Lebanon and the Damascus Summit
Abdullah Iskandar Al-Hayat - 23/03/08//
The presence of representatives from Lebanon at the upcoming Arab summit in Damascus in light of the current crisis is not merely a reflection of an internal conflict and presidential elections crisis. Nor is it attributed to Syrian-Lebanese differences over relations between the two countries. The fact of the matter is that it is an extensive accumulation of the resistance towards dealing with "Lebanon the State", whether from the Lebanese side - currently represented by the Opposition - or by "Syria the State", which is attempting to correct the "historical mistake" of announcing "Greater Lebanon" at the beginning of the past century.
The well-known story about the formation of the modern Lebanese State during the French Mandate in Lebanon and Syria can almost be found in all forms of the political debate related to the current crisis - governance , the election of a president, the internal political trends, and the external relations of Lebanon. The insistence of the current majority on refusing to "return to tutorship" and that of the Opposition on "strategic relations with Syria" are nothing but an expression of this problem, despite the fact that the Taef Accord was not able to put an end to the civil war except on the basis of "common paths". This was translated into a confrontation with Israel that was subsequently limited to Lebanon while right to arms was exclusively allocated to Hezbollah on the one hand. On the other hand, this also translated into the control of power and institutions in Lebanon, including the ability to interfere and modify decisions made by the Lebanese State.
In Syria's political understanding, the "common paths" eliminated the previous refusal of the Sykes Picot agreement, since it guaranteed its right to interfere in the decisions of the Lebanese State. And this is exactly what it did during its direct military presence in Lebanon. After its withdrawal, this right was transferred to its allies, whose power and roles were magnified through the "common paths". In other words, Syria gave up a "historical right" in the four cazas according to the widespread story about the formation of the modern Lebanese State, against the rights given to it by the "common paths".
In this context, it was possible to understand the Lebanese government's crisis, then the parliamentary crisis, and finally the presidential elections crisis. These three crises would not have emerged had the Lebanese constitution mechanisms been respected. However, when Syrian allies did not activate such mechanisms, it appears that the recognition of the Lebanese State is linked to this State's compliance with "common paths" and "privileged relations".
The mere use of "Syrian allies" and the strategic relation with them demonstrate that the Lebanese State still has a long way to go in order to attain normal relations with Syria. Until it does so, and complies with the necessary requirements, Damascus declares that it will not accept to have diplomatic relations with Beirut.
It is no secret that Damascus is negotiating with intermediaries to solve the Lebanese crises in the name of its allies. The conditions set in these negotiations give its allies (i.e. Syria itself) the right to prevent any Lebanese decision taken by the current majority government (veto power in the Cabinet). These allies will not approve the election of a president as long as this right is not guaranteed. In other words, Damascus will not welcome a Lebanese president at the first Arab Summit it is hosting unless he commits to guarantee this right, even if it is in conflict with the Lebanese constitution mechanisms.
The other aspect of this reality is the complete disregard since its founding of past policies and resolutions of the United Nations, whose primary function is to maintain the sovereignty of its member states - even those states whose political borders were set up by former colonial powers. As a result, UN policies and resolutions become meaningless when invoked in Lebanese-Syrian relations, where even the justification of this disregard is countering US and Western intervention. It does not hide an evasion from the present issue, which is recognizing Lebanon as a sovereign independent state autonomous over its international borders.
Regardless of the Lebanese government's decision to be represented in the Arab summit, the fact is that the mere prolongation of the presidential crisis for more than 4 months prior to the scheduled Arab summit, is a statement to Arab leaders that the institution of the Arab league does not have any authority or legitimacy to protect a member and a founding state.
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