M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: The Taif Accord was not an agreement to build the State, but rather to divide it up - PART FOUR
Al-Hayat - 07/07/05//
Al-Hayat interviews the man who came to Lebanon's Sûreté Générale from the Intelligence services, and was at the heart of decision-making, and at the heart of the storm...
In this segment, the former Director General of Sûreté Générale, Major General Jamil el Sayyed, discusses the Taif Accord, the parliamentary election law, and the role of some allies of Syria in Lebanon in sparking anger toward Syria.
* Here is the text of Part 4:
Al-Hayat: Did you believe that adopting the Caza (the smaller constituency) as the electoral constituency would lead to victory by the opposition?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: As I said previously, during the meeting I rejected the idea that the smaller constituency was better than the bigger constituency. I said that we would be defeated or victorious in both cases, and explained the conditions pertaining to each. This meeting was not conducted in secret. We held discussions and my presence at the meeting was natural. Later, a long while after this meeting, al-Diyar newspaper published an item about the meeting after a session between its editor, Charles Ayyoub, and Speaker Berri. I telephoned Ayyoub, who is a journalist, and who was interested by the news. I informed him that part of the item was correct (that a meeting took place) while the other part, which maintained that I asked "How can we defeat Hariri?" was not an error, but a lie. Prime Minister Hariri was not the topic of the meeting; it was held to study which election law would be better and under what conditions for the loyalist camp against the opposition. At the end of the meeting, the point of view of President Lahoud and Minister Franjieh won out, while Speaker Berri accepted the Caza, with reservations. Prime Minister Karami was in line with the president's position. The following day, a change took place in the various positions, but the government headed toward the draft law that adopted the Caza. The discussion about Prime Minister Hariri took place later, during the discussion about dividing Beirut into three constituencies. This was seen as aiming to limit Prime Minister Hariri's influence by making Ashrafieh (a mainly Christian neighborhood) independent from Mazraa (a mainly Muslim one), while the Shi'a of Bashoura and Zoqaq el-Blat would be joined to the Armenians and the Moseitebeh neighborhood. This would give Tammam Salam, the Tashnak Party, Amal and Hizbullah greater opportunities for success, while Mazraa would be added to Ras Beirut, with a Sunni majority.
The 1960 electoral law took the Christian part of Beirut, which is not connected geographically with one of the constituencies, and made it a part of this constituency. The draft law for the 2005 elections prevented areas that are not geographically contiguous from being part of the same electoral constituency. There is no ideal electoral law for a country where sects are distributed in a disparate fashion among various geographical areas. The discussion centered on the election law as representing a compromise settlement for all parties. To produce this settlement, the law took something from everyone and gave something to everyone, but in this way no one would be 100% satisfied. For example, Prime Minister Hariri - even in 2000, when he was not in office - was consulted, and he expressed his desire for an electoral law based on nine Governorates (muhafazat): two each in the Bekaa, the North, the South and Mount Lebanon, and one in Beirut. He expressed the same desire for 2005, and newspapers said at the time that the division of Beirut in this way was meant to limit Prime Minister Hariri's influence. When Prime Minister Hariri won in 2000, former MP Najah Wakim attacked me without mentioning me by name, saying that a security official who had dealt with the election law was paid $13 million by the late prime minister.
Al-Hayat: What's the story behind that amount?
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| president Emile Lahoud> |
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I was tasked with feeling out most politicians' opinions regarding the 2000 law. There was Christian opposition to the big electoral lists in the 1996 law, based on the Muhafazat. But after President Lahoud came to office, we wanted to have something fairer, but which cannot be 100% fair in a sectarian country like Lebanon, where there are differences in geographical distribution. As a compromise between the Muhafazat and the Caza, we arrived at an election law with 14 constituencies: two each in the North and the South, three in the Bekaa, four in Mount Lebanon and three in Beirut. We believed that this law would not anger many people, and would be considered a compromise. After consultations with Prime Minister Hariri, he reluctantly agreed to this law, as it would take more from him than it gave. We began discussing the electoral alliance phase. State involvement that is permitted in elections is connected to the election law, setting up alliances, and uniting various groups. When it comes to the ballot box, however, State intervention becomes tampering. Our work during this phase was limited to producing the law and creating alliances. Prime Minister Hariri telephoned me and asked to meet with me. He said, "What about the division of the Muhafazat of Beirut? I understand that its division took place in such a way that I would win only in the Ashrafieh-Mazraa constituency; you left Moseitebeh for Tammam Salam to benefit from, and Ras Beirut for Prime Minister (Salim) Hoss."
