M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Remnants of the security regime is a lie they made up, and believed . . . Rafiq al-Hariri tried to extend Elias Hrawi term a second time, and Jean Obeid was the alternative candidate - PART FIVE
Ghassan Charbel Al-Hayat - 08/07/05//
Al-Hayat interviews the man who came to Lebanon's Sûreté Générale from the Intelligence services, and was at the heart of decision-making, and at the heart of the storm . . . (Part 5)
In this segment, the former Director General of Sûreté Générale, Major General Jamil el Sayyed, discusses accusations that are being directed these days against the security bodies, and goes back to General Emile Lahoud's becoming president, and the attempt to extend President Elias Hrawi's mandate for a second time.
Here is the text of Part 5:
Al-Hayat: Did Prime Minister Hariri ask President al-Assad for you to be removed from your post?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I'm not aware of such a request. When I used
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| el Sayyed (2nd from left) during a visit to Syria in mid 1980s with Chief of Staff General Michel Aoun. |
to meet with Prime Minister Hariri, because there was no permanent hostility, he would be angry about one thing, then become satisfied, and send for me. He used to tell me, jokingly, "If it were in my power, I'd 'cut off your head'. You got out of it this time, but next time I'll take care of you for good." A few words were enough to erase earlier disputes, while awaiting the appearance of a dispute over something else in the future. In general, this applied to everyone.
Al-Hayat: Were you connected to the incident in which the Army surrounded the Finance Ministry during the tenure of Finance Minister Fouad Seniora?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: In 1992, or perhaps 1993; I think that happened when Hariri had just become prime minister. The problem wasn't with Jamil el Sayyed. The problem was with the Army. At the time, Minister Seniora had halted financial and administrative paperwork for the Army. When Brigadier General Mussa Zahran went down - on behalf of the Army command, as an administrative officer - to check on the paperwork, he told the Army Command that he had been subjected to insulting treatment at the office of Seniora's secretary. The Army command sent an officer with a patrol to accompany the secretary, as a party to the act. At that point, the issue escalated and President Hrawi and Prime Minister Hariri requested my removal. The Army command's answer was that it, and not an individual, had issued the orders, so I shouldn't be removed.
Al-Hayat: Where were you the first time that you discussed General Emile Lahoud's becoming president?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Do you mean as members of the Army command sitting around and discussing how General Lahoud could become president? Things didn't happen that way. At the end of 1994 and the beginning of 1995, with President Elias Hrawi's tenure nearing its end, political bickering and deterioration had reached a maximum level in the country. The question was, which Maronite would be able to take Hrawi's place? Automatically, and things didn't need any hint from anyone at that time, the Army was a shining light in the post-Taif period. Thus, without a "candidacy," General Lahoud became a candidate.
Al-Hayat: Didn't you conduct polls?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Of course, there were opinion polls. However, I used to point out the following: why did General Lahoud become qualified to become a serious candidate for the presidency and the only competitor to President Hrawi? It was because of his accomplishment in the Army. This achievement put him in the spotlight. You'll tell me, "There were some 'finishing touches' and some politicians and media people became enthusiastic about him." That's natural. If there is a successful project that you are leading, don't you go to others or don't they come to you? Many people "came along" and there was an atmosphere of support for Lahoud. There were many groups who were upset by the existing political make-up and were looking for the person with the best chances of success; they were looking to the most prominent (of the probable candidates). This produces a type of campaign, which includes donors. The matter didn't need hints to be made.
Al-Hayat: In 1995, didn't Prime Minister Hariri convince Syria to extend President Hrawi's mandate as part of his effort to prevent the arrival of your "project" to power?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Prime Minister Hariri was one of the leading enthusiasts of seeing President Hrawi remain in office. That's correct. He and a big group of politicians who rejected the head of the Army, and didn't like seeing the Army in power.
Al-Hayat: Minister Jumblatt was one of those?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Minister Jumblatt throughout his life has never liked the military. He has an amazing sensitivity to the Army and everything military, historically speaking.
Al-Hayat: What was Speaker Berri's position?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: In 1995, he was close to supporting General Lahoud.
