M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: The attempted bombing of the Italian Embassy was not fabricated... They washed their hands in the blood of Hariri and the Syrian withdrawal and they accused the security regime of corruption - PART SIX
Ghassan Charbel Al-Hayat - 09/07/05//
Al-Hayat interviews the man who came to Lebanon's Surete Generale from the domain of intelligence, and was at the center of decision-making, and the center of the storm . . . (6)
Here is the text of Part 6.
Al- Hayat: The attempt to bomb the Italian Embassy in Beirut last year sparked a commotion and many people doubted that it was true. There were also matters related to those detained in (the riots of) Majdal Anjar. Were these all fabrications to prop up the political situation of the authorities at the time?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: In Lebanon, everything ends up involving the conspiracy theory. We live in a climate where there is a lack of confidence in the State itself and between the State and everything outside of it. Everyone doubts everyone else and truth is mixed with lies; people get lost.
The case of the Italian Embassy did not begin in Lebanon, but in Italy. In the summer of 2004, a high-level Italian security delegation came here on a special plane, carrying information about an imminent attempt to bomb the Italian Embassy in Beirut, with 300 kilograms of explosives.
The delegation had a photograph of one of the suspects, Ahmad Salim Miqati, taken by a security camera at the entrance to the Embassy. The Italians weren't sure if the picture was of Miqati and they asked for the Lebanese authorities' help in identifying him. Miqati has been wanted by the Lebanese authorities since the Dinnieh events in the North in 2004, which saw clashes between the Lebanese Army and a fundamentalist group. They killed 14 Army personnel and (fundamentalist) fighters and some were detained. Miqati fled to the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp near Sidon and it's not presumed that he is outside the camp. The file was transferred to the Internal Security Forces, which would coordinate with Italian security; the latter said that it had an important source that could lure Miqati to an area near the Beirut pine forest (Horsh Beirut). The ISF, in coordination with the Italian source, produced a plan and detained Miqati 48 hours after the Italian delegation's arrival. Of course, investigations began with the supervision of the concerned judiciary and the ISF raided various places, including Majdal Anjar in the Bekaa, where some weapons and explosives were confiscated and some people were detained. One person, Ismail Khatib, died during the investigation.
During that period, the political attacks in the country were at their peak, and the war of extension (of the president's mandate) was in full swing. The security organizations and their accomplishments were classified as being in the president of the Republic's camp; any accomplishment of this type would be considered political capital for the pro-extension camp.
The sad death of Ismail Khatiib during investigation at the ISF facility set off the first spark of the campaign of doubt about the seriousness of the bombing attempt; it went as far as lodging a legal challenge to the acts of the ISF and the principles of investigation, and methods of torture, among other things. Then, the matter took on a sectarian character that resulted from a series of media criticisms and objections; some of these turned into demonstrations and blocking roads in certain towns.
In any case, the Italian delegation departed, thanking Lebanon for the arrests. They believed that an attack against their embassy had been thwarted; an official statement by the Italian Defense Ministry talked about the attempted act, confirming it, and thanking the Lebanese and Syrian authorities for their cooperation.
Thus, the story is true and not fabricated; its source is from outside the country and the Lebanese security authorities. However, the political timing of the event was very bad and Ismail Khatib's death complicated things. The event entered the political bazaar of tension and accusations, and has remained so until day. Some ISF officers paid the price and some detained individuals were released. There were political promises accompanying the parliamentary elections that those who remain detained would also be released.
Al-Hayat: What's the secret of your strength?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: In Lebanon, no one is always strong, or always weak. Strength and weakness are determined by conditions. There are people who are served by circumstances. What does it mean if you are a strong (state) employee? Do you organize a revolution if you're transferred from your post, or do you carry out an intifada is there is a decree passed that you don't like? Perhaps the reason for my strength is that I am ready to lose, when necessary. I don't like to lose, but I'm ready to. Most people I deal with don't like to lose aren't prepared for it. I go all the way and others will stop halfway and come back. This gives the impression that I'm strong. I'd be lying if I said I liked to lose, but I'm ready for it when necessary. What happened with me recently is considered a loss. I was convinced that the path would lead here. I prepared for my exit from my post with a statement, news conference, and letter of resignation. I'm a realist, and I accept the consequences.
Al-Hayat: Did you feel that the date of your resignation had approached when you heard the news that Prime Minister Hariri had been assassinated?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: At that moment, nothing came to mind other than the fact that a catastrophe had befallen the country. My personal feelings were that I had taken a blow; not in terms of my job, but in terms of my morale.