Hariri added, "I propose the following deal: Mazraa and Ashrafieh for me, and you (the loyalist camp) ally with me in Moseitebeh, while in Ras Beirut I don't want to ally with Prime Minister Hoss, so it will be an all-out battle!" Hariri outlined his plan for an alliance with Tammam Salam and Hizbullah in Moseitebeh that would win unopposed. Salam would get two Sunni MPs, Hizbullah one Shiite MP, and the other four would be Hariri's. I considered the offer fair and I discussed it with Tammam Salam. He said that it was fair and appropriate, while President Lahoud thought it would be more suitable if an unopposed victory also went to Najah Wakim (Orthodox). I returned with the new offer to Prime Minister Hariri, but he insisted on his original plan, and said, "Either unopposed victories like I offered or a battle!" I answered with the suggestion that the Orthodox seat be left vacant on the list, limiting the electoral battle to this seat, with the others winning unopposed. He rejected the idea, unable to accept Najah Wakim. I went back to Tammam Salam and told him what happened, and he said, "If there are no unopposed victories like Prime Minister Hariri offered, and we have a battle, do you know that my list will fail to win a seat?" I said to him, "I know." He said, "Tell those who are concerned." That's how the electoral battle in (Beirut) took place; Prime Minister Hariri won all of the seats and Hizbullah took one Shiite seat, with Prime Minister Hariri's help.
Later on, Najah Wakim learned about the consultations that had taken place and felt that we had negotiated on his behalf without his approval. In fact, we were not negotiating on his behalf, as I noted; it was merely a bit of loyalty and appreciation toward him on the part of President Lahoud. When the results came out and Wakim lost, he attacked me without naming me, saying that I had received money from Prime Minister Hariri. This led me to inform the Public Prosecutor's Office; some friends intervened and Mr. Wakim corrected his statement, saying that he did not mean Jamil el Sayyed. In return, I withdrew my lawsuit, on the grounds that I had defended my rights.
To sum up, the period before the passing of the 2000 election law saw intensive contacts with Prime Minister Hariri and many others, to reach a settlement. The same thing happened with Minister Jumblatt, who considered that his victory in the Chouf was guaranteed, while in Baabda-Aley, there were different calculations. There were discussions with him over forming a joint list, but he had a fundamental reservation about allying with the late Elie Hobeika. However, Jumblatt didn't mind allying with (rival Druze politician) Talal Arslan. The conditions for seeing a joint list weren't there; the result was that Minister Jumblatt won all of the seats in that constituency, while Talal Arslan won the seat that was left open for him.
Al-Hayat: Why didn't you have a good relationship with Minister Jumblatt?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: The relationship with Minister Jumblatt has always been good, and hasn't been disturbed by anything at any time. He stood with me during some difficult times, and I have done the same for him. I've experienced difficult circumstances on a number of occasions, and I know that he supported me even when the problem was with his allies. When Minister Jumblatt experienced a sort of break and big problems with the authorities, I didn't cut off ties with him, but remained in contact. Meetings with him were very entertaining; they sometimes included people close to him. I know that he appreciates me quite a bit, but in fact direct contacts between us have remained open, even after the assassination attempt against Marwan Hamadeh and the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri. However, when the situation became tense and I held a news conference to answer accusations made against security organizations, Minister Jumblatt, who had "kept me neutral" somewhat, considered that I had put myself in the middle of the battle, that I had become the godfather of the security agencies, and that I should bear the consequences. He took me to task because I behaved as if I was the front for the security agencies, although he had tried to keep me neutral. There was no hostility between us at all. The opposition blamed him for talking to me most recently, and the journalist Ibrahim al-Amin wrote this in al-Safir newspaper. There was a huge commotion among members of the Qornet Shehwan Gathering (of Christian opposition politicians), who asked him what he intended by contacting me. This caused him embarrassment and the contacts were halted at that point; however, we still like each other.
Al-Hayat: As a former security official, how do you see the security situation in Lebanon in the wake of the series of assassinations and bombings of late?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Security constitutes a certain climate, before it constitutes a tool. The security tool is usually comprised of human personnel and technical means. The good climate in a given country is due to normal security tools, used to produce effective security. A bad climate in a given country requires "big" security tools to produce security that is less than acceptable.