Al-Hayat: Who, then, settled the issue of Hrawi's extension in 1995? (Syria's) General Hikmat Shehabi and Vice-President Abdel-Halim Khaddam?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I believe that this period saw peace negotiations and there were meetings in Washington in 1994-1995. I remember that a delegation from the Lebanese Army participated in these meetings and we were among those sent by the Intelligence Directorate. Ambassador Suheil Shammas headed Lebanon's delegation. I think a Syrian delegation also went to the negotiations, headed by General Hikmat Shehabi. This situation produced a climate of us being in a phase of negotiations and that it would be better to extend President Hrawi's term. It was the regional pretext more than a domestic one.
Al-Hayat: But we can say that Prime Minister Hariri prevented General Lahoud from reaching the presidency in 1995.
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: We can't say that he deprived him of the presidency in 1995. He wanted Hrawi to remain, and the regional negotiations served the purpose of extension, as a transitional period.
Al-Hayat: In 1998, the situation had changed.
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: There was no regional, international or local situation then preventing (Lahoud's becoming president).
Al-Hayat: Did Prime Minister Hariri also attempt to prevent Lahoud's presidency in 1998?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: There was a new attempt to extend President Hrawi's mandate.
Al-Hayat: Who was the alternative candidate: Jean Obeid?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: The leading "candidate" was Hrawi's remaining in office. The second choice was Jean Obeid, and others. A number of names were discussed. Other than President Hrawi and General Lahoud, the most prominent candidate was Jean Obeid, as the one with the best chance of success.
Al-Hayat: Did Bashar al-Asad settle the matter in General Lahoud's favor in 1998?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Bashar al-Assad wasn't president at the time, it was his father, Hafiz al-Assad, God rest his soul. You couldn't defend an extension in 1998; the scope of the domestic imbalance was so great that President Hafiz al-Assad found the Lebanese situation to be an accumulated burden, one that was growing, on Syria. The relationship with Syria involves a strategic ceiling. But what are the pillars of this ceiling? The Lebanese domestic situation. Between 1990 and 1998, the Lebanese domestic situation was unable to create a State of institutions, and was on the verge of collapse. With its collapse, the strategic ceiling would collapse. President al-Assad was well-informed in 1998 that the pillars of the Lebanese domestic situation had become fragile to the point of threatening to destroy the strategic ceiling, through collapse in Lebanon. Therefore, with the presidential election of that year, he found it a suitable opportunity to introduce change and re-stabilize the Lebanese pillars of the strategic ceiling. He preferred General Lahoud, based on his achievements in the Army, which also satisfied Lebanese at the time. He met the conditions required for the presidency more so than anyone else.
Al-Hayat: Did President Lahoud meet with President al-Assad prior to the 1998 presidential election?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: No, he was still commander of the Army.
Al-Hayat: He didn't meet with him?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: It was said at the time that a secret meeting took place about this topic. But in fact, when President Lahoud would go to Damascus he would go on an official visit, at the invitation of Syria's Army command. When he was in Damascus, he was always invited by President al-Assad - just as today with, for example, Michel Suleiman (the current Lebanese Army commander). The Syrians have an exceptional sense of protocol, and everyone recognizes this.
Al-Hayat: The first time Lahoud met al-Assad was in 1993-1994, and the Cabinet took a decision . .
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I know that we accompanied President Lahoud on an official visit to Syria and as part of the visit, he met President al-Assad. However, meeting with senior officials in power and outside of power is a traditional Syrian practice; it involved President Lahoud and all Army commanders who have visited Syria.
Al-Hayat: Even General Aoun?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Yes, he made an official visit to Syria and the Army command and its head received him.
Al-Hayat: When Aoun was commander of the Army?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Yes, when he was Army commander.
Al-Hayat: Did he meet with President al-Assad at the time?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I don't remember. But he went on an official visit and we were with him. At the time, I was the head of Army Intelligence in the Bekaa.
Al-Hayat: What about the assassination attempt against you in the 1980s in the Bekaa?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: It was in 1987, when I headed intelligence in the Bekaa.