Al-Hayat: When did you conclude that you would have to resign? Was it after a former general at Surete Generale, Hassan Sabaa, was selected minister of interior?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: My media appearance took place before he was appointed, and I mentioned this; there was no connection between his arrival and my resignation. Things were moving in that direction even during the government of Omar Karami.
Al-Hayat: During your news conference, you appeared irritated and agitated.
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Yes, because I was distressed while speaking. All of them washed their hands in the blood of Hariri and the Syrian withdrawal, while forgetting the crimes that they committed against the country, the bureaucracy, ministries and state funds, and (their) corruption; they rained accusations on the security regime. I'm a part of this regime. I accept seeing facts published, names specified, and accusations made - not accusations about generalities so that the perpetrator remains unknown and suspicions arise about everyone, without exception. I wouldn't have protested if they had named the person in the "security regime" against whom the accusations were being made. They ignored who was responsible and held the security regime responsible for corruption and collapse. This I don't accept. I challenge them to reveal all of the files. During the 37 years of my service in the military and security organizations, I have not had a direct or indirect personal interest. This is why I said that they were using the blood of Prime Minister Hariri to cover what they had done.
Al-Hayat: Why did you go to Kuwait to file a complaint there against some accusations, instead of doing so in Lebanon? Isn't your lack of trust in the Lebanese judiciary strange?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: It wasn't an issue of a lack of confidence; I was still director general of Surete Generale, and the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Siyasa published an article after the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri mentioning my name along with Syrian officers, as part of an untrue story about our being suspected of being behind the explosion. Due to the popular feeling about the assassination and the accompanying political accusations and media commotion, al-Siyasa's article hurt me to a great extent. I had two alternatives: file suit in Lebanon, and they would say that I was using my influence with the Lebanese judiciary to my benefit, or go to the home of Ahmad Jarallah and his newspaper and submit the complaint there, so that the accused would be in a better position than me, in front of the judiciary of his own country. I preferred to go to Kuwait and engaged the famous lawyer Abdel-Hamid Sarraf, who accepted. We now have six complaints against Jarallah and his newspaper in Kuwaiti courts; they have begun to look into them. I will follow this up until the end, even if I have only one day left to live. I want Ahmad Jarallah to understand that attacking people's dignity and honor won't go unpunished, however long it takes. Even if the court finally finds him innocent of defamation and slander in some of the six lawsuits I filed with the Kuwait judiciary, I'll follow it to the end. If the Kuwait judiciary completely exonerates him, I will study legal ways of suing him through British courts. I won't stop going after him because he cased me moral and material harm; he's unaware of the degree of the damage that he caused. Jarallah is asked to issue a public apology, suiting the degree of the damage caused.
Al-Hayat: It's said that you filed other lawsuits in Lebanon.
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: When the accusations by politicians against security bodies multiplied regarding the Hariri assassination, no one was mentioned by name; they all accused the security agencies without naming anyone. When I headed one of these agencies, I considered myself concerned by their accusations. Rather than burying my head in the sand on the grounds that they didn't name me, I took the initiative of gathering all of their statements and sending an accompanying letter to the Public Prosecutor's Office, asking that they be summoned and questioned. I indicated my readiness to answer and reserved the right to take legal action for slander. I did the same thing with the Democratic Left Movement and its secretary, Elias Atallah; I filed suit against them because they named me in the assassination of the journalist Samir Kassir. Elias Atallah was guilty of assaulting me with the accusation, and I will continue till the end to see that he pays the price of his action, with the judiciary. This person can make general political accusations but he has no right to make direct criminal accusations against anyone.
Al-Hayat: What did you feel vis-à-vis your family when you saw your picture raised at the (14 March) demonstration of one million people, along with accusations and demands that your be removed from your post? Did you feel that you were hated in the country?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: When the pictures were raised, we learned that a number of people, some of whom were from the (Hariri) Future Movement, had done this. The image of the pictures was hurtful in and of itself. Personally, I considered it an attack and a violation of the law. But in the emotional climate in the country, such things happen. The (extent of the) pictures was limited, but the media played them up.
Al-Hayat: Did you feel fear at the time?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Why should I be afraid? When I entered the Army in 1968, I considered danger to be a part of my life. When I moved to security, there was even more danger. I don't like to live in danger, but the nature of some responsibilities puts you in the forefront and sometimes creates enemies whom you do not know and do not hurt.
Al-Hayat: Did you try to contact the Hariri family after the assassination?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I paid my condolences after the funeral; I visited Qoraytem, like everyone did at the time.
