M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: The Israeli agent Ahmad al-Hallaq blew up a car in Beirut, we lured him and drugged him and he woke up in the Army Intelligence Directorate prison - PART SEVEN
Ghassan Charbel Al-Hayat - 13/07/05//
Al-Hayat interviews the man who came to Lebanon's Sûreté Générale from the domain of intelligence, and was at the center of decision-making, and the center of the storm . . . ( Part 7)
In this segment, the former Director General of Sûreté Générale, Major General Jamil el Sayyed, discusses the operation to drug the agent Ahmad al-Hallaq in the occupied border strip and other events.
Here is the text of Part 7:
Al-Hayat: Can you tell us the story of capturing the collaborator Ahmad al-Hallaq in the (Israeli-) occupied strip and his execution?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: As you know, in the mid-1990s, the situation in South Lebanon was flaring up between the Israeli occupation and its aggressions, and resistance attacks. Israel would carry out operations inside Lebanon, including air strikes, car bombs, and assassinations through its agents. Ahmad al-Hallaq was a secret agent for Israeli intelligence, tasked with assassinating one of the officials in the resistance with a car bomb in Beirut's southern suburbs. He then fled to the border strip. The investigations that we undertook at the time, as the Army Intelligence Directorate, led to our learning his identity. We had very strong sources of information in the occupied border strip, all Lebanese citizens offering to help their country, and from various villages and sects. These sources told us that Ahmad al-Hallaq was going under an assumed name in the Marjayoun-Qlayaat area; we had previously distributed his picture. We set up a working unit between the Intelligence Directorate and South Lebanon Intelligence, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Maher Tufayli. There was coordination with groups affiliated with us in the occupied strip, some from the Nohra family, using the idea of inviting Ahmad al-Hallaq to a dinner at a home. He was known for being a heavy drinker, so the plan was to drug him and move him in the trunk of a car to the liberated area. The difficulty was that the roads leading from the occupied strip to the liberated areas had Israeli and (Israeli-allied) South Army Lebanon roadblocks, in addition to members of Israeli intelligence. We had to choose the easiest and least traveled crossing point; we chose Jezzine and the plan required that as soon as we drugged Ahmad al-Hallaq and moved him toward the crossing point, some of our military forces would fire at the surrounding areas to raise tension and busy the checkpoints. They would drop their concern with searching cars in order to confront the military situation. That's how it happened. A group inside that was working with Lebanese intelligence slipped Ahmad al-Hallaq through the checkpoint, drugged, and delivered him to the Intelligence Directorate. It was a huge surprise when he work up and found himself in our hands. Later, he was transferred to the judiciary; he was tried and sentenced to death, which was later carried out.
The Israeli occupation forces discovered what had happened after we announced that we had lured Ahmad al-Hallaq and detained him. They carried out a wave of arrests in the region and detained many people. They kept one of those, from the Nohra family, for many years in their prisons and accused him of conspiring in the incident. Later, during an exchange of the bodies of Israeli soldiers who had been captured by the resistance for Lebanese detained by Israel, including the person I just mentioned, he received a medal for his sacrifice.
Al-Hayat: How long did you stay in the Bekaa?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Until President Elias Hrawi was elected on 24 November 1989. He was elected in Chtoura and the atmosphere of the assassination of President Rene Mouawad hung over everything.
Al-Hayat: Nothing ever appeared with Mouawad's assassination?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I was based in the Bekaa at the time; like everyone else I learned about the assassination through the media.
Al-Hayat: When did you meet President Hrawi?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I knew him before he was elected president and we used to exchange visits when he would come to the Bekaa; he was an MP for the region. At the same time, he was a member of the group of independent Maronite MPs. We used to discuss the general situation. After he was elected, he asked me to be responsible for his security.
We spent a few days at the Park Hotel in Chtoura and then we moved to my home in Ablah, because the headquarters of the military commander of the region wasn't ready. The reason for the quick move was the difficulty in guaranteeing security at the hotel. That's why the president moved to my residence in houses for officers in Ablah, where he spent 10 days waiting for the regional commander's home to be finished. I remained responsible for his security for a number of months.
Al-Hayat: How did the move take place? It's said he wore a military uniform during the move.
