M.G. Jamil El Sayyed: The extension of President Lahoud mandate was not based on a report, but some of its opponents facilitated its taking place - Hariri laughed: Tell President Lahoud that he has cost me dearly on two occasions - PART THREE
Ghassan Charbel Al-Hayat - 06/07/05//
In this segment, the former Director General of Sûreté Générale, Major General Jamil el Sayyed, discusses his relationship with the late former Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri, the extension of President Emile Lahoud's mandate, and other events. Here is the text of Part 3:
Al-Hayat: When was the last time you met with Prime Minister Hariri?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I don't recall a specific date for our last
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| left ot right: B.G. Jamil elSayyed, President Emile Lahoud. |
encounter, but it was after he left office. After that meeting, I stayed in touch with him by telephone. During difficult periods, a week wouldn't go by without there being a call via Lieutenant Colonel Wissam al-Hassan, one of those very close to him, someone who enjoyed his trust, whom he liked, and who was trustworthy. All the details of the parliamentary consultations that preceded Prime Minister Hariri's decision to decline forming a government were the subject of nearly daily contacts with al-Hassan, who would sometimes sit next to Hariri, and pass the phone to him so that he could talk to me. In our conversations, we discussed the developments in the consultations about the government that was to be formed at the time, and finally his declining to accept the job. I was one of the few people who knew things from Prime Minister Hariri before the media did. After he declined to form a government and his famous farewell note was broadcast, Wissam al-Hassan called me, then passed the phone to Prime Minister Hariri, who asked me to comment on what had happened. I said that the way out that he had chosen would not be provocative to anyone. Prime Minister Hariri was determined to send a message upon his exit from office that was not a challenge to Syria; rather, it expressed his inability to come to an understanding with the president. He knew that at the time, this understanding would not take place without Syrian mediation, while the Syrians had decided to not intervene, after accusations had rained down upon Syrian from here and outside the country, that it dominated the political system - Damascus decided to not intervene through mediation.
Al-Hayat: How would you describe your relationship with Prime Minister Hariri?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: His feelings about me were double-edged. As much as he enjoyed meeting with me, he couldn't stand me at times. The relationship with Prime Minister Hariri improved once I moved from the Army to Sûreté Générale. While in the Army, I met with him three times, at the most. After I moved to Sûreté Générale, the frequency of meetings became intensive; there were a number of meetings every year, and this is when some openness began to appear (in our relationship), despite the differences that would arise among various state officials on various matters.
The late prime minister believed that I was able to find solutions when things became complicated, and he would usually summon me for this purpose, when there were thorny issues such as administrative appointments or issues connected to the Cabinet's agenda. He would include his advisor, Judge Suheil Bouji, at times, and many of those close to him liked this relationship (between Hariri and Sayyed) and encouraged it, such as Wissam al-Hassan, and the journalists Mohammed Choucair and Faysal Salman. At times, I was surprised by Hariri's lack of reservation about his expressions and his bringing up the details of how he thought, and he used to say, jokingly: "Tell President Lahoud that he has cost me dearly on two occasions. The first was when I 'ran away' from his becoming president, and fell into the lap of (President Elias) Hrawi's extension. The second was when I 'ran away' from him when he became president in 1998, and I fell into the lap of Speaker Berri." And he would laugh.
Al-Hayat: Was there mutual hatred between the two of you?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Hatred arises when you let annoying matters accumulate inside of you. Personally, when I am angry I express it immediately. My rival or my friend knows immediately that I am with him or against him on a given matter. Things don't accumulate with me, so therefore I don't have hatred. I'm not the kind of person who adopts a low profile when weak and seeks revenge when strong. Returning to your question, since I don't let things accumulate I didn't have personal hatred toward Prime Minister Hariri. Of course, when it came to many political issues, I didn't facilitate matters about which I was unconvinced, and on many occasions he wanted me removed, or to be defeated. There was no problem between us; a dispute would arise because of political and administrative issues about which he would disagree with President Lahoud and he would accuse me of always being biased toward the president. I never once felt that Prime Minister Hariri hated me on a personal level; he hated some of the positions I took. Some people around him certainly hated me personally, in an attempt to grandstand. Prime Minister Hariri was strong enough not to hate; he took a negative position when necessary. Currently, after his martyrdom, this same group is playing the same role with Sheikh Saad Hariri. These people want Sheikh Saad to be spiteful and vengeful toward everyone who stood against his father or made him angry. I say to Sheikh Saad, not everyone who angered your father was his enemy. This was politics and Prime Minister Hariri, like every politician, would get angry at times and make people angry at others. I hope Sheikh Saad is conscious of this fact.