Al-Hayat: Did you hear anything unfriendly?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: No. I reiterate: I don't have any feelings of guilt. However, I did feel that I had received a blow to my morale, as a security official. Why shouldn't I go? Of course, in the security field, after such an incident of this type you feel yourself to be in a weak position, even if the security of the person who was targeted wasn't one of your direct responsibilities.
Al-Hayat: Were you informed that Arab countries had recommended to Syrian officials prior to 14 February (Hariri's assassination) that they should be concerned with Hariri's security?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: No, I heard about this in the media after the crime took place.
Al-Hayat: Didn't foreign parties draw your attention to the probable threats against Hariri?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I've already answered that question; nothing of this sort was raised with us. We directed the attention of ambassadors and the UN secretary general's envoy, Terje Roed-Larsen, to the fact that Resolution 1559 would move the country from one position to another and abolish the strategy upon which security and stability had been based; it would push Lebanon toward danger, and the unknown.
As for anticipating a huge crime such as 11 September 2001 or the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri, this was extremely difficult, due to the secrecy that usually surrounds the preparations for such crimes. Thus, security bodies require luck, or a coincidence. Security is daily, exhausting work and is served by coincidences. Sometimes, you work day and night and no coincidence takes place. It's true that the more you work, the more coincidences arise, but it's not necessarily the case that a coincidence will arise each time. Sometimes it passes in front of you but you can't catch it; sometimes you're on the verge of revealing it.
Al-Hayat: When the crime took place, did the heads of security bodies discuss the topic of resignation?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: There was no such meeting of that kind.
Al-Hayat: Didn't the head of Army Intelligence, Brigadier General Raymond Azar, express a desire to resign?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Later on, and after my news conference, where I said that if the matter was political, we would depart with the politicians - you (the opposition) win in the elections and we'll leave. But if it's a crime, then we'll go to court. However, I didn't resign under the weight of the crime.
Al-Hayat: Then why did you resign?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: With the government of Prime Minister Najib Miqati, it was clear that it adhered to a program outlined by the ministerial policy statement, and one of its planks involved removing the heads of security agencies. I considered the spirit of the govenrment to be a post-election spirit, and not that of the pre-election phase. Therefore, I said in my letter of resignation that I considered that the new government had been formed as if the opposition had won in the elections, before their taking place, so thus I should resign. The alternative was to await being removed temporarily (placed at the disposal of the government) and this was a punishment that I rejected beforehand.
Al-Hayat: But you went to see the new prime minister.
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: The prime minister telephoned, and since I had known him for a long time, he asked me to propose an exit strategy. He said that the government would be ready to go along with it. I told him, "There is a way out. If our presence angers the international investigation committee, what about leaving during the period of the committee and returning after its work is finished, and not returning if I am found guilty?" He asked me for a scenario, and I provided him with one. Prime Minister Miqati said, "We'll adhere to this." At the same time, due to my knowledge of what was going on, I expected that they wouldn't be able to continue with this scenario in the Cabinet. On the following day, Prime Minister Miqati left with President Lahoud for Rome. The minister of interior objected to the scenario that Miqati and I had discussed, and Prime Minister Miqati didn't say that he was the one who telephoned and requested this of me. Since the days of Prime Minister Hariri, (state) employees have been received for meetings, but after the minister of interior's objection, Miqati said only that "we also insist on hierarchy." Thus, Miqati could not tolerate the consequences of the visit that was responsible for the proposal; how could he (defend) the proposal in the Cabinet
You try to head off an imminent insult to yourself; you don't wait for it to happen. I considered the matter closed and prepared my resignation letter, in which I thanked prime minister for his initiative to summon me and request a scenario (for my departure); I left with my dignity, the international committee was present, and I am ready.
Al-Hayat: Aren't you bitter about being retired at the age of 55?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I worked for 37 years without interruption. I don't think it's a matter of the age at which one retires. Thirty-seven years, and 27 of them in security. Every day in the security field equals three normal days. It means I worked for 100 years, and I need some rest.
Al-Hayat: Isn't there bitterness?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I'm not bitter about leaving my job. There's bitterness about the circumstances that attended my leaving, which reveal that there was a test of political strength, and wasn't connected to the facts. I accept everything that's logical; in the end, we followed a specific policy. Lebanon is experiencing radical changes, and I said that the heads of sensitive political positions in Lebanon, as in other countries, appear with one policy and change when that policy changes.
Al-Hayat: Can it be that you don't like having authority, as someone who didn't allow roles to be played by others?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: What do you mean?
Al-Hayat: You expanded your role and turned Surete Generale into a partner in power, which angered the president and the various governments.