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: When you're responsible for the movement of an important person, you have to carry out what's called a security maneuver. You have to assume that someone's waiting for him and trying to assassinate him. This is the kind of immediate security that led me to register my reservations about the immediate security of Prime Minister Hariri, after we evaluated his assassination. Immediate, or close-proximity security, obliges the subject to adhere to certain rules. There are obligatory measures such as those regarding the route to be taken, the type of vehicles, changing roads or exiting a covered or hidden area and halting in a covered or hidden area. Someone responsible for personal security should consider every safe return the survival of an assassination attempt. If the official becomes reassured, the possibility of a mistake becomes real. The measures taken each time are as if an assassination attempt might take place. While carrying out the security maneuver, you should expect that the one waiting for you is very smart, so that you engage in the highest level of deception.
Yes, Hrawi wore a military uniform and went with us in a jeep, without anyone noticing his exit, including security personnel at the hotel. Some of them even thought he had gone missing the following day. President Hrawi was responsive - in a jeep, without any special external appearance, or sirens. Before reaching the base, one of the tires blew out.
"We've begun our presidential term with a flat tire," he joked.
Al-Hayat: Let's go back to Ghazi Kenaan (Syria's officer responsible for Lebanon). There was a controversy when you differed with him prior to his leaving Lebanon.
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: When I became the head of the intelligence branch in the Bekaa, it was natural to coordinate with Syria's representative there. We had some excellent days and did much work to facilitate things. There were also days that weren't so good. A rivalry between us later arose, before his departure from Lebanon, and lasted about six months. He was quick to become agitated and hurtful; then he would regret things. I was informed that he was very critical of me during my absence, in the presence of some people who then told me. I thought it was his right to discuss security and politics with me, but not attack me personally, since this made it a matter of dignity. The issue snowballed and we broke off ties with each other, which ended prior to his departure.
Al-Hayat: Did he try to remove you from your post?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Yes, he tried. He sent someone to the top three leaders and asked them to stop dealing with me; two of them did so, but not President Lahoud, or Minister Jumblatt.
Accusations and Revenge
Al-Hayat: Some accused you of achieving personal benefits during your tenure in your post.
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Let me tell you something. First of all, the basic political and bureaucratic posts in Lebanon legally require their holders to submit a statement of personal wealth upon taking up and leaving a given position. This applied to me upon becoming director general of Sûreté Générale, and I carried it out.
Second, as for exploiting one's position, Lebanese in general, both loyalists and opposition, foreign embassies in Lebanon, the statement by the Maronite Bishops that talked about the poor situation of state institutions, the 2004 UN report on corruption and the performance of state institutions in the Middle East - they all agreed that my running of Sûreté Générale produced an institution that was the best in terms of integrity, performance, and productivity. You know that institutions are either repaired or corrupted from the top.
Accusations meant to defame or take revenge are the easiest thing to do. To answer them, anyone who has a file, evidence, or witnesses regarding any personal advantage or deal (of mine) should go to the judiciary, and I'm now out of public service. Making defamatory media statements is mere folklore. Anyway, it's not a crime if you have money or possessions; the crime is connected to the source of such things.
Al-Hayat: Did President Hrawi try to remove you from office by going to President Hafez al-Assad?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: That's correct. President Hrawi doesn't have any secrets and he'll tell you if you ask him.
Al-Hayat: Did President Hafez al-Assad protect you?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I left the temporary presidential palace, which Prime Minister Hariri had placed at the disposal of President Hrawi, after President Rene Mouawad, because of the pressurized atmosphere there.
Al-Hayat: Can you discuss these pressures?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: The truth is that President Hrawi thought his stay at the temporary residence in Ramlet al-Baida was going to be short, and that he'd quickly move to the Presidential Palace in Baabda. Things moved slowly because General Michel Aoun was residing in Baabda. Some people close to President Hrawi began doubting the Syrians' intentions. The problem dealing with any president is the presence of two teams that always surround him, with the problems and tensions that this can produce. One group was always asking why the Syrians didn't settle the matter and their comments registered with him. My view was that the matter wasn't that simple. Where was the logic in striking at the Lebanese Army and seeing the Lebanese Forces take control, with the president becoming their hostage in Baabda, like what happened with President Elias Sarkis and (then-LF leader) Bashir Gemayel? I told President Hrawi that the objective conditions for settling the matter weren't there yet. Of course, I didn't expect Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. I told President Hrawi that the conditions weren't there and he thought I was being disingenuous. I told him it wasn't enough for him to have the Taif Accord for the matter with Aoun to be settled; other elements were needed. President Hrawi began to get exasperated. One day, one of my aides, Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed Farshoukh, later assistant Director of Intelligence, and close to Prime Minister Hariri, clashed with May Kahaleh, who was President Hrawi's media advisor. She showed up with a Danish delegation to film "A Day in the life of the President" while the shelling was going on. Farshoukh protested, and had a disagreement with May. President Hrawi was on his way to his office when he encountered Farshoukh and asked him, "Are you security people with me or against me?" I was the head of presidential security and was being assisted by three officers of my class, Mohammed Farshoukh, Riad Mezher and Hussein Shahin. This was a temporary apparatus. I brought soldiers with me from Ablah and I needed officers residing in Beirut. I asked the three, whom I trusted, to work in this body. I was sitting with Riad Mezher when Farshoukh came in, agitated. He said, "The president insulted me." He told me what Hrawi had said and I replied, "He means me, not you."
