was for the sake of democracy. There are also many advocates of winning over the Islamic Republic of Iran - some of them are promoting a deal in order to avoid a military confrontation or to possess nuclear capabilities. Others are talking about the need to strengthen Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and veteran politician and former President, Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, to be able to overthrow the current president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, as if toppling him is the key to the salvation of the US from Iraq. This serious trend ignores what these two men are presenting, mainly overthrowing democracy, strengthening personal powers, and suppressing any opposite popular Iranian attitudes.
The American uprising against the war on Iraq came belatedly, although the public opinion, the media, Congress and the Republican and Democratic parties did not scrutinize the consequences of dragging the US into this war during the period of preparation, planning and justification. What is happening now is almost an uprising on the self and on the George W. Bush administration, as well, because of the consequences of this war, which exposed the US and uncovered shameful stories about practices of the US army, in addition to causalities and slipping into the quagmire of occupation and the cycle of civil war.
The Liberals, Democrats and Republicans who are at loggerheads with the neoconservatives, who are washing their hands today of the failure of the war on Iraq: they are all blaming George W. Bush, completely forgetting their roles, which ranged from silence, voting for the war and failure to assume the responsibility of opposing the war and forestalling the neoconservatives and their definite arrogance.
They are bidding higher on their deliberate missing what they had failed to do when it was crucial, as they could have actually opposed the rush to the war under various pretexts. When the matter turns to mere hatred of the president without self-accountability, everything seems to be opposable as long as it is approved by George W. Bush. In fact, this act implies somewhat childish behavior. So long as these sectors had not borne their responsibilities before the war, which was waged by its makers in the name of vengeance, they are not shouldering their responsibilities in deeply examining how to get out of the war in the least possible rational way. Therefore, they call for winning over Syria and Iran, as if it was a magic wand.
May Tehran be ready to accept this charming campaign since it may spare the region, if ready, the disasters in Iraq and which may possibly move to Lebanon upon a decree by the Islamic Republic of Iran. In fact, the ruling institution in the Islamic Republic wants to take back the rule and popularity from the president, who has taken off the white gloves and exposed the true nature of the ruling regime in Iran. It is an internal battle between the pillars of the ruling regime itself, in light of the mobilization of popular and government consensus over Iran's 'right' to possess nuclear capability, which the government is claiming to be confined to peaceful and developmental applications, even though it insists on enriching large quantities of uranium.
This internal disagreement is not about the foundations of foreign policy, nor is it about the identity of governance in the Islamic Republic. It is not about how to correct relations with the US, nor is it in facilitating the desired withdrawal of the US from Iraq. The traditional ruling institution in Iran is no less enthusiastic to support Hezbollah in Lebanon than Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, nor is it less generous in transferring funds and weapons to Hezbollah via Syria and others than the Presidency and the Revolutionary Guard.
What is not wanted by the leaders of the traditional ruling institution, especially Rafsanjani, is that Ahmadinejad's preparation for a military strike on Iran may lead to a considerable financial loss they would incur. Ahmadinejad has not entered the 'club' of the seniors who gain personal benefits from wars and from 'practicing' patriotism and nationalism. This is why he is using foreign policy to enhance his internal political, and not financial, stand. Indeed, he is troubling the water of Khamenei and Rafsanjani and their followers, since he is using artificial stupidity and reveals the opposite of what this class of the ruling regime has pretended to be; that is to say, that they were different. In fact, the difference is about the methods, not the nature and orientations of the authority in Iran.
Some advocates of the war on Iraq betted on Rafsanjani as a natural partner for the expansion of 'Petrolstan'm stretching form eastern Saudi Arabia to Iraq and Iran. But Ahmadinejad's arrival to power put the spoke in the wheel of the Iraq war philosophers who wanted a sectarian war to serve their partition and fragmentation schemes. They believed that Rafsanjani was the best sponsor in a silent partnership with Israel and in the Iranian-Israeli and Iranian-American bargain relationships. Ahmadinejad used the Israeli issue to implicitly expose Rafsanjani in a way that strengthens Ahmadinejad's internal position and expands his Islamic popularity against the Arab regimes.
Toppling the Arab regimes is a common denominator between the Iranian revolution - especially Ayatollah Khomeini, Khamenei, Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad - and the neoconservatives, who claimed a wish to spread democracy. However, the war on Iraq strengthened most Arab regimes and provided great services to Israel and Iran by removing Iraq from the strategic equations of each of them. Now, in time of American wrath over this war and its cost, the beneficiaries want to pretend to be the victim; hence the danger of the standpoints sponsored by some in the US.
A young expert, who is enthusiastic about having different, new ideas in the absence of American options in Iraq and Iran, innovated a notion based on empowering Rafsanjani and Khamenei to make them capable of seizing Ahmadinejad's authority. Thus, according to in his own view, the rug will be pulled out from under the feet of Hezbollah. At this point, China and Russia can be addressed in the language of interests, so that China can give energy guarantees and Russia give guarantees in the field of the development of Iran's peaceful nuclear program, as well as in the field of re-armament. Hence, it would be possible to find a face-saving formula for the US withdrawal from Iraq.