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I filled a vacuum when it was necessary, and authority usually has many vacuums; the prerogatives of Surete Generale include politics, the economy, security, etc.
Al-Hayat: There's talk in the country about you always having had a number of ministers you manipulate, sometimes against Prime Minister Hariri. It's also said that some of them would write reports (as informers). How can a director of Surete Generale do such a thing?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: It's a small country and everybody knows everybody else. If the director of Surete Generale knows half the Cabinet, if not all of the ministers, that's natural. It would be unnatural if the director of Surete Generale didn't know the members of the Cabinet. If the government resigns and you haven't established a relationship with its members, that's also unnatural. If you take into consideration my work in intelligence, and then Surete Generale, you'll see that it's natural for me to know many ministers, MPs, opposition members and senior state employees. Relations with them vary. There are close friendships, relationships that are ordinary, and passing acquaintances. There are people who have sensitivities when it comes to you. The reality is that sometimes there are ministers close to you, not as director of Surete Generale, but due to the policies of the government or the president.
As for some ministers writing reports about meetings, there's no need for this at all. Lebanon is an open country. The Cabinet's deliberations are printed by the newspaper the next day, including the disputes that arise. Talk of some ministers being informers is a type of vilification. We have friendships with certain people, different people who belong to various political orientations that are close to one another; we interacted with them but not based on a personal policy.
I've been accused recently of being an ally of Prime Minister Hariri and during other periods, I was accused of being hostile to him. The reality was that it was connected to the issue at hand, its nature, and timing. Something that was in Hariri's interest did not involve a whim, and being his rival wasn't based on a whim either. Your vision of the most suitable way to deal with an issue puts you in a position of closeness or distance from him.
Al-Hayat: Did you intervene in the formation of Cabinets?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: It depends on what you mean by "intervene." Sometimes you or someone else is asked to propose names with certain qualifications. My opinion was sometimes sought about certain details; that was part of my work at Surete Generale, and it wasn't connected to Jamil Sayyed. All of my predecessors had proposed Cabinet formations and administrative appointments that they would carry among top leaders, to reduce differences or disputes. This is the nature of the work of Surete Generale, so in that sense, yes, I intervened.
For example, in the last Omar Karami Cabinet, I was asked for the name of an honest and bold person who could handle the burden at the Ministry of Electricity, to rein in the waste and corruption. I proposed several names, including Mr. Maurice Sehnaoui. He was accepted and proved to be one of the most successful ministers. In a few months, he accomplished what took others years to accomplish.
Al-Hayat: If we go back in time, do you consider Hariri's exit from office after the election of President Emile Lahoud in 1998 to have been a mistake committed by Lahoud and his team? Wouldn't it have been better to see Hariri use up his political capital by staying in office?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I don't think that was the perspective used in the matter. In reality, President Emile Lahoud's coming to office in 1998 took place contrary to the wishes of most of the political class in Lebanon. I can say contrary to the wishes of 90% of them, including Prime Minister Hariri, Minister Jumblatt, and others. Prime Minister Hariri was the most important political player on the scene and would be a partner in the executive branch with any president. President Lahoud wanted his term to begin with a partner other than Prime Minister Hariri. However, Syria, represented by President Hafiz al-Asad, at the time supported a type of continuity, accompanied by a correction of Lebanon's political, economic and administrative conditions, instead of a total change that could plunge the country into the unknown. This was especially true in light of the huge economic burden, which Hariri was considered as being able to deal with. President Lahoud responded to the Syrian wishes to keep Hariri. When the two got down to the business of their "forced marriage," they began dealing with the details, and the devil is in the detail, as they say.
The parliamentary majority named Hariri for the prime minister's post, but he objected to the way that some MPs delegated their votes on the matter to the president. He considered this unconstitutional and MTV quoted him as accusing the president of violating the Constitution. I think President Lahoud would accept any accusation except violating the Constitution, particularly because he arrived at the presidency under the slogan of a "state of law and institutions." He believed the accusation to signal a desire to break ties. All of the factors for a "divorce" were there; the statement (on MTV) was the final straw, which brought things out in the open. Both Lahoud and Hariri concluded that they were headed toward a divorce and preferred to not enter a partnership in power.
Al- Hayat: Did Hariri receive advice from a Syrian official to leave office and wait for some of President Lahoud's political capital to be used up?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I didn't hear anything about this piece of advice. I know that Prime Minister Hariri was ready to participate in government but not according to the conditions that suited President Lahoud.
