What Made Khaddam Speak?
Hazem Saghieh Al-Hayat - 05/01/06//
Abdel-Halim Khaddam is not Hussam Hussam. Khaddam is a witness of the first degree, whose importance is not diminished by the torrent of curses that have fallen on him, reaching the point where he was accused of causing cancer among Syrians. In its recent long session, the People's Assembly (Majlis al-Shaab) in Syria resembled the Central Committee of the Stalinist era, when everyone would take turns recounting the shortcomings of the traitorous comrade, impugning his reputation and that of his family. No one expresses anything different, as they all confirm that they were aware of his doings from when he was at the political summit in Syria, even though they preferred to remain quiet about what they knew!
However, if the People's Assembly, in its iron consensus, indicated the distance separating it from elected Parliaments, Khaddam weakened his strong testimony when he failed to say anything that involved a review of his past roles, including his involvement in suppressing the Damascus Spring, limiting the accusations of monopolization of and isolation in power to the Bashar al-Assad era. This is despite the fact that authoritarianism is older and precedent to the current and Khaddam was an active partner in anchoring this system of rule.
In fact, the "legitimacy" of the previous phase is the first thing that made Khaddam speak, regardless of whether it was this or that incident, and this is what helped kindle his desire. The former Vice president belongs to a generation that is not that of the current President and those surrounding him. It is something that usually constitutes a reason for the resentment by the "founders," who can't tolerate things from the sons that they would tolerate from the fathers, who were there friends and partners. However, the "legitimacy" of the former phase is not only about ages. It also has to do with a method, or style of politics. Khaddam has been a traditional Baathist, a partisan of "pan-Arab" equality in despising peoples, or treating the Lebanese people exactly like the Syrian people are treated. In turn, he is a substitute for the lack of respect by honoring a number of Lebanese leaders, as he is aware of the "particularities" of Lebanon. The younger generation, with less knowledge and expertise, and less Baathist in a certain sense, has been beset by an imperial urge that, in its contempt, equates between the people and the leaders, while making politics into purely a matter of security and secret police coordination.
The background of Khaddam's rise is useful to understand what took place. He became one of the key figures in the regime after the Corrective Movement of 1970 (when Hafez al-Assad came to power); the movement established a relative opening to the Damascene bourgeoisie and conservative Arab regimes in the Gulf, without giving up the "strategic alliance" with the Soviet Union. In this climate, the long-time Foreign minister achieved his first diplomatic success in cementing Syrian positions in Lebanon. Then, with the staggering of the USSR and the outbreak of the war to liberate Kuwait came the second success, namely Damascus' joining an international coalition led by Washington, which brought regional and international backing for these positions.
In other words, Khaddamism, if we can use this attribute, was based on establishing a linkage between Damascus' Lebanese role and 3 settlements that always needed to be fashioned and worked on: one was the Lebanese political make-up, the second was the conservative Arab environment, and the third was the US. As for the civil-sectarian, Arab, and diplomatic sensitivities that arose in parallel with this policy, Khaddam sought to benefit from the Iranian element, as one of the important parts of the "Syrian strategy," especially in light of the sharp conflict with Saddam Hussein. However, relying on this element and its extension to Hezbollah in Lebanon, instead of others, was no longer digestible by Khaddam's acumen and sensitivities, after US forces reached the borders of Syria.
Most likely, these elements exploded in Lebanon with the assassination of PM Rafik Hariri, as it seemed that what Khaddam and his generation had built was being threatened by Bashar al-Assad and his generation. This is especially the regime's civil space narrowed and began to be contained by the challenges of the relationship with the US, Europe and the Arabs. When Abdel-Halim Khaddam says what he said, after the "suicide" of Ghazi Kenaan, the boat has begun its frightening descent under the waves. Lebanon, as the place that exports these contradictions and the sponges that can absorb them, is no longer there. The regime in Syria has to manage its contradictions face to face, in a manner better than the speeches that were delivered, in very bad Arabic, in the People's Assembly.
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