Trapped Between Humiliation And Bush's Visions
Mostafa Zein Al-Hayat - 26/01/08//
Once again, it becomes crystal clear for the Arabs who have already signed peace treaties with Israel or those aspiring to do so, that the Palestinian question is an Arab affair and a national security issue. They also realized that the desire to put the Palestinian cause behind them and to ignore it in the name of realism, the inability to confront the Israel and the US, or the claim that Hamas has flipped against Palestinian Authority and joined the Iranian-Syrian project, changes nothing.
Once the inhabitants of Gaza broke the siege and swarmed through the borders, Israel instantly evoked the Egyptian choice, a choice motivated by its understanding of its national security since Egypt's responsibility for Gaza Strip and Israel's ability to export the Strip's crises to Cairo, and absolves it of its obligations as an occupying power and achieves its dream of separating the Palestinian territories. This would be far more convenient than hoping that Strip be swallowed by the sea as Isaac Rabin, the man of peace, used to say.
On this occasion, a few Israeli leaders recalled the Jordanian option vis-à-vis the West Bank. Having annexed most of this part of Palestine and to avoid its responsibilities, Israel often summons the choice of sharing responsibility over the West Bank with Amman under the pretext that the Palestinian State should be on the eastern bank, that is, inside Jordan. This choice was often repeated by Ariel Sharon (is he still alive by the way?) as he took advantage of Arab helplessness.
According to its calculations, Israel believes that the peace treaties with Amman and Cairo will secure its peace with the presence of international (American) guarantees. With this, Israel hopes to rid itself of the need to discuss the permanent status resolution, the roadmap, the refugees and Jerusalem, let alone the establishment of a Palestinian state.
Invoking the Jordanian and Egyptian choices may seem to be part of the history of the conflict, their implementation demands many new wars that the Jewish state may be unable to tolerate, especially after the failure of its war on Lebanon in 2006. Yet, they remain fundamental to the Israeli national security theory that makes distinctions between one Arab state and another only to the extent that such a distinction serves Israel's security. In the Arab world, meanwhile, the national security theory, if one exists, is based on the security of this tribe or that sect. Is this not the case in Iraq where each sectarian faction has its own state, army, security and political leadership? Is this not a potential scenario in Lebanon after reviving the "our strength lies in our weakness" slogan, allowing us to call for our disengagement with the Palestinian cause and to demand catching up with the fast moving peace wagon even if this cost us settling the Palestinians?
Hamas aside, when the inhabitants of Gaza broke the siege, they reminded the Arabs that they share common security and one enemy. They also reminded them that ignoring or avoiding this fact and failing to develop a national security theory that distinguishes friend from foe will keep them trapped between the peace treaties they concluded with the enemy and President George Bush's visions that are protected by his military bases. This being the case, it will be futile to seek help in Cairo or elsewhere because such an option will not be available.
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