Washington And Tehran: An Equation Of Defeat And Victory

Sami Shoursh     Al-Hayat     2003/12/1

During the times of armed resistance in the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan in the 1980s, one of the Peshmerga fighters, a peasant from a mountain village, became famous for constantly complaining about the students, professors and intellectuals working for the Kurdish resistance, describing them as being good only at distorting the truth and twisting words. When someone would ask him to give examples corroborating his claims, he would immediately respond: these people are calling the military withdrawal at the fronts as an organized retreat, the crime of killing a person by revolutionary execution and the crime of killing another person as martyrdom, the political withdrawal as a tactic, a defeat as a victory, and stealing people as donations.

This Kurdish fighter came to my mind when I heard Iran's reaction to the decision of the IAEA regarding its nuclear program. The Iranians welcomed the decision and agreed to sign the additional protocol for the non-proliferation treaty. They also vowed to permanently cease the uranium-enriching operations, seriously cooperate with the international agency and allow its inspectors to enter every site they wished to inspect. But the problem is that they borrowed the language of the educated, which the Kurdish peasant talked about, and started calling the decision as a victory for Tehran over an American-Zionist conspiracy, and a defeat for Washington before the resistance of a country that refuses to yield! But the question that Tehran did not wish to ask is: which victory and which defeat?

Which victory? The Iranian regime was forced, after long years of a worsening situation, postponing and raising tension with neighboring countries and the international community, to admit that is owned a program for enriching uranium. Which victory? The Iranian officials had to confirm, under pressure and threats, that they had violated to some extent their commitments towards the international agency.

What defeat then? The Americans achieved what they wanted and even more after they succeeded in rallying the international community, and especially Europe, and imposed over Iran an accurate and strict inspections system over all of its institutions and programs, in addition to obtaining a direct pledge from Tehran to seriously and fully cooperate. What defeat? Washington also succeeded in rallying the various Iranian movements, conservatives, reformists and centrists, behind a single pragmatic position, at least in the context of the nuclear file, thus managing to pave the way for a more pragmatic Iranian position that could prevent what is described as an Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs.

And yet, it is not right to say that Iran was defeated, or that Washington won. Tehran was not defeated; it took a wise step in respecting the interests of its people. As for Washington, it did not win; after the September 11 attacks, it placed its decision-making power in the hands of the Department of Defense, but did well when it took it back to the Department of State during the time the IAEA decision was made.

But the question is: can this decision put an end to the American-Iranian crisis over the nuclear file? It can't. Both countries face another major test and other essential questions related to implementing the decision: will Tehran proceed with its current policy based on cooperation, compliance and positivity at a time when the agency's inspectors will be supervising its institutions and nuclear laboratories? Or will it adopt Saddam Hussein's way in cooperating with the international resolutions on paper and create crises in the execution? Also, will Washington proceed with its positive dealing with Iran? Did the U.S. want to invest the agreement of the international community over the last resolution to convince Tehran of the need to cooperate with the IAEA? Or does it want to use this agreement as the foundation stone for building a new international political alliance against Iran within the near future?

Answers to these and other questions are not yet clear. But what is more important than the answers is that Tehran will stop its heraldry description, which is full of the 'revolutionary' spirit to the decision of the international agency, and to avoid turning the facts into pompous and untruthful terms such as 'victory,' 'resistance' and 'foiling conspiracies.' What happened is not a victory for Iran or Washington, nor a defeat for either of them, but is in the best situation a positive sign from both capitals, and from the regional and international community, that it is possible to overcome the suffocating crisis and the oppression in the world, if we refer to a brain that Saddam Hussein have always lacked.

<h1>Washington And Tehran: An Equation Of Defeat And Victory</h1><h4>Sami Shoursh     Al-Hayat     2003/12/1</h4><p><p>During the times of armed resistance in the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan in the 1980s, one of the Peshmerga fighters, a peasant from a mountain village, became famous for constantly complaining about the students, professors and intellectuals working for the Kurdish resistance, describing them as being good only at distorting the truth and twisting words. When someone would ask him to give examples corroborating his claims, he would immediately respond: these people are calling the military withdrawal at the fronts as an organized retreat, the crime of killing a person by revolutionary execution and the crime of killing another person as martyrdom, the political withdrawal as a tactic, a defeat as a victory, and stealing people as donations.</p><p>This Kurdish fighter came to my mind when I heard Iran's reaction to the decision of the IAEA regarding its nuclear program. The Iranians welcomed the decision and agreed to sign the additional protocol for the non-proliferation treaty. They also vowed to permanently cease the uranium-enriching operations, seriously cooperate with the international agency and allow its inspectors to enter every site they wished to inspect. But the problem is that they borrowed the language of the educated, which the Kurdish peasant talked about, and started calling the decision as a victory for Tehran over an American-Zionist conspiracy, and a defeat for Washington before the resistance of a country that refuses to yield! But the question that Tehran did not wish to ask is: which victory and which defeat?</p><p>Which victory? The Iranian regime was forced, after long years of a worsening situation, postponing and raising tension with neighboring countries and the international community, to admit that is owned a program for enriching uranium. Which victory? The Iranian officials had to confirm, under pressure and threats, that they had violated to some extent their commitments towards the international agency.</p><p>What defeat then? The Americans achieved what they wanted and even more after they succeeded in rallying the international community, and especially Europe, and imposed over Iran an accurate and strict inspections system over all of its institutions and programs, in addition to obtaining a direct pledge from Tehran to seriously and fully cooperate. What defeat? Washington also succeeded in rallying the various Iranian movements, conservatives, reformists and centrists, behind a single pragmatic position, at least in the context of the nuclear file, thus managing to pave the way for a more pragmatic Iranian position that could prevent what is described as an Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs.</p><p>And yet, it is not right to say that Iran was defeated, or that Washington won. Tehran was not defeated; it took a wise step in respecting the interests of its people. As for Washington, it did not win; after the September 11 attacks, it placed its decision-making power in the hands of the Department of Defense, but did well when it took it back to the Department of State during the time the IAEA decision was made.</p><p>But the question is: can this decision put an end to the American-Iranian crisis over the nuclear file? It can't. Both countries face another major test and other essential questions related to implementing the decision: will Tehran proceed with its current policy based on cooperation, compliance and positivity at a time when the agency's inspectors will be supervising its institutions and nuclear laboratories? Or will it adopt Saddam Hussein's way in cooperating with the international resolutions on paper and create crises in the execution? Also, will Washington proceed with its positive dealing with Iran? Did the U.S. want to invest the agreement of the international community over the last resolution to convince Tehran of the need to cooperate with the IAEA? Or does it want to use this agreement as the foundation stone for building a new international political alliance against Iran within the near future?</p><p>Answers to these and other questions are not yet clear. But what is more important than the answers is that Tehran will stop its heraldry description, which is full of the 'revolutionary' spirit to the decision of the international agency, and to avoid turning the facts into pompous and untruthful terms such as 'victory,' 'resistance' and 'foiling conspiracies.' What happened is not a victory for Iran or Washington, nor a defeat for either of them, but is in the best situation a positive sign from both capitals, and from the regional and international community, that it is possible to overcome the suffocating crisis and the oppression in the world, if we refer to a brain that Saddam Hussein have always lacked.</p></p>