Al-Hayat: Is it true that groups with ties to Hizbullah tried to assassinate you?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: It wasn't connected to Hizbullah, contrary to what was rumored at the time. There were local acts of revenge. The problem began in 1983, with Sheikh Sobhi Tufayli (the first leader of Hizbullah), who is from the Bekaa. At the time, Brigadier General Ibrahim Shahin was the commander of the brigade and I was a security officer. General Ibrahim Tannous was Army commander, in Beirut. One day, as I remember, there was a big incident with the Lebanese Army's shelling of the southern suburbs of Beirut in the Gallery Semaan area. This later led to Tannous' removal. This shelling of the suburbs caused huge damage and casualties, which led to a response in the Bekaa, since residents of the suburbs are mix of Shia from the South and the Bekaa. The incident led to the fall of the Lebanese Army's Sheikh Abdullah Barracks in Baalbek, to armed individuals led by Sheikh Sobhi Tufayli. Ibrahim Shahin was notified, as our command was in (the Bekaa towns of) Ablah and Riyaq, that the Baalbek area was off-limits to the "criminal" Lebanese Army. Brigadier General Ibrahim Shahin had training and target practice programs that included target practice by armored vehicles and tanks at the Taybeh shooting range, next to the barracks in Baalbek. Sobhi Tufayli's people learned that the Army was coming to conduct target practice so they sent word to Ibrahim Shahin, telling him not to go, and if he did, there would be a problem. Brigadier General Shahin is a stubborn individual, a brave military man, and he insisted on going. The convoy went to target practice and he accompanied them. At the time, I was at a course on "tactical information" in Beirut. They set up an ambush at the Brital junction in Baalbek; it was raining and cloudy. Six soldiers and an officer were killed in the ambush, and Ibrahim Shahin was wounded in the chest by several bullets, but he miraculously survived. A number of the fighters were also killed. This incident widened the division between the Army and Sobhi Tufayli's group; it was followed by acts of revenge against officers from the Air Force in Ablah, such as Suleiman Mazloum, Michel Ziade, and Emile Hanna. Ibrahim Shahin, who is Shiite, was targeted at the beginning; later, Christians were targeted. The goal was to bring down the Army barracks and separate people on sectarian bases. I became head of intelligence in the Bekaa and we followed a policy of remaining steadfast, as the wave of assassinations continued. After the last one, that of the martyr General Michel Ziade, the Army command ordered us to send the Christian soldiers to East Beirut. I prepared a report for General Aoun, the Army commander, explaining that implementing the order would lead to an exodus of Christian civilians from the region, and they numbered in the tens of thousands. In the report, of which I have kept a copy, I also said that if the fighters became desperate at our holding fast to our position, they'll turn to assassinating Muslim officers. I added that I thought I'd be the first target. After reading the report, General Aoun ordered the Army command to keep Christian soldiers in the region. Three months after this report, I was the first one to become an assassination target; the late Sergeant Ahmad Arabouni, who was accompanying me, was killed beside me and a civilian who was with me, Sami Sayyed Ahmad, was injured. I miraculously survived. Since I remained alive, we knew the identity of the perpetrators, but the general amnesty law was passed (after the war) and the incident was erased.
Al-Hayat: Did you deal with the Michel Aoun issue and his remaining outside the country?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: No, no one tasked me with the Michel Aoun issue while he was outside the country, and after his return to Lebanon (in May 2005) there was no opportunity to make contact. I served under him when he was Army commander and he knows me well from those days. Through intermediaries, I received messages of appreciation from him when he was abroad, citing his admiration of the way in which I ran Sûreté Générale as an honest, modern and organized institution. Other than that, some of the main people around him are my comrades in arms.
Al-Hayat: Didn't you congratulate him on his return?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: He returned to Lebanon under exceptional circumstances, due to my resignation. Therefore, I didn't take the initiative to congratulate him, so that it wouldn't be misinterpreted as an attempt to become close to him.