Al-Hayat: Did you ever clash directly?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Do you mean a verbal confrontation, for example? Not at all, such behavior would be shameful. Anyway, I'm not the kind of person who "loses control" with words. At the time, he was a prime minister and I was a director general. There were differences of opinion, as I said, about various topics. It would end up with him summoning me for a discussion. He never raised his voice at me, and I never went beyond protocol with him.
Al-Hayat: Were you one of the people who engineered President Lahoud's extension?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I met President Lahoud in the Army, and I saw in him a pure intention to seek the imposition of the law and build institutions. He was the decision-maker in the military and he would receive consultations from the chief of staff's office. As intelligence, we were the primary "kitchen" for making decisions. As the chief decision maker in the Army, General Lahoud succeeded in building an institution, which qualified him for the presidency. There was a popular consensus over his presidency, and people considered him a savior from the deteriorating political and economic conditions that prevailed from 1990 to 1998. I was one of those who were very enthusiastic about Lahoud's becoming president, because I believed in his intention to build a state. Lebanon is a country that lacks for nothing; it has a treasure called its environment and another treasure in the Lebanese people and its learning, progress, culture, and openness. Lebanon has always lacked a state, in all senses of the word; it lacks a political regime, not a regime of politicians.
When Emile Lahoud became president, he found, like his predecessors, the Lebanese Constitution had produced three heads of state, at the least. In the Army, there's one head, which decides, orders and is obeyed. In the state, there are many heads. Whatever one's good intentions, under this Constitution, neither President Lahoud nor others can claim that they can issue a decision without the signatures of others. Why doesn't the Constitution specify one head of state? Again, it's the sectarian system and sectarian division (of power). One president means that this individual is from a certain sect, and who accepts it being this sect or that one?
Thus, the first imbalance that prevented President Lahoud from implementing his inaugural address existed in (legal) texts, not to speak of the mistakes that were made in practice, particularly concerning some people's actions against the principles contained in Lahoud's inaugural address. We can also add the differences of opinion and obstacles put forward by top leaders themselves, as each one is able to obstruct the decisions of the others, because of sectarian partnership. This tells you that the inaugural address will never "take off" and it also tells you why there was a setback. President Lahoud didn't change his convictions regarding establishing a state based on law and institutions, even though he has been unable to carry this out thus far. However, this doesn't prevent President Lahoud's mandate from seeing accomplishments, such as liberating the south and protecting the resistance. These were issues that President Lahoud was exclusively responsible for, meaning that his decisions won out over others.
When the topic of an extension came up, there was no campaign. The extension of Lahoud's term was something related to circumstances. The conditions in support of extension and those opposed to it were quite close, until the final moment. Therefore, extension didn't require a mobilization or a campaign, particularly because the domestic failures that the opposition was focused on didn't allow this kind of campaign in support of extension. On the contrary, the entire campaign was focused against extension.
Al-Hayat: Was there a decision to extend Lahoud's mandate by President Bashar al-Assad in 2004?
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| Parliament in session. |
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Some of those who participated in the extension were among those who opposed it: President Bashar al-Assad repeated on various occasions - during a trip to Kuwait, in an interview with al-Hayat - that all candidates were friends of Damascus, and that all alternatives were open in Lebanon. Who narrowed these possibilities? The opposition's campaign slogan was "Anyone but Lahoud." Members of the opposition lost the extension issue between a "fight" with Lahoud and a "fight" with Syria. Syria had said that all options were open, but the counter-move only involved an attempt to "break" President Lahoud. In Syria, loyalty is considered very important by the al-Assad family and Syria's loyalty to President Lahoud was connected to general, national issues. As for internal state matters, which are considered to be exclusively Lebanese, what happened was that everyone made mistakes. Extension wasn't the result of a strictly Syrian decision as much as it was the result of mistakes made during maneuvers by the anti-extension camp, which took the "fight" to Syria. President al-Assad, in all his statements prior to the extension, sought to send a message to everyone that Syria was at an equal distance from all candidates, and who says that such a message wasn't annoying at times to President Lahoud? Who says that such a message wouldn't relieve Lahoud's rivals? The campaign against extension was managed in such a way as to help provide the suitable conditions for extension, as it left Syria with only two alternatives. It could abandon its chief ally or help him, and Syria, like other countries, knew that the international "kitchens" (of decision-making) were preparing to pressure Damascus and Resolution 1559 was waiting in the wings beginning in June 2004, based on what President Bush told Le Figaro during his visit to Europe.