I considered President Hrawi's question unacceptable by itself, because he was questioning his security. It's like asking your wife if she's faithful or not. Getting a divorce is better than such a question being asked. The question is an accusation. It was a Thursday. I prepared my letter of resignation and told the president words to the effect that "I hope those who are pushing you in other directions are as determined (to protect you) as I am." I sent the letter and left for my original headquarters, as head of Army Intelligence in the Bekaa.
Two days later, I was surprised by a phone call from Brigadier General Ghazi Kenaan, who said, "President Hrawi passed by on his way to Damascus and complained that you sent him a letter in which you were quite bold." I said that I hadn't been, that he was my president and prior to that my friend. The rights of the presidency and friendship are mixed up with me and the latter won out. That's why I left. I don't want my friend to make a mistake. And I can't deceive him."
Kenaan said, "We feel embarrassed when there's friendship between us and there's this kind of atmosphere between you and the president - unless you make it up to him and go back."
"He's the president," I said, "and I'm ready to go back and officially apologize but I can't stay on (in that position). When he asks if his security is with him or against him, that means that I shouldn't be there."
"We'll take a position on this," Kenaan said.
A few days later I went down and visited President Hrawi and told him, "I left as a friend and I have returned to you in your capacity as president to apologize and leave (my position)."
"We're friends, we're family, and we're from the same region," Hrawi answered.
He stood up and kissed me, and gave me a tie as a gift. Although my office and home were in Ablah, for six months I didn't visit Anjar (Syrian headquarters in the Bekaa), because I didn't want to embarrass them over President Hrawi. A while after that, Kenaan's aide called me and smoothed things over. In short, President Hrawi chose me for his security and I left because of the war with the advisors, which led him to pose the question that I thought was unacceptable.
Al-Hayat: Who were the parties to this war?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: They're well-known. That's all (I'll say).
Al-Hayat: We know that Prime Minister Hariri used to spend out of his own pocket on the presidential headquarters in a building he owned in Ramlet al-Baida.
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: President Hrawi was elected president of a state that didn't exist. The temporary presidential residence in Ramlet al-Baida was owned by Hariri. The firm Ogero, which Hariri owned as well, could perform the works quickly. Of course, President Mouawad resided in the same building before his assassination. When we arrived with President Hrawi, we found that the security arrangements were limited to sandbags directly in front of the building. Who would blockade himself in such a way, unable to see anything close-by? We tore down the surrounding parts and paved the area, and set up a security plan for the headquarters (of the presidency). Prime Minister Hariri took on these expenses at the time, including security and guards. We would give the soldiers an amount to be added to their salaries, since most of them were from the Bekaa. President Hrawi gave us an amount to distribute, around $100 for each soldier. My impression was that Hariri was handling the expenses.
Al-Hayat: You were responsible for security, and you say "my impression"?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Regarding that word, I didn't personally handle suitcases of money from Prime Minister Hariri to President Hrawi.
Al-Hayat: Did you receive part of what Hrawi received from Hariri?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: President Hrawi would give us a monthly budget, after we set down the criteria for allowances to the officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers responsible for guarding the headquarters. The apparatus was made up of 170 personnel and we spent about $23,000-27,000 every month. In addition, there was $3,000 to pay for hosting journalists at the Beau Rivage; we'd receive an amount that did not exceed $30,000. There are records.
