Moqtada's Bitter Cup
Zuheir Kseibati Al-Hayat - 27/03/08//
With the Iraqi Commander in Chief, Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki testing his power to disarm al-Mehdi Army in Basra by force, the price should be questioned before the target. If the preliminary figures of the fierce battles indicate the loss of hundreds of lives in the city awash with oil and subject to dozens of oil smuggling and plundering projects, Moqtada al-Sadr's choices become desperate as he knows well that praising his "national role" is equivalent to decorating him an honorable medal before having him retired.
The "Charge of the Knights" operation led by al-Maliki in his military uniform in south Iraq, is practically the beginning of what will hopefully be the last chapter in ending an inter-Shiite conflict. The only obstacle in the way is al-Mehdi Army, which has grown restless since the truce imposed and extended by Moqtada, probably at Iranian suggestions. In reality, the "Army" militias which have long boasted of fighting the American occupation forces, never gave in to the desire of their guide, Al-Sadr, to give up arms and dedicate themselves to the study of religion as this would have left the arena open to the "government militias," that is, the military arms of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution (led by Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim), Badr Corps, and Al-Da'wa Party led by al-Maliki.
Problematically too for Moqtada's supporters, even though they are accused of harboring criminals and smugglers, they are incapable of adapting in an era when the intention is to dissolve their role and their arms in the run up to the provincial council elections next October. They are equally unable to "understand" Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim and al-Maliki's need to assert another legitimacy for the Council and Al-Da'wa Party through the new elections that do not necessarily dismiss the possibility of forming federal provinces when the time comes.
Whether the "Charge of the Knights" operation came as a result of a deal struck by al-Hakim and al-Maliki with Iran in return for guaranteeing protection for Moqtada al-Sader and encouraging him to pursue his education in Qum, or the Supreme Council and Da'wa Party alliance surprised its Iranian friends by initiating the campaign to eliminate Al-Medhi Army with American encouragement, the fact is that none of Iraq's political leaders envies the young leader for drinking this bitter cup, for having his repeated threats to undermine the government's security "achievements" eliminated.
As a matter of fact, al-Maliki himself cannot defend his government accused of facilitating Al-Sadr's infiltration until the showdown hour arrived, offering the government the excuses to clamp down on the Army, while Iran turns a blind eye after having sponsored and supported these militias. After all, Iran prefers to appease a "strong" ally, such as the Iraqi government and Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, who both acted as messengers carrying Iranian messages to the Bush administration.
It is worth asking whether the "Charge of the Knights" operation represents another Iranian declaration of intents to rebuild the bridge of the Iranian-American dialogue which seems to have collapsed recently when Tehran was disappointed with Washington's refusal to set a new date for another round of direct talks in Baghdad "for the security of Iraq."
It makes no difference for al-Sadr's supporters to defend their position and role within the parliament by claiming their ideological difference with the occupying forces. After all, if the exchange of interests between the Ahmedinejad and Bush administrations demanded turning the page over Moqtada and his army, militia and "ideology," then so be it.
In all cases, this phase is aimed at transforming the political environment in South Iraq. Once the provincial elections are held, the Supreme Council and al-Da'wa Party will share the seats. Meanwhile, the battle over the oil wealth in South Iraq will be left to rage in another phase between the two Shiite victors.
On the other hand, claiming that the price is irrelevant reminisces of how a few Iraqi politicians justified the cost of war since the American invasion five years ago. Such a claim does not conceal the map of "small" wars in Mesopotamia: the Turks launch their campaigns to undermine Barazani's dream of a Kurdish state; the Sunni Awakening Councils' patriotism is certified every time they fight al-Qaeda and its branches; and the Shiite forces have their "charges" in the struggle for power.
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