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The Pakistani Link
Ghassan Charbel Al-Hayat 2004/03/21
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, President Pervez Musharraf had to take a difficult and critical decision by answering a difficult question: where would Pakistan stand in the 'war on terror'? Musharraf had to take many factors into consideration, the first being that losing the relation with the United States might lead to an American-Indian alliance threatening Pakistan in an unprecedented manner. The second is that should Pakistan join the camp hostile to the U.S., or hindering its war, the fate of its nuclear arsenal and the dangers it constitutes because it is in 'insecure hands,' would be discussed. He also had to take into consideration that the Taliban is, first and foremost, a Pakistani production blessed by the U.S. He had to remember that Pakistan, under the American blessing, played the role of the safe passageway and the backbone of the Mujahideen who came to Afghanistan to fight the Red Army - including Osama bin Laden. Musharraf did not need someone to remind him of the Pakistani military intelligence links with the Taliban and the sympathy of the Pakistani Islamists toward it and Al Qaeda, in addition to Taliban and Al Qaeda relations with the Pakistani tribes on Afghanistan's borders. Musharraf chose the adequate long-term solution and joined the "war on terror," which facilitated the way for the U.S. to topple Mullah Omar's regime and deprive Al Qaeda's leader of a safe haven.
The George W. Bush administration needed Pakistani support in order first, to facilitate its armed forces' mission in Afghanistan, and second, to prevent the fall of the substitute regime, in addition to forbidding Al Qaeda elements and leaders to find a secure Pakistani refuge. The Bush administration was accused of getting a big Islamic ally to face groups that seek to show the war on them as a war on Islam and Muslims. Developments showed the importance of the Pakistani link.
Soon, Al Qaeda felt the pressure of the American presence. Hence, a decision to assassinate Musharraf was issued - so far, he has escaped from many attempts, two of which targeted his convoy. The truth is that Al Qaeda desperately needs to eliminate the Pakistani link from the cordon around it, because this is a precondition to any serious attempt to change the situation in Afghanistan. Not to mention that troublemaking in a large Islamic country that possesses nuclear weapons would facilitate the way for Al Qaeda to capitalize on such a crisis.
In light of this effort to break the Pakistani link, one can understand the so moderate American retaliation to the perpetrations of Abdulkadir Khan, the world's biggest nuclear trader. Within the same framework, one can understand the statement of the Secretary of State Colin Powell considering Pakistan the biggest non-NATO ally and the Indian displeasure over such rhetoric. In return for these American gifts, Musharraf took the decision to fight Al Qaeda outposts on the borders, though he risks confrontations with the tribes there and with Islamic parties inside Pakistan.
It is obvious the fate of the Pakistani link is important for the future of Taliban, Al Qaeda and the "war on terror," especially after it was obvious that Iraq's structure does not allow Al Qaeda to seek a long-term refuge there, even if it were able to organize thunderous attacks in it.
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