The First Meeting with Hariri
Al-Hayat: When did you see Hariri for the first time?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I saw him in Ablah, after President Hrawi moved to the residence of the region's commander. That was the first time I met him. President Hrawi told me, "Go down to the road leading to the barracks. There's a car bringing Sheikh Rafiq al-Hariri. I want you to receive him well and accompany him here." Hariri had arrived in his plane at Damascus Airport and had come by car to Ablah. I remember the convoy arriving. I greeted him and accompanied him to President Hrawi's headquarters. There was a person accompanying Hariri whose name I learned was Abdel-Latif Shammaa; I met Hariri around two weeks after President Hrawi was elected, which means it was at the beginning of December 1989. I later saw him at Hafr al-Batin in Saudi Arabia, when President Hrawi decided to make a visit in order to thank the leaders of the Tripartite Committee (Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Algeria), which oversaw the Taif Accord. Saudi Arabia's King Fahd bin Abdel-Aziz received President Hrawi at Hafr al-Batin and we stayed at the Officers' Club. Prime Minister Hariri was there; his room was near the presidential wing. A Saudi soldier came to me and said Sheikh Rafiq al-Hariri wanted to see me. I went and found him walking in the corridor. Prince Saud al-Faisal (the foreign minister) entered a meeting between King Fahd and President Hrawi. In the large courtyard, we walked for about an hour, Prime Minister Hariri and I, and it was the first time we actually got to know each other. We had a discussion of the fighting underway in the "eastern region" (Beirut and Christian parts of Mount Lebanon) between General Michel Aoun and Dr. Samir Geagea (the leader of the Lebanese Forces). Hariri had questions about the Syrian "slowness" in settling the issue. He had the same doubts that I would hear from President Hrawi about why Syria was hesitant to act, and I explained to him the reasons for why the military option was being delayed, for the reasons I mentioned earlier. He wasn't convinced, just like Hrawi. When we headed off for the official dinner, he took my hand and sat me next to him. Afterward, we went to the sitting room and continued our conversation, to the extent that some people in attendance thought that we were old friends.
Al-Hayat: Didn't you know about his earlier roles (in Lebanese politics) during the 1980s?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Of course, but there was no personal acquaintance. My work was in the Bekaa. The first time I appeared in Beirut was 5 January 1990; I stayed with President Hrawi. President Hrawi was elected on 24 November 1989. After two days at the Park Hotel, I moved to my home in Ablah and on 6 December I moved to the residence of the regional commander for the Bekaa. On 5 January, we went to Beirut at night. During those days, the Cabinet would convene at the Ablah Barracks. The first government was headed by Dr. Salim Hoss.
Al-Hayat: Did you use to record the Cabinet's deliberations?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: There weren't so many great secrets that required this. The secrets of the Lebanese State are not in the Cabinet. If they wanted to betray a secret, they'd bring it up in the Cabinet. President Hrawi would request me to provide lunch for the ministers. I'd order food from the Auberge Restaurant in Shtoura. At the first lunch, he told me, "Stay and have lunch with us." I happened to sit near Mohsen Dalloul, who had been appointed minister for the first time in his life and was given the Agriculture Ministry. President Hrawi was familiar with agriculture. In front of Minister Dalloul was a plate of assorted pickled vegetables and there was a similar plate in front of President Hrawi.
President Hrawi reached out and took a piece, asking Dalloul, "Minister of Agriculture, what is this?"
Dalloul picked up a similar piece from his plate and said, "It's pickled potato." Hrawi asked me the same question, and I said, "It's taro."
Hrawi said, "Oh boy, a minister of agriculture who can't tell the difference between potatoes and taro." He liked to joke.
Al-Hayat: When did President Hrawi request your removal?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: When I was assistant director of intelligence in the Army. When Hariri became prime minister after the "tire revolution" against Omar Karami's government (in May 1992, after popular protests that featured burning tires), differences began to appear between the government and the Army over various issues. General Lahoud, who was the Army commander, erected a strong barrier to prevent politicians from intervening in the military, and we would carry out this policy. Hrawi was criticized in the media and he thought I was running this campaign against him. By the way, President Hrawi liked the world of intelligence. If he hadn't been elected president, perhaps he would have liked being a director of intelligence.
In fact, Hrawi liked the former director of intelligence in the Army, Johnny Abdo. Abdo was accused of what I was later accused of, regarding setting up governments and nominating ministers. It's said that he supported Hrawi's becoming a minister during the Elias Sarkis presidency. There was a strong friendship between Abdo and Hrawi. I found this out when I went down to Beirut with him. His ties with Abdo were close.
Al-Hayat: Did you discover this through tapping Hrawi's phone calls?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: No, he would call him every day, sometimes in front of me, and discuss matters with him. President Hrawi doesn't have a complex about such things.
Al-Hayat: So, Abdo was the friend of Hrawi and Hariri, meaning that he had influence.
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: It was natural for Johnny Abdo, who resided outside the country, to enjoy a special situation due to his ties to the two men, despite all of the sensitivities that his name provoked due to his former responsibilities, like any intelligence chief who leave his post under exceptional circumstances. After leaving his post, Johnny Abdo found himself confronting hostile feelings by many people, which could cause him harm. There were many friends who were unable or unwilling to help him. His situation was similar to everyone who has had security responsibilities and then been let go due to strategic developments.