Al-Hayat: Did you participate in the events of 7 August 2001, which saw the suppression of students (pro-sovereignty demonstrators)? And did you participate in the decision to close (opposition television station) MTV?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Prior to 7 August, Lebanon witnessed a series of demonstrations of a student nature. The protests were against Syria and the rulers in Lebanon. Some of these demonstrations, for the first time, headed toward Syrian centers in Lebanon. Each time, we had "our hearts in our mouths" because we were afraid that someone might start shooting, which would lead to a massacre. Such an event would lead to unpredictable repercussions. Thus, the Central Security Council would meet at the Interior Ministry each time a call for a demonstration was issued. Minister Murr was the minister at the time. The meetings included representatives of the Army, Surete Generale, State Security and the Internal Security Forces, in addition to the Public Prosecutor, for judicial consultation, and the Governor of Beirut, since most of the demonstrations were taking place in that Muhafazat. Sometimes, the Civil Defense would join, if necessary. The Central Security Council would meet each time there was a demonstration called for, in order to anticipate the repercussions. During the meeting, tasks would be distributed: the Army usually took up the outer perimeter, the ISF in military uniform would handle the inner perimeter, and security personnel in civilian clothing would be dispersed among the demonstrators. It was forbidden for this last group to exercise security measures; they were always tasked with surveillance and communication, particularly if there were weapons among the demonstrators. These instructions were for every demonstration.
Al-Hayat: This would take place each time there was a call for a demonstration; the measures included specifying the demonstrators' marching path and places of assembly.
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: When I was in the Army, we had a painful experience, which happened in the southern suburbs of Beirut in 1993, when Hizbullah organized a big demonstration. There was shooting in a side street of the suburbs by an Army patrol, firing in the air. The demonstrators were at Ghobeiri Square. They were frightened by the shooting behind them and they ran toward the Airport Bridge. There was a force there, headed by an officer. They also heard the shots, saw the people running toward them, and fired. It was a reaction on their part, but 14 people were killed and 70 wounded. It was a massacre, the result of a miscalculation. There were no orders to fire on demonstrators. There was a miscalculation on the ground. This was in 1993. We opened an investigation and drew conclusions. One of these was that the security forces should have informers among demonstrators, to tell us what is going on, so that we are not surprised when something happens, including shots being fired.
If we had had informers during the demonstration in the suburbs, telling us what was going on, they would have told us that the demonstrators were frightened by the gunshots, but that they were not armed. The officer responsible wouldn't have reacted. This was the conclusion of our painful experience, which prompted us to adopt a general principle with every demonstration, namely to have unknown people among the demonstrators, telling the operations center what was going on, with the operations center relaying this information to the security officials present on the ground.
When a demonstration was announced for 7 August, in the National Museum neighborhood, the Central Security Council estimated that there would be at least 10,000 participants. When you have this many demonstrators, it means you should have 50-100 plainclothes security agents among them.
At first, it was requested that the Army impose a wide cordon, to limit the participation in the demo. That was a kind of long-term constraint, with the ISF handling the inner perimeter. One of the security bodies - I won't say which one, but it wasn't Sûreté Générale, and I take responsibility for what I'm saying - was tasked with the mission. I don't say this to blame them for being present, since it was their duty.
Al-Hayat: Which security body was it?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: It's our practice not to say which one, but it wasn't Sûreté Générale. This doesn't mean that I didn't participate in the meeting in which the policy for handling the demonstration was laid down, since I was a member of the Central Security Council. The plan was adopted with everyone's approval. A distant cordon by the Army to reduce participation, a close cordon by the ISF, and a group of informers from a security agency for surveillance and communication within the demonstration. The distant cordon was successful, so instead of 10,000 people only 200 people made it. How many informers did we have? About 100, or one-half of the demonstrators.
Usually, you select an informer who is physically strong, so he won't get beaten up easily if discovered, and so that he informs (us) if there are any weapons or other readiness by the demonstrators to do something. These 100 people found themselves among 200 demonstrators and they could handle them. Instead of letting them express their opinions with chants and yells, as is the case in any demonstration in the world, faced with organized (security) forces, they saw themselves as having roughly the same number and therefore felt themselves able to win out.
Beatings with batons and spraying people with water are common methods in the world to deal with demonstrations. But it's not that common to see plainclothes security people beating up civilians. That was the ugly aspect. The informers found that their numbers were equal to those of the demonstrators, so they decided to go after them before the security forces arrived.