What is the climate? A group of political, economic and social factors that prevail in the country. When these factors are stable and healthy, the cost of security and its tools is less and their production is greater. When these factors are upset, the cost is higher and the "security production" is less. Security alone doesn't produce stability.
In Lebanon, the political, economic and social factors are unstable and unsettled, and in most cases they are in conflict; they're bad in terms of management and performance. What kind of security can be effective in such a climate? In addition, UN Security Council Resolution 1559 put Lebanon in a transitional stage between its former strategy and the coming one. When an external factor exerts pressure on domestic instability, security becomes even more difficult.
In the absence of political and economic stability, security not only becomes paralyzed, but also turns into the ugly face of the state. People see only this face, while they are asking to see the state's benefits and its political and economic face.
In other words, the top model Claudia Schiffer is one of the world's most beautiful women. Imagine Claudia Schiffer without clothes or skin - what remains? A skeleton. How would you see her then? The height of ugliness. Even though it's Claudia Schiffer's skeleton!
If we go back to the State, we see that its clothes are politics, its skin is the economy, and its bones are security. Clothes often change from time to time, and skin grows or becomes weak, but the bones are stable.
In Lebanon, the State has no clothes or skin, i.e. no politics or economy, so what is left? The skeleton, i.e. security, which means ugliness. The State of Lebanon needs to acquire some suitable clothes and sufficient skin. In the absence of this, security will remain insufficient and ugly, until further notice.
What we need to do is halt the current deterioration in security and head toward two types of inseparable treatment. The first is rebuilding and redirecting the State's political, economic, social and security institutions, as quickly as possible. This is because the current playing around with political bickering constitutes a free invitation to any party to provoke a security imbalance in the country. We can't forget that Lebanon is located in a turbulent region, from Palestine to Iraq. We don't have the luxury of most Lebanese politicians to become engaged in petty wars while the fire is eating up the garden as well as the house. If we don't quickly rebuild, reform, and organize State institutions it's folly to look for a way to halt the deterioration, not just in security but in other areas of the State.
The second type of treatment involves isolating crimes from politics and letting those with the proper specializations and competence handle such matters. Thus, we should provide the objective and neutral conditions for judicial and security institutions to play their technical role in investigations, without political considerations exercising pressure, as is currently the case. This has robbed security and judicial institutions of their self-confidence. Security is in essence an expression of confidence and morale. What we see in Lebanon today is the destruction and hatred of security institutions; the first casualty is the country's stability. Exercising security is tantamount to being exposed to something. You are exposed to danger upon confronting crime, and you are exposed to criticism when you are deficient when it comes to revealing or solving crimes. Today, the level of political accusations against security bodies prompts the heads of these organizations to adopt a stance of self-defense. They lose the desire to expose themselves and their readiness for sacrifice; the cost is paid by citizens. Security institutions that are not willing to expose themselves end up exposing the people they are presumably protecting. Security bodies that are obliged to protect themselves from criticism and security (bodies) that are robbed of political protection become unwilling to take risks and make sacrifices. In short, security that protects itself does not protect people. Security that is protected by a political leader or personal loyalty doesn't protect itself. Security bodies that are cursed every day by politicians don't protect people. Security that is attacked yesterday and blamed today, and attacked today and blamed tomorrow, doesn't protect people. Security that is demeaned does not protect people. This all constitutes folklore and doesn't protect anyone.
Unfortunately, Lebanon is now experiencing this type of security. We require a rapid treatment in two directions, as I said earlier. Security can treat a defect in a home but can't treat a home that is full of defects.
Al-Hayat: Was it true what was said about President Lahoud seeking to halt the implementation of the Taif Accord and impose a different system regarding presidential prerogatives and security bodies?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Taif preceded President Lahoud's tenure as Army commander and president. There is much said about Taif but many people aren't aware of the meaning of Taif. In essence, Taif was an American-Arab settlement with international patronage, whose goal was to end the war. There were negotiations over the document in Saudi Arabia, prior to the first Gulf War, in 1989. This settlement was called the Taif Accord and it constituted the beginning of the end of the civil war in Lebanon. Taif saw the distribution of consolation prizes to those concerned; thus, through Taif, a trilateral partnership arose, made up of the "princes" of the war, i.e. the militias, the "princes" of traditional politics, and the "princes" of money. Therefore, the first practical translation of Taif, in the initial stage, was a marriage of these three sides - militias, traditional politicians and businessmen. Taif was sufficient to end the state of war but it wasn't sufficient to build peace in Lebanon. Up to today, Taif has been insufficient to build peace. The Taif Accord was not an agreement to build the State, but rather to divide it up. During the war, the "princes" of the militias divided up the street and the people through violence. Then they were offered the chance to sit at the table of the State and divide it up, instead of dividing things up through violence in the street, which produced casualties. Practically speaking, I believe that each one of those people was rewarded for the war. Usually, those who make trouble and engage in violence are punished, but Taif rewarded everyone who took part in the war, under the slogan "let bygones be bygones."