Al-Hayat: Does it anger you to read that you are Syria's man in Lebanon?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I'm Syria's man in Lebanon and Lebanon's man in Syria, due to my deep and full belief in the Lebanese-Syrian relationship. This is a historical and geographical reality. It's shameful to attack the relationship in and of itself. The problems lie in the exercise of this relationship. I adhere to the principle of the relationship and I believe that it should not be harmed, whatever the reservations about it in practice. In my opinion, many of those who have carried out this relationship in the name of the Lebanese-Syrian alliance, whether Lebanese or Syrian officials dealing with Lebanese matters, made common mistakes.
Al-Hayat: Did you have secret visits to Syria? The common view is that you had weekly or monthly meetings.
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Based on my understanding of this relationship, I don't see any embarrassment in such visits; I would be honored if I had had regular, secret meetings with President Bashar al-Asad. But this wasn't the case. President Lahoud sent me twice on missions to Syria and the third time was when an appointment was arranged with President al-Asad following my resignation, when I was a civilian. Inside Lebanon, other officials and I had meetings with representatives of Syria in Lebanon, whether during the tenure of Major General Ghazi Kenaan or Brigadier General Rustom Ghazaleh. These meetings were periodic and were part of the coordination and existing missions between the two countries. They weren't limited to security officials; most politician had meetings with representatives of Syria.
Al-Hayat: When did you go to Syria as a Lebanese Army officer?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: The first time was with Brigadier General Ibrahim Shahin, when he was the commander of the First Brigade. That was in 1979, as I recall. There was the First Brigade of the "Vanguard Army" that was present in the Bekaa Valley, and which comprised soldiers from various groups, at a time when the Lebanese Army was divided in other areas. Part of its was under the command of General Hanna Said and another part under Ahmad Khatib. I was in Beirut and Ahmad Khatib issued an order about my not joining him, and I preferred to go to the Bekaa. There, I examined things and decided voluntarily to join this force. Fahim Hajj was the leader of the Vanguard Army, and with him were officers from all of the country's sects. Ibrahim Shahin was a member of the leadership council and Suleiman Mazloum, Michel Ziade, Butros Farah and Fawaz Masri were also there.
Brigadier General Ibrahim Shahin decided to visit Syria and asked me to go along, as security officer for the brigade. I was a captain.
Al-Hayat: Didn't you go to Syria in 1976, for example?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Absolutely not. I didn't know anyone there at the time.
Al-Hayat: As security officer in the Bekaa, didn't you coordinate with the Syrians?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: In 1978, I was in military security, i.e. within the Army, and I was a captain. I began to coordinate with the Syrians when I was in the Intelligence Directorate of the Army in the Bekaa in 1983; coordination was usually at that level, not lower.
Al-Hayat: Who did Brigadier General Shahin meet with on that visit?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: He met with the Syrian chief of staff, General Hikmat Shehabi. The Vanguard Army received equipment from Syria. The Vanguard Army had the Riyaq Barracks, which included the Air Force base, and the Ablah Barracks, the headquarters of the First Brigade, whose units were in Rashaya and Baalbek. Shahin was the commander of the field forces. Equipment, weapons, ammunition and fuel were supplied by Syria.
Al-Hayat: When was the first time that you met with a high-ranking Syrian official?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I met Major General Ghazi Kenaan in 1983; he had just arrived in Lebanon. Brigadier General Michel Rahbani had been appointed the head of Intelligence in the Bekaa and he suggested appointing me as his assistant. Rahbani handled the relationship with Kenaan. New postings were announced and Rahbani was transferred to Beirut. Before he left, he said that he would introduce me to Syrian official with whom I would be coordinating.
The head of Army Intelligence in the Bekaa carries out two tasks: the first is regional security in the Bekaa and the second is as a liaison officer with the Army Command in Beirut and the Syrian Army Command in the Bekaa. He would play the role of mediator and accompany Lebanese officials on their visits to Damascus, especially when visits resumed following the collapse of the 17 May Agreement (peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon).
I went with Lieutenant Colonel Rahbani to visit Colonel Ghazi Kenaan, who liked and respected Rahbani. Rahbani coordinated with the Syrians due to his work with the Arab Deterrent Forces. Kenaan was based in Shtoura and he displayed a negative reaction because he preferred to see Rahbani stay, because he knew him. That was the first time I met Kenaan. Afterward, and due to the relations and tasks that Kenaan had, I would go to Damascus at the request of the Army Command when President Amin Gemayel made trips there, accompanied by the head of Army Intelligence Simone Qassis and usually Foreign Minister Elie Salem.
Tomorrow: Part 7
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