Al-Hayat: Did you participate in oppressing Johnny Abdo?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: You should ask him that question. Politics separated us but our rivalry was within the rules of the game.
Al-Hayat: There was an incident with Abdo's wife.
-Johnny knows the story. I'm against immoral behavior when it comes to security. I support being harsh when the matter requires it, or with someone who deserves it. But not crime, or immorality. Security bodies sometimes harass people. But there's a difference between harassment and being unethical. The FBI in the US, for example, monitors a person to learn about him. It follows him around the clock, but this guarantees the security of the person under surveillance and does not bother him. There's a difference between a little annoyance and acting without morals, such as hitting a woman. In any case, as an expression of my refusal of such practices, I took the initiative to telephone Mrs. Abdo, condemning the incident and offering to help.
Al-Hayat: Is it true that you wrote newspaper items anonymously, or under pseudonyms? Do you write well?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I haven't written newspaper articles, but I write well. The media looks for a story. The professional journalist looks for news in certain places. We didn't distribute news. Assume that a journalist is preparing a topic and he believes that Jamil el Sayyed has something that will help. If a journalist calls and I believe that providing information is useful, I deal with him. Where is the person who works in intelligence and doesn't have a relationship with the media? The media and intelligence are cousins; the difference is that intelligence people write privately and the media writes for the public.
Al-Hayat: Did you use to pay journalists?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Just for the record, the budget of security institutions in Lebanon is among the lowest in the world. The total monthly budget for all four security agencies isn't more than $400,000. When I was in intelligence, the budget was not in the hands of the Assistant Director. At Sûreté Générale, there isn't a big budget, unfortunately. Under the best of conditions, Sûreté Générale's security budget is $60,000 a month. If you ask about facilitating things and providing services, yes, and journalists are like politicians and others who work in public domains. They get special treatment in terms of services, through the public relations office.
Al-Hayat: You had disagreements with journalists and harassed them.
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: When you deal with security, political and economic issues, there are repercussions, such as criticism and praise, or personal attacks, or ignoring proper decorum in the press, etc. Lebanon is an open country and its media is wide-open, too much so. There are some good writers and other, hired guns. Of course, as part of my security work, for many years we had problems with some journalists. The reason usually wasn't related to a lack of tolerance for opinions, but rather the slanderous attacks on the State, its symbols, policies, or harming relations with fraternal (Arab) countries. Even legal complaints aren't accepted by some journalists. I'll give you an example. During this period, five people have mounted a campaign of personal insults against me: Ahmad Jarallah, Tahsin Khayyat, Hassan Sabra, Nuhad Ghadiri and Fares Khashan. I'll ask anyone in the Arab world. What's the common denominator among these five? Some people know the answer and others who don't should ask.
Al-Hayat: The patrol that followed Samir Kassir (a Lebanese journalist assassinated in June) one day almost clashed with his bodyguards - was it from Surete Generale?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: The problem with the journalist Samir Kassir took place in 2001; in 1999 he had asked me to appear with him on a television program he was writing for (state-run) Tele-Liban. The request came via my son Malek, who was his student in university. I excused myself because I hadn't yet given any press interviews. A while later, changes took place at TL and Samir Kassir was no longer a program presenter, which he was appointed to during the Hrawi-Hariri period. Kassir had well-known, critical and scathing political positions. Our problem with him in 2001 was that we picked up his passport when he entered Lebanon and Sûreté Générale at the airport gave him a receipt for it, saying that it was being reviewed to check the origin of the passport. This is because Kassir was of Palestinian origin; his father was a naturalized Lebanese and his mother was Syrian. His passport was returned after verifying and there was an official statement by Sûreté Générale at the time. Regarding the patrol that would follow him in 2001, it didn't belong to Sûreté Générale. Sûreté Générale only checked into the passport, and these are the confirmed facts at Sûreté Générale. The problem ended with him at the time, after the official statement. Later, after the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri by about two months, Kassir's wife, Gisèle Khoury, called me, via the public relations person at MTV, Nadine Tarabay. She asked me, on Khoury's behalf, if I would agree to appear on Khoury's show on al-Arabiyya, to talk about this period. My answer to Mrs. Tarabay was that she should tell Mrs. Khoury that I accepted in principle, but at a suitable date following my leaving my post. Later, Mrs. Tarabay told me that she informed Gisèle Khoury of the positive answer and Khoury laughed, not expecting that I would say yes regarding her program.
Tomorrow: Part 8
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