Al-Hayat: Wasn't there a decision to beat up the demonstrators?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: An investigation was later opened by the Army command. There was no decision to beat up civilian demonstrators. It was a stupid decision; and no one made it beforehand. If the investigation were re-opened, it would appear with certainty that there was no such decision. But at that particular political moment, an opposition member needed only this mistake to use the incident against the authorities. Isn't that always the game (between the authorities and the opposition)? There was the photo of the girl being protected by her male friend and security people pulling him from her, while beating him - they made a big deal out of it. If that guy and girl had reached the regular security forces standing behind their shields and batons, which are used to beating people, there wouldn't have been a problem, since this always happens at demonstrations when there is a confrontation between demonstrators and the security forces. On 7 August 2001, there was no conspiracy, but a serious decision to stop a certain deterioration in events on the ground. There was a demonstration every day and they could lead to surprises. Where you have a security person and a demonstrators, a surprise will certainly turn up. Sometimes, you'd say "I hope there won't be a tragic surprise; I hope things end peacefully."
Al-Hayat: What about the decision to close MTV?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: This was a government decision, not a security decision. In general, state officials have problems with this or that station. Many state officials aren't very understanding when it comes to stations or newspapers. New TV had problems at a certain time; LBC and MTV did as well, from different directions. In Lebanon, as Prime Minister Salim Hoss said, there is much freedom but little democracy. Therefore, things are wide open at some times, too much so. A lot of what happens in Lebanon when we talk about the media isn't connected to freedom.
What happened with MTV was that it adopted a certain policy. The screen wasn't open for just criticism, but campaigns. In the civilized world, criticism is permitted within limits, but you can't watch television every day and see newscasts demeaning the president, Syria, and the economy. In all countries, stations criticize, they don't engage in campaigns.
Al-Hayat: This took place under Hariri's government?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Yes, they used to launch attacks in every direction. Over time, there was a quasi-consensus within the government that a step needed to be taken against the station. This was the post-2000 Cabinet, there was President Lahoud on one side and Prime Minister Hariri on the other. If one side said that something was black, the other side would say that it was white. The differences of opinion in the government were well known. Who was happy about such differences? Those who were causing problems for both sides; they would use them to attack each side. This is Lebanon: contradictions, not alternatives, are what give you life. At one point, MTV overstepped the boundaries and the matter was raised in the Cabinet; the majority was with closing the station.
Al-Hayat: Did you make suggestions or get involved in the issue?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: The matter didn't require the security bodies, but as part of the mission of Sûreté Générale, we had to follow up politics, the economy, and the media; there would be sessions and discussions (between me and media people, station or newspaper executives). We were interacting daily with the media.
In fact, I met on more than one occasion with state executives and I discussed with them the exaggerations that were being expressed; I would enumerate our reservations with them. They would prepare to be moderate and then deviate from this. If they had heeded my advice, they wouldn't have ended up with a political-legal confrontation with the government and the station wouldn't have been closed.
Al-Hayat: Did you exercise pressure on LBC?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: If you mean pressure as a kind of a tyranny, no. When you search for a way to have influence on them, you have contacts and try, during difficult circumstances, to explain your position. Most stations are responsive, sometimes. Your duty is to always remind them about moderation and that the country's situation is delicate, and that it can't tolerate political and sectarian exaggeration. Why? Because security and the media go hand in hand. When the media exaggerates and incites, the "security bill" is a costly one.
Television is a weapon that you can fire into every home if you don't behave responsibly. Television is a moral-political-sectarian-scientific weapon; when it's not used correctly it can cause harm. Imagine security treating a matter while the media pours oil on the fire - what will be the result?
In reality, based on what I've just said, we had "influence" on many media, including television stations. But we didn't direct their policies; the main goal was to avoid a high cost in treating various issues, especially those connected to people's (behaving on the basis of) instincts on the ground.
Al-Hayat: Didn't any leads turn up in the investigation of the assassination of Elie Hobeika?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: To be honest, we didn't receive the file. The investigation was limited to the Army and the ISF. In the analysis, you can posit hypotheses, but I don't talk about hypotheses.
Al-Hayat: You have been accused of "programming" the judiciary based on political interests. Was (former Chief Public Prosecutor and Justice Minister Adnan) Addoum influenced by you?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Minister Adnan Addoum is a living being; all judges in Lebanon are alive and well. I'm not now in office. But even regarding the files that were opened prior to 2000, you can ask Addoum and any other judges. Jamil Sayyed never once tried to influence the judiciary. How can I do that when I don't let anyone intervene with me? Speaking institutionally, if I prevent anyone from interfering with me, how can I get involved in the institutions of others? Interaction with Addoum as chief public prosecutor was as the legal party that oversaw us. Meetings of the Central Security Council were attended by the chief public prosecutor, who is our legal "boss." On a professional and personal level, there was a strong relationship. Adnan Addoum dealt with Army Intelligence, the ISF and Sûreté Générale. But we can't say that he worked for us. Adnan Addoum is known to be stubborn and excitable. He was the legal reference-point for security agencies and institutions. Having a relationship with him is not an accusation. In terms of hierarchy, he was above us. We could go to him to review certain matters.