By so doing, according to this view, through a deal with Rafsanjani and Khamenei to topple Mahmoud Ahmadinejad comes salvation.
This idea is somewhat childish and dangerous to a greater extent, unless it is based on prior garantees from the Rafsanjani-Khamenei camp for the nuclear and regional ambitions of the Islamic Republic.
It is childish and serious; for one reason, because it entraps the US in the speculations of the Iranian experienced politicians and will never come out victorious no matter what it does. Rather, strengthening a camp at the expense of another inside the ruling institution of the Islamic Republic means that the US will enter once again as a party in a coup in Iran, but that of a different kind. Moreover, strengthening any wing in the Islamic Republic with American effective assistance means another betrayal of the democracy promises in the Middle East. Some parties in Iran will consider the US as the biggest traitor if the latter embraces the idea of strengthening the Khamenei-Rafsanjani camp to have control over the ruling regime in Tehran. The effect will be a further stringency in the despotic rule of the mullahs over women, freedom, and democracy in the name of getting rid of the phenomenon of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, as if this phenomenon is the whole problem and extremism is confined to Ahmadinejad, while the section alleging moderation is as radical as Ahmadinejad himself.
It is important for the traditional institution of the ruling regime to rein in the revolutionary and hazardous presidency, but to gain confidence now depends on the guarantees it will provide at the nuclear and regional levels and within the framework of internal freedoms. If there are some within the American intellectual and academic establishment who believe that winning over Tehran is the key to a happy ending, they should consider beyond the disapproval of Rafsanjani-Khamenei along with Ahmadinejad's denial of the Holocaust or beyond the anger at George W. Bush's policies in Iraq.
The division of Iran's roles in Iraq is looming on the horizon, alongside the rivalry between Iranian leaders on how to deal with the US in Iraq and, at the same time, not to push it for immediate or near withdrawal. Iran, with its two wings of the presidency and the traditional institution, does not want the withdrawal of the American forces, because these forces are undertaking missions instead of it, leading to securing the balances of power that are loyal to Tehran. A US withdrawal now would turn Iraq into a dangerous neighbor for Iran, threatening Iranian regional ambitions, restricting its powers and threatening the Islamic Republic if the war in Iraq extends to it, at a time when its economy is on the wane. Accordingly, one of the available options within Iraq and toward Iran is not military action, strengthening the Islamic Republic, but rather a military withdrawal from Iraq and redeployment aboard aircraft carriers.
If the traditional institution in Iran is willing to conclude a deal for cooperation and understanding with the US, it must include Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine, along with understandings on the nuclear issue. In this context, the wooers should understand the US central relations with Arab moderation ranks at the government, elite and popular levels, rather than drifting to winning over Tehran and its allies, instead of the constant fear of addressing the issue of Israel and the importance of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.
The two major beneficiaries of the Iraq war, namely, Iran and Israel, owe the US. Their benefit from the Iraq war is enormous. Since the American national interest is threatened by this war, the wooers should support the US policy when it is good, rather than rising above the scrutiny of its benefits for the American national interest simply because it is the George Bush administration's policy. In this regard, the Arab Peace Initiative with Israel, which was adopted in the Riyadh Summit last month, is an example. The Bush administration, as well as the majority of the world, supports this initiative, but most intellectual institutions and advocates of friendliness brush this very important initiative aside and reduce it to the inability of the 'lame duck' administration to make a US main foreign policy toward Israel in the last two years and amid early elections.
These attitudes are locked in some sort of bankruptcy, particularly as the requirement of dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian issue is clear to all and that the protection of Israel from peace and its commitments will cost the US dearly, not only in the Iraq war, but also in the war on terror. Israel itself will pay dearly if it continues to refuse to make peace, sometimes under the pretext of the weakness of the government or allegation that it is unable to make concessions, and sometimes under the arrogance of a government that needs nothing but to dictate. Perhaps a day may come when moderation ranks say to Israel: "That's enough. We're washing our hands of attempts to make peace. The arena is now open between you and extremism, where moderation is no longer a buffer zone."
In other words, the American intellectual, political and media institutions are required to assume their responsibilities toward the requirements of protecting the US national interests rationally and bravely, instead of codifying their anger at Bush, wooing Syria and Iran, or supporting Israel blindly without scrutiny or accountability. For example, what is happening in the Lebanese arena draws the attention of the American media institutions casually without understanding the dimensions of the events in Lebanon and their impact on regional relations, the future of democracy, and the need to end the era of impunity. What is happening in Lebanon is a clear indication that George W. Bush's policy in Iraq was different from that in Lebanon. His policy in Lebanon comes within the framework of international consensus, while that in Iraq was individual. This is exactly what those who are enraged and the camp of wooers in the American arena are missing: they do not differentiate between policies and anger blinds them and prevents them from rational thinking.
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