Al-Hayat: With the exception of Samir Geagea (the imprisoned leader of the Lebanese Forces militia)?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: No. The difference between them and Dr. Geagea was that they gave up their weapons and dissolved their militias at the outset, while Dr. Geagea experienced a crisis over Christian representation in the first post-Taif government. He was offered a share but felt himself treated unjustly, since he was treated like Elie Hobeika and others, whereas he felt himself equal to Berri and Jumblatt. Thus, he decided to reject the share that was offered and insisted on retaining his militia and arms. That's the difference.
Thus, Taif, as I said, was sufficient to end the war but wasn't a project for rebuilding the State. It was translated into a transition from dividing up the street to dividing up the State. The problem with Taif was that it didn't take into consideration building a State after ending the war. At no time did President Lahoud claim that he was in conflict with the Taif Accord. General (Michel) Aoun had a problem with the Taif Accord and paid the price for confronting Taif, because he was the only one who opposed this settlement, until he was ousted militarily on 13 October 1990.
Taif was not sent down from heaven; it constituted a transitional phase to end the war but is not an expression of Lebanon's permanent interest. Lebanon's permanent interest lies in building a State. When General Lahoud became Army commander, he did not say that the Army was the solution. He said that it was a model, but not the solution. The Army is a model upon which you can build institutions outside the logic of dividing up the spoils and political and sectarian influence. This let General Lahoud benefit from this reputation and made him a strong candidate for the presidency, because under Taif - which was all about a policy of dividing up benefits - he was able, with help from the Army leadership and Syria - to unify the Army and make it an effective institution without the policy of dividing up benefits; it was for everyone. He turned the Army into a model and example for what could be done with other State institutions. The Army's success was matched by a deterioration in the political and economic situation, and this produced a common sensitivity by the three partners of Taif, as bickering and accusations arose that led to us being accused of seeking to practically overthrow the authorities. This isn't true. We know in Lebanon that a coup is not possible because it must come from all the sects and must take place within them first. When you can bring along all these sects, what you're doing is not a coup, but rather a new settlement.
Al-Hayat: How did the political class interact with the Syrians and their role in Lebanon after Taif?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: As I said, Taif represented a partnership among the "princes" of traditional politics, the war, and money. A large portion of them dealt with things on the basis of offering to make statements and take positions and in return gain immunity as well as ministries and State institutions. This was the logic of the "princes" of war and money. I don't want to be unfair to everyone, but this was the method followed by the majority. A large portion of their acts were based on this method. However, there were important exceptions, such as Prime Minister Salim Hoss, Deputy Prime Minister Issam Fares, and others. They weren't from the school of using their political positions to bargain for personal interests and shares of power in return.
This practice led to internal tension between the parties that followed this policy and those that didn't. Now that Syria has withdrawn from Lebanon, it is said that Syria taught them this method. But I can affirm that this isn't true. Some Lebanese were the basis for this policy and they involved Syrian officials in its exercise. Syria did not begin the "school" of corruption and corrupting people in Lebanon; this policy sprang from Lebanon's sectarian system. When we speak of the existence of a system of political-sectarian protection, even without a Syrian presence, and even with a US and French presence, or without their presence, there automatically arises a corrupt class that is stronger than the law and the people. President Lahoud, returning to his position on Taif, was in essence a military man who rejected bargaining. One of the reasons for his failure to reach an understanding with politicians in Lebanon was that he did not know how to bargain and didn't like to bargain. His mentality didn't allow you to come and tell him that you're with him and would vote for him in Parliament, "but in return give me this ministry or State administration or fund, or so on."
But this doesn't mean that there weren't people close to the president who engaged in bargaining; they engaged in deals to the extent that Lahoud was hurt badly and this damaged in the eyes of the public. This type of bargaining flagrantly contradicted his personality and the hopes for him and his inaugural address.
