The Palestinian Truce

Waddah Charara     Al-Hayat     2003/07/8

The Palestinian truce reflects the confusion prevailing on the Palestinian scene. While the Palestinian Authority was the one to announce the truce, it has no control over the forces on the ground engaged in resistance. These forces have conditioned their truce, and most of the terms they imposed were on the Palestinian Authority, which they expect to obtain from the Israelis. If the Authority fails to bring Israel to fulfill these conditions, stipulated by the resistance groups, it could lose some of its influence.

Still, the Palestinian resistance groups have said it loud and clear that they mainly agreed to the truce to avoid a military confrontation with the Authority. This truce is based on the agreement that has existed between the Palestinian resistance and the Authority since the start of the second Intifada. Had it not been for that agreement, fighting between the Palestinians would have been unavoidable. It was the Authority, with Yasser Arafat as its leader, which supported and encouraged the second Intifada. Moreover, some Palestinian leaders highlight the role of the Egyptian mediation in achieving the truce.

Thus, one may conclude that the appointment of Mahmoud Abbas as Palestinian Prime Minister, together with the Egyptian mediation, were decisive factors in producing the truce. But should the government of Abu Abbas prove to be unable to confront the militant Palestinian factions, or should the Egyptian mediation efforts tone down, nothing will stop the militant Palestinian groups from "fighting until total victory."

Thus, the Palestinians are carrying out the truce as two separate parties: the Authority and the resistance groups. This duality reflects the break between the Authority, which is the core of statehood, and society. Thus, the Authority does not truly represent the Palestinian society.

Following the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, missiles were fired at an Israeli settlement. The Palestinian Authority condemned the attack while Al Aqsa Brigades, which never accepted the truce, hesitated between claiming responsibility for the attack and taking its distances from it. But when the Israelis killed one of their fighters, the Brigades reminded the Authority of its reservations against the truce. This attitude appears like the resistance organizations have a role of guardianship over the Palestinian society, while the role of the Authority is restricted to maintaining the ceasefire.

That was but one example of a situation that could lead to political collapse within the Palestinian camp. The fact that the role of the Authority is restricted to that of mediation between Israel and the resistance groups will place it, sooner than later, in the position of being accused of biasness toward the occupation, thereby justifying war against it. Unless the truce is the first step in building a Palestinian state, which requires the inclusion of all movements into the state and accepting the powers of the state in running foreign and domestic affairs, it will be impossible to achieve a viable Palestinian state.

The resistance groups' refusal to accept the Palestinian Authority as the sole power in charge of maintaining law and order and in running foreign affairs will result in maintaining the duality in the Palestinian camp. Such a situation illustrates part of the political culture of the neighboring countries. In these countries, the ruling groups always maintain a "leader" party that is in charge of organizing paramilitary groups, which enjoy authority exceeding the state's institutions, under the guise of protecting the national interest. Along that model, the Iranian authorities unleashed their paramilitary groups against the students who demonstrated demanding reform throughout past June. Similarly, the Baath Party in Iraq barricaded itself behind paramilitary forces that ended up with assuming the powers of the state.

This confusion is also apparent within the Palestinian camp. While the majority of Palestinians, according to an opinion poll, support the Roadmap, only 36 percent call for arresting those who violate the truce and 25 percent support cutting all financial aid to the militant groups, while 65 percent believe that the military operations succeeded in achieving what the negotiations have failed to realize.

The assumption by Mahmoud Abbas and Condoleezza Rice that assimilating the militant Palestinian groups into the anticipated state or buying their weapons could reduce the possibility of Palestinian infighting could prove to be right. But it could also reflect a defeatist will.