Al-Hayat: You resigned from your post and put all of the heads of security agencies at the disposal (of the government). Some later incidents were attributed to the "remnants of the security regime." Have you dealt with security after your resignation?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: In Lebanon, politics is so very "smart." Take this example: Syria withdrew from Lebanon, the security agency chiefs were put at the disposal (of the government), I resigned, and the country had parliamentary elections. This means that the struggle of the opposition against the "joint enemy," i.e. the Syrian and Lebanese regimes, arrived at its goal. Elections are the division of seats and spoils. Parliamentary seats are limited and opposition candidates were many, including the "whales" who don't accept a single eat. General Aoun came back to the country, and he was the "sheikh" of the opposition, so there were fewer and fewer (seats). The commotion began within the opposition itself. Public opinion was watching; the opposition was embarrassed about its divisions. The opposition members who had been based here wanted a bigger share, and General Aoun outflanked them from outside the country. They tried to prevent his return with the French, but didn't succeed. Aoun knew this, and came back. They responded to him with the alliance of symbols of Syria, and the alliance between Hariri and Jumblatt, and Hizbullah and Amal; some members of Qornet Shehwan joined secretly, some Christian MPs, and others. Suddenly, some of them dropped their opposition to the 2000 election law and forgot the war they waged against the Omar Karami government for adopting an election law based on the Caza. The cries of the deceived opposition arose against the traitorous opposition. There were accusations flying everywhere. Then, the "genius" who was concerned about the "unity" of the opposition, or what remained of it, brandished his tongue and said: "Look out, there are remnants of the security regime playing with you and inciting people against you and dividing your ranks and defaming you with some media. The public wasn't stupid and the public knew what was going on.
So, this is politics, and the "remnants of the security regime." Regarding security and events on the ground, as you know, security isn't a grocery store you can open up and run yourself. First and foremost, security means immunity. This immunity is usually derived from the law, and from the security and political hierarchy. The simple question is: who is prepared to take responsibility for security, without immunity? When you resign, it means that you lose your professional immunity, your legal immunity, and your security hierarchy immunity. "Remnants of the security regime" is a stupid term used by an opposition member or an official to justify his shortcomings and render the real actor unknown. Or, they use it to terrorize anyone who previously worked in security, to keep them silent. "Remnants of the security regime" is a lie they made up, and believed. As for me, like I said, my work in security is cause for pride and honor. The term "remnants of the security regime" can't frighten me or shut me up. If I go out and make a statement, does that become an accusation? If you print this interview with me in the newspaper, will that become an accusation, so that it can be said that one of the remnants of the security regime is talking? I'm a Lebanese citizen and I have experience in the regime; I have a memory of events, and of secrets. What I talk about today is the memory of events, which I have a right to talk about. As for my memory of secrets, (talking about them) is not permitted. They're locked up with 200 locks because I know how to differentiate between what is an event and what is a secret. The events I talk about were discussed by the press in a certain way and I'm talking about it in the way I was aware of it, which I know to be true, a version which should reach the Lebanese people. I read the Taif Accord in my own way, and based on my experience in security. It's not forbidden for a security official, if he leaves his post, to have conclusions about his country and the people in his country, without these conclusions touching on personal or moral secrets, or any kind of secrets that make me ethically responsible, if I violate my professional duties. I'm a professional in the field of security, to the degree that I clearly and comprehensively differentiate between what is a secret to be kept and what is an event, about which conclusions and lessons can be drawn, or that can be discussed. My conclusions are not my own, they are public conclusions and I want them to reach people, not just for you but for others in the future, if the opportunity arises. I have the right to make public conclusions through my public experience, which I exercised in the state; I have the right to talk about them, provided that they are conclusions, and not secrets.
Tomorrow: Part 6
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