Al-Hayat: There are those who say that you wrote the inaugural address.
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: There isn't a president in the world who writes his own inaugural address. President Lahoud is like any other president, he has fundamental ideas about policy. I was with him during his almost nine years as Army commander and during this period I began to learn how he thinks and what he thought about a number of issues. No president in the world sits down and writes things himself. He reads over a text and makes certain changes, asks for an idea to be removed or a paragraph to be inserted. This is natural; it's shouldn't be an accusation.
Al-Hayat: When the inaugural address was written, was there a feeling that Taif should be adhered to or was there a conviction that the accord was meant to end the war but not build a State?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: The goal of the inaugural address was to send people a message of "building a state." Taif gave people the message of "ending the war." The message of ending the war, from 1990 to 1998, accompanied a message of "playing around with the State," with the exception of the military. President Lahoud's taking office resembled a coup; it was the conclusion of the message of ending the war, via a message of building the State, which, unfortunately, as a result of these conditions, didn't take off.
Al-Hayat: How long did Prime Minister Hariri continue to send money to the Lebanese Army?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Not during President Lahoud's tenure as Army Commander. That's for sure. Prior to 1990, during the tenure of President Amin Gemayel, the dollar experienced an insane rise compared to the Lebanese Pound (Lira), to the degree that an officer's monthly salary equaled $50, and that of a soldier $20-30. I think that during this phase, there were certain contributions to reduce the burden on the Army, but during President Lahoud's tenure this stabilized at an acceptable level.
Al-Hayat: Were you among the team of bargainers surrounding President Lahoud?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: With President Lahoud, I helped see another
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| Meeting at Taef. |
type of logic, which we used in the Army with success. What was this deal? It was that we believed in the Lebanese-Syrian relationship, in the resistance, and in strategic matters. This was the basic measure of Syria's dealings in Lebanon. This was our ceiling in Lebanon. Small deals are not a ceiling for Syria, as the political authority. Let me clarify: Syria's ceiling in Lebanon was a strategic one. The ceiling of some Lebanese and Syrians during some period was different from the one in domestic matters.
What happened in the Army was a clear commitment to the strategy of the relationship with Syria and protecting the resistance; Syria supported the Army, in terms of building the Army, protecting its unity and protecting it from political intervention. If it weren't for Syrian protection, the Army would not have been unified; it would have remained a collection of sectarian brigades, inherited from the civil war.
Thus, there was no bargaining in the Army between the strategy and personal interests. Instead, between the strategy and the building of the Army there was a bargain, without negotiation, between two parties; actually there was a commitment and conviction by one side, the Lebanese Army leadership, and by the other side, Syria, there was support and appreciation.
Later on, the same thing was implemented at Sûreté Générale, which resulted in our being able to establish a successful, honest and fair institution for all people. It was not permitted to see sectarian and political shares distributed among various parties. This produced considerable resentment by the political class and now, after the Syrian withdrawal, they have the power to take revenge and re-distribute the institution as spoils, all over again.
Al-Hayat: In fact, you are accusing allies of Syria -
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I mean some allies of Syria, and some of the opposition; I said this openly at the news conference. I said frankly that one of the principal reasons for the feelings of Lebanese anger against Syria, which was translated in the recent demonstrations, was the actions of many allies of Syria in Lebanon, and not Syria's direct actions in Lebanon. They themselves would engage in the practice of "all these sins" and tomorrow they'll ride the wave of the US and France and do the same things themselves. They'll never change, because the sectarian system itself produces such deviations.
Al-Hayat: What was (Syrian) General Ghazi Kenaan's role in this?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: General Ghazi Kenaan helped in many matters. But the weight of the political class obliged him to engage in (managing) the balance of power in the country. His role was to manage this balance. In addition, he played a role that had positive and negative aspects. Whether it's me or anyone else, when one engages in a task for a certain period of time, you can't expect to be always praised for the positive things you do. Each person, in his positive and negative aspects, has a personal temperament. Kenaan used to deal with the political class by working with it, so that it would work with him, and vice versa. This is what Lebanese politicians usually do when they deal with Arab or foreign influence in Lebanon.
Al-Hayat: Was there incitement against you in Syria, and with Kenaan?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: It's natural in the light of such political and other disputes for one to be the subject of complaints here and there. I was one of those who experienced this from time to time. Earlier, I spoke about this topic and about the disputes that would arise because of this.
