The Roadmap: From An Implementation Plan To A Negotiations Card (1/2)

Nayef Hawatmeh     Al-Hayat     2003/08/8

It is no longer possible to talk about the Roadmap without relating it to what happened in both Sharm Al-Sheikh and Aqaba, whereby the results of these summits cast doubt over the seriousness of the Bush administration in dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as the Palestinian-Israeli one. Instead of taking a balanced stance of integrity and neutrality, this administration once again adopted the policies it had been applying in the White House ever since it got there, hence planning to wage wars to serve Israel's interests. And to that end, the administration cooperated with the government of terrorist Sharon in exerting enormous pressures on the Arab countries, namely on the Palestinian parties, so as to carry out Sharon's 14 reservations to implement the Roadmap, which practically cancelled the main idea of the plan and turned it into a paper to negotiate one term after the other, during the course of the practical implementation, instead of a simultaneous implementation under the supervision of the international Quartet, in accordance with what the Roadmap stipulates.

The U.S. administration, which is relatively siding with the Sharonian understanding of a compromise, believes that the developments that followed the Anglo-American occupation in Iraq, along with the worsening situation of official Arab regimes and its success in imposing "a new and different leadership" to the Palestinians (according to the American-Israeli allegations), are all paving the way towards imposing a compromise that would suit the rightist Israeli terms, as well as give the U.S. administration the exclusive right of supervision. In other words, it would be the American hegemony, just like during the Washington negotiations (1991-1993), leading to Oslo (1993-1999) to this day. The results of both these summits represented the beginning of a serious step back in the direction of a destructive course aimed at imposing the Israeli view of the Roadmap, hence stripping it of its content and turning it into a series of security conditions imposed on the Palestinians; on the other hand, the Israelis washed their hands clear of most of their duties listed in the Roadmap, not to mention that they presented Sharon's speech in the Aqaba summit, relating the Roadmap to the 14 terms and understandings reached with the Bush administration, which worsened even further the latter's biasness.

What both Bush and Sharon sought in Sharm Al-Sheikh and Aqaba is no more than an obvious attempt to skip the main and urgent issues of the conflict and move on to the demands of the third stage, namely, to cancel the right of return, validate the return of both Egyptian and Jordanian ambassadors, resume the normal work of the Israeli communication and trade offices in the capitals where they were previously open, not to mention to pave the way for the rest of the countries to take the initiative of normalizing relations; all this latter should be done before any point of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that figures in the final stage (Jerusalem, the borders, the refugees, the settlements, etc.) is resolved.

A biased plan

The Roadmap, according to the logic and chronology of its text, is not balanced. Indeed, it gives priority to security issues rather than politics, and disregards the legitimate national rights of the Palestinians, namely that of an independent, fully sovereign state, the refugees, borders, settlements, detainees, Jerusalem. The text also condemns the legitimate right of our people to fight the occupation and the settlements.

The introduction of the Roadmap came as follows: "The solution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as to establish two countries, can only be achieved by ending violence and terrorism, and when the Palestinian people have a leadership working seriously against terrorism," etc. The seventh clause of the first stage says: "It (the Palestinian leadership) calls to immediately end the armed Intifada and all the violent actions against Israel everywhere, as well as for the all the Palestinian institutions to stop provoking Israel." The latter is pure injustice to the Palestinians, as both these texts prove the Israeli-American view saying that the Palestinian national struggle for liberation in all its forms, whether through the Intifada or armed resistance, is condemned and unjustified terrorism.

The U.S. administration having released the Roadmap after a six-month period of anxious waiting, realizes that the effects and repercussions of the Intifada and the resistance have been reflected in the Arab situation, whether at the popular or political level (political and financial resolutions of the Cairo summit, October 2000, to officially support the Intifada and the resistance; Amman in March 2001; Beirut in March 2002, the Arab peace initiative.)

