Disqualifying Iraq
Abdullah Iskandar Al-Hayat - 19/03/08//
Five years after the American invasion and occupation of Iraq, the outcome boils down to nothing more than multidimensional catastrophes. The scary figures so far recorded reveal the impossibility of comparing the declared objectives of the invasion and the status quo: Tens of thousands dead, hundreds of thousands injured, millions displaced, and billions of dollars wasted on the country's infrastructure. This is not to mention the sectarian, ethnic, and tribal divisions unprecedented in the modern history of Mesopotamia. On top of this, the structure of the Iraqi state is in complete collapse; its former institutions have been transformed into partisan and confessional sectors that consume massive budgets and invest them in domestic conflicts and war over influence. The oil wealth, meanwhile, has been plundered and squandered through smuggling, whereas the agricultural and industrial sectors have melted down, leaving billions of dollars in losses.
Among the catastrophes that will leave deeper marks on the future of Iraq is the collapse of the economic infrastructure, the domestic production cycle, and economic sustainability. These catastrophes have turned the Iraqis into an impoverished nation begging from donor nations to survive. All this is happening in an Arab country known to be among the wealthiest in natural and human resources. In addition to this, the new political authority is incapable of continuity without expressing allegiance, whether directly to the occupation forces or to the new force de jour represented by Iran. In other words, the Iraqi state has lost its sovereignty over its economy and its capacity to self-determination, at least in the foreseeable future.
It is no longer possible to hide behind the claim that all these consequences were necessary to get rid of Saddam Hussein and the Baathist rule. Such an excuse only aims at justifying the failure to protect Iraq's economic and political independence. It also aims at justifying the transformation in the nature of the Iraqi state and its institutions, as it continues to be the outcome of an intersection between American-Iranian interests. It is for all this that all attempts at reconciliation have foundered, and with them all efforts to end the violence arriving from every direction.
When accounting for the outcomes of the invasion and occupation, the spotlight remains focused on Iraq only because of the catastrophic outcomes on the human and political level in this country. Yet, the repercussions of the invasion and the occupation have left and will continue to leave deep marks across the entire region, not only with respect to fermenting new conflicts to be added to existing and continued disputes, but also regarding the circumstances that could push in the direction of serious democracy and good governance in the region.
This deep imbalance in the region does not only affect the perceptions that sectarian and ethnic groups have of their identities, histories and aspirations, but it also has to do with the loss of the collective abilities to maintain control or exercise deterrence by states on the domestic level and the loss of international deterrence, especially American deterrence. The US, once the only superpower before the invasion, has declined into nothing more than a paper tiger. With the retreat of Arab communities to the pre-state phase in simultaneity with the collapse of the state in Iraq, the demons of sectarianism have been let loose out of the guts of history in their pursuit of their lost kingdoms.
In this context, although with domestic variations, the Lebanese crisis would not have taken such a fatal turn without considering the outcomes of the collapse of Iraq and the formation of a new Iraqi authority, where many of the players are tied organically to Iran. This points at a crisis in several Gulf nations, especially given the offensive Iranian diplomacy on the domestic, regional and international levels. In parallel, by breaking down the Iraqi state, the occupation offered Arab safe havens for the radicals who were dispersed following the collapse of Taliban in Afghanistan. It also offered Islamists everywhere the material they needed for propaganda and instigation, allowing them to become an increasing source of threat to the existing authorities in multiple Arab states. In other words, the invasion has fueled and supported extremism in a manner that has spread turbulences and narrowed the domestic options of states. The Arab world is now more divided than ever on the basis of the position from Iraq and the outcomes there, even if the Lebanese crisis appears to dominate the surface of this conflict.
With the collapse and absence of Iraq, the Arab region has become in its modern history exposed to new rules governing a new set of conflicts.
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