Peculiarity Of So- Called 'Decision-Making Process'

Azmi Bishara     Al-Hayat     2003/09/18

Sharon has a public opinion that supports the ongoing escalation of repressing and the assassinations policy, even though it ascertains that it might have advantages or disadvantages on the short run, but only disadvantages in the long run. Still, it supports ceasing these operations temporarily but not on the long run! This opinion, called public, is really intriguing, as it supported giving the Roadmap a chance, but didn't believe that Abbas' government would fight terror, even though it thought that Arafat was running it. This public opinion supports Sharon, although it does not trust him and is not satisfied with him. It also backs Arafat's expulsion, even though it is aware that such measure will not help stop the terror. The following is a sample of polls that were conducted over the past four months, ever since the new Palestinian government was formed and until its resignation.  

In Ma'ariv, on May 2, 2003: 53% are satisfied with the Prime Minister's work. This percentage recently dropped to 50%. Moreover, 46% support Abbas' appointment as Palestinian Prime Minister, while only 26% believe he will fight terrorism, and 71% consider that Arafat (opposed to 7% who opted for Abbas) is running things in the Palestinian Authority.

On June 13, 2003, following the assassination attempt of Al Rantissi, Yedioth Ahronoth published an opinion poll, that revealed that 33% believed the assassinations policy was useful, 18% considered it to be useful on the short run but not on the long one, while 38% believed it was harmful. It is a real state of confusion. 30% wanted this policy to last, whereas 58% asked for a temporary freeze. Naturally, Israel did not stop the assassinations, not even temporarily.

On August 22, 2003, 62% opposed the ongoing discussions with Abbas following the Jerusalem operation, while 35% wanted them to continue and 57% were against Israel implementing its commitments in the Roadmap, whereas 78% thought that Arafat was behind the operations, and 53% wanted him out.

On September 10, 2003, before the Israeli government made its latest decision, Haaretz published a poll revealing that 46% of Israelis wanted Arafat out or dead. Furthermore, Yedioth Ahronoth published another poll (September 12, a day following the decision), according to which 60% of Israelis backed up such a stance and 28% thought this move would reduce terror, although it was the first time a majority (53%) would give Sharon a bad grade on the way he handled terror.

The Israeli public opinion is not confused because its government's policy is, but because its government's policy is confusing it. This opinion only supports what the government suggests in terms of fighting terror, in a clear retaliation of vengeance. On the other hand, this public has orientations supporting a political solution that the government refuses. This is what causes the confusion.

On September 11, 2003, the Israeli government took the following decision: the latest events proved that Arafat is an obstacle to any kind of reconciliation between Israel and the Palestinians. Hence, Israel will work on removing this obstacle. This is what made the decision a hypothetical one, not ready to be implemented immediately. The Israeli foreign minister also reiterated this statement on September 15, when he said that the issue of killing Arafat had not been yet discussed. The decision has undoubtedly been accurately formulated. It meets both the needs of the public opinion and the immediate execution capability. The Arab media interpreted it as a decision of expulsion for two reasons: first, several Israeli ministers have suggested this isolation in the past, knowing that fighting this decision could lead to death. Second, because the Hebrew term 'sayluk,' if conjugated differently, could mean expulsion or isolation. But the translation is not accurate because the syntax of the sentence changes the meaning of this word. 

Clearly, the Israeli government has no response to the security issue. Sharon insists that the Israeli community has no choice but to hold on and wage a war of attrition if necessary.

The Israeli government holds the Palestinian President responsible for everything, even for the failure of the Roadmap. Hence, it provokes the public into demanding action towards this situation, such as killing the President. But would that really solve the problem? Sharon knows that this decision is pointless, as removing Arafat did not depend on an official governmental decision, but on the American stance from the moves that had no obvious results. More importantly, the Israeli security bodies are now convinced of the necessity of firing people, starting with the Chief of Staff, and ending with people, like Mofaz.