The Intifada triggered international reactions that appeared in many of the Security Council resolutions, mainly: resolution 1397 that acknowledged for the first time in unanimity the Palestinians' right to a free Palestine within the borders of June 4, 1968, and Bush's vision speech on 24/6/2002.

Facing the effects of the Intifada and the collapse of the Oslo course, the EU, the UN and Russia rose for the first time, following ten years of American hegemony in deciding the destiny of the conflict in the Middle East, since the Madrid convention (October 1991), until the beginning of the Intifada and the resistance on September 28, 2002, which led to the formation of the international Quartet after Bush's speech; the latter expressed the American consent for a role for the EU, the UN and Russia in seeking a solution for the conflict through this committee.

Hence, the courageous Palestinian popular resistance against the occupational forces and the settlements was the response to the Sharonist expanding occupational and bloody policies. It also stopped the policies of the unfair Oslo Accords, in response to which was waged the Intifada, as the Israelis refused to recognize the Palestinian legitimate rights. This proves the American-Israeli attempt to deprive Palestinians from this right, but does not explain the Arab official policies contradicting the summits of Cairo, Amman and Beirut, as well as Mahmoud Abbas' government policy, which became consistent with the American proposal in both Sharm Al-Sheikh and Aqaba summits, and the latest return from Washington with empty hands and illusive words that mostly disappeared after Sharon's visit to Washington on 30/7/2003.

Mr. Mahmoud Abbas condemned in the Aqaba summit what he called terrorism and violence, and did not forget to show his sympathy for the Jews for the sufferings they endured throughout history, disregarding hence the sufferings of the Palestinian martyr, who is still crucified ever since the 1948 Nakba, with the oppression and daily massacres perpetrated by successive occupational governments.

This is an attempt to bend the truths, as the armed resistance was the result of the ongoing occupation and oppression, and stopping it cannot happen unless the occupation takes end and the settlements are dismantled; the Palestinians should also be given their legitimate rights in the independent State of Palestine, with its full sovereignty and Jerusalem for capital, and with borders of June 4, 1968. Moreover, the UN resolution 194 regarding the refugees should be implemented, as well as those of the Arab summits having followed the Intifada, the last of which was the Arab peace initiative (March 2002.)

The plan of the Roadmap is imbalanced because it requires Palestinians to make a series of long and exhausting security moves, followed by Israeli ones. This would not happen unless Israelis assess the seriousness of Palestinians in committing to what they are asked to do, which makes Israel the enemy and arbitrator, and puts hence Sharon, along with the radical rightist parties, in control of the initiative, as to hinder the implementation of any Israeli steps. Furthermore, this Roadmap is even shakier because of its long duration: it lasts three years and is implemented according to three stages, which makes it as bad as the Oslo course that ended in May 1999.

Solving the issue of refugees

The third stage contained the following text: "And it joins a realistic and fair solution that is agreed upon regarding the refugees." This is where we notice that the American administration has adopted the Israeli concept in explaining this text, and it was quite clear in President Bush's speech in the Aqaba summit, when he talked about "maintaining Israel's security as a Jewish state," knowing that the staff of the American administration has always reiterated that the solution of the refugees was illogical, as it threatened the security of the State of Israel and its Jewish aspect. The latter is a Sharonist suggestion that not only cancels the right to return as to accept the Roadmap, but also jeopardizes the right of a million and a half Palestinians in Galilee, the coast and Al-Naqab, as to live on their territory and that of their ancestors.

This American stance, which expressed its "understanding" of the Israeli fears, is a case of piracy of international law and international resolutions, which granted the right of Palestinian refugees to return home, according to resolution 194 enacted in 1949.

While the Roadmap makes the issues of the borders, Jerusalem and settlements negotiable in the third stage (2005), this proposal is extremely dangerous as it does not adopt the principles raised by the international resolutions, namely the full retreat from all the regions occupied by Israel in June 5, 1967 to the borders of June 4, 1967.

The Roadmap is a return to the policy of small steps that was tried in Oslo, and tragically failed in the end.

* Mr. Hawatmeh is the Secretary General of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.