Al-Hayat: Was the relationship with Rustom Ghazaleh (Kenaan's successor as the Syrian officer responsible for Lebanon) different? Did they have different styles?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: When Brigadier General Rustom Ghazaleh took up his responsibilities in Lebanon, he never claimed that he wanted to provide protection and guarantees for the political class to the extent that these were prevalent. Thus, the entire political class began to fall apart. The question was: "Who will be the new guarantor of this class?" and not "Who is the new representative of Syria in Lebanon?" Lebanese are kings of the art of personal calculations: "Ghazi Kenaan is out and so-and-so has taken his place." The calculation becomes one of who wins and who loses with this change. These were the questions of politicians during this phase. Brigadier General Rustom Ghazaleh moved toward President Lahoud as the leader of the country and didn't play the traditional game of managing the balance of power, or providing protection for certain people. This produced hostility toward him by many politicians and he began to be seen as a party (to the disputes); this was the case throughout his tenure.
Al-Hayat: For example, the relationship between Rustom Ghazaleh and Prime Minister Hariri was not good from the beginning?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: No, the relationship wasn't bad; Prime Minister Hariri was one of those who welcomed him. However, like I said, with Ghazaleh's arrival, the political class, which had lived off bargaining for 20 years, wasn't comfortable. We can go back to the official send-off for General Ghazi Kenaan. The big celebration was held at Prime Minister Hariri's home in Qoraytem. Kenaan brought Ghazaleh along with him and said something to the effect of "this is my successor and he will be like me." This change, as I said, didn't suit the political class, and it became angry with him (Ghazaleh). This same political class continued to have good ties with officials who formerly represented Syria in Lebanon or dealt with Lebanese affairs in the name of Damascus. Usually, a representative of any country "takes a hit" before his country does, because he acts as its first line of defense. Just like a security officer should take a hit before an ordinary citizen. But if the security officer is saved and the citizen doesn't, this means that he was working more for himself than for his country.
Al-Hayat: Earlier, you cited Salim Hoss and Issam Fares as examples of officials who didn't engage in bargaining. Didn't they benefit from this relationship (with Syria)?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: God forbid. Neither they nor some others, who I won't name, had any connection to the slightest level of personal benefit. They were from a completely different school than that of the method by which things took place, even if they were partners in the government.
Al-Hayat: They didn't ask for anything in return for their political positions?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Is there anything simpler than administrative appointments? They didn't "receive" any appointments (for their allies). They were pained when appointments would take place in their presence and everyone else took part in the division of spoils. Deputy Prime Minister Issam Fares, for example, is a leading politician in Akkar and North Lebanon. He has served his area more than the State has. What did Issam Fares do besides this? Delegations of people would come and ask for something from the State. In Lebanon, people ask MPs and prominent local politicians to offer them a service or favor. However, Fares was unable to obtain anything from the State that benefited (people in his region of the country), whether (development) projects or (bureaucratic) appointments. He would compensate for this by making personal contributions.
Al-Hayat: You have been described more than once as the strongest person in the political make-up of the country.
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Actually, I don't want to boast. When you say that someone is strong, the person is pleased. I don't get angry if it's said that I'm strong. When it's said that I'm stronger than everyone else, this means that there has been "friction" between me and important people, and they were unable to defeat me. Most of them are stronger than me. Was I stronger than Prime Minister Hariri, stronger than Speaker Nabih Berri? No, I wasn't. I wasn't stronger than many others. However, as I said earlier, I was ready to pursue something to the end, and lose, if need be, while many others don't like to lose and are content to merely engage in a confrontation. This is in addition to the contradictions that always helped me to persevere. When I was in the Army, President Hrawi and Prime Minister Hariri wanted to remove from Army Intelligence, and General Lahoud stood with me. He said, "This is an Army officer and he's carrying out the Army command's orders." After I transferred to Sûreté Générale in 2000, and after the parliamentary elections, there were attempts to remove me - Prime Minister Hariri, Minister Jumblatt, and Ghazi Kenaan stood with me. And when General Ghazi Kenaan tried to influence the top three leaders, Lahoud, Berri and Hariri, to remove me, President Lahoud, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, and Minister Jumblatt stood with me. This is the way things went most of the time; it wasn't connected to my strength, as much as it was connected to existing contradictions in the country and their impact on whether someone stayed in his post or was removed.
Tomorrow: Part 5
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