Al-Hayat: Do you think that the way in which Prime Minister Hariri managed the campaign against extension tipped the balance in its favor?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Prime Minister Hariri didn't manage the campaign alone, and he wasn't its "maestro." The campaign against extension included allies and opponents of Syria in its ranks. It had traditional rivals of Lahoud, in addition to former friends, including some who supported him for president. Prime Minister Hariri opposed Lahoud because they were from two radically different (political) schools. Minister Jumblatt also opposed Lahoud from the beginning to the end. Positions changed subsequently, after six years of changes in positions, interests, and ways in which various people were benefiting from things. We can't say that Prime Minister Hariri was alone in raising the banner opposed to extension; the Christian opposition rejected an extension as well.
Al-Hayat: Were you worried by the deterioration in relations between Prime Minister Hariri and Damascus?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Prime Minister Hariri's relationship with Damascus, like that of any other Lebanese official, had its ebbs and flows, according to changing circumstances, developments, and specific issues. In politics, points of view come into conflict on a daily basis. If we want to calculate the period of good ties between Prime Minister Hariri and Damascus, and period in which their relations were troubled, ever since he took office in 1992, we'll find that the good times outweighed the bad. On many occasions, Syria stood with Prime Minister Hariri on domestic matters and on issues related to ministries and appointments, as it considered that Lahoud was not in the right. Even during the worst periods of the relationship, Hariri was in contact with key positions in the (Syrian) regime, and they wouldn't have been open to dealing with him if there had been a blanket decision to cut ties. Therefore, even when relations between Hariri and Damascus were cool, there was no break. For example, there was Abu Jamal (Syrian Vice-President Abdel-Halim Khaddam) and (the former Syrian Chief of Staff) General Hikmat Shehabi. When it was said that there was a dispute between Prime Minister Hariri and a party in Syria, the Khaddam-Shehabi door remained open, because a break in ties was not the goal. There were issues that led to coolness in the relationship. This took place with everyone, without exception. Just as disputes arise among Lebanese on a daily basis, the same happened between them and the Syrians, due to the interaction between certain issues and events.
Al-Hayat: What do you think about what Fitzgerald said in his report about the meeting between Prime Minister Hariri and President al-Assad?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: This came up in versions by Lebanese that appeared openly after Prime Minister Hariri's assassination. Personally, Prime Minister Hariri didn't tell me about this sharp discussion before his martyrdom, and neither did Lieutenant Colonel Wissam al-Hassan. During this period, Prime Minister Hariri tasked Wissam al-Hassan with informing me about all of the difficulties with Anjar (the headquarters of Syrian forces in Lebanon), with President Lahoud, and others. What I know directly from Prime Minister Hariri and from Wissam al-Hassan is that Hariri was determined, during the most difficult of times, to keep bridges open with Damascus. Even during the coolest period of the relationship, Prime Minister Hariri didn't take the initiative to break off ties; he sought to open the door to better relations. And in return, Syria's doors were always open to Hariri. I read a lot of rumors in Fitzgerald's report.
Al-Hayat: What about the story of the clash with Rustom Ghazaleh (the head of Syrian forces in Lebanon)?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: This story also spread after Prime Minister Hariri's assassination and it was never confirmed openly by anyone. Ghazaleh had lunch with Hariri at Qoraytem (Hariri's palatial residence in Beirut) in the presence of Charles Ayyoub (the editor-in-chief of al-Diyar newspaper)
Al-Hayat: Did this meeting take place prior to Lahoud's extension or afterward?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: After the extension, of course. There were witnesses, as well. The relations between Hariri and Syria were up and down, but Prime Minister Hariri's contact with Damascus and Anjar remained open. This channel was open and the media mentioned a number of occasions.
Al-Hayat: Did you try to improve the late prime minister's relations with Syria or did you help muddy the waters, as you have been accused of doing?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: The scope of the relationship between Hariri and leading Syrian figures did not permit the ties to be disturbed so easily. However, there were issues regarding appointments and others involving the domestic situation where differences in points of view led to certain sensitivities. The issues that could disturb relations with Syria are essentially strategic and did not actually exist. Syria is aware of the facts and knows that most Lebanese want to distort each other's image, not only with Damascus but also foreign embassies frequented by Lebanese of all political persuasions. However, would this lead to disturbing relations of states with individuals? Prime Minister Hariri might anger you regarding a certain issue or might be unsatisfied with you, but that doesn't mean that relations have become bad because of it. When clashes took place over domestic disputes on various issues, Prime Minister Hariri, just like Berri, Hrawi and President Lahoud, and others, would all seek Syrian arbitration and try to ensure victory for their point of view, in order to win the contest. It was a normal practice, and not a distortion of what took place. Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah (the leader of Hizbullah), who enjoys complete credibility, said that Hariri's positions on the big issues, like protecting the resistance, and what he quoted the late prime minister as saying in meetings and elsewhere, leads us to conclude that any negative action against Prime Minister Hariri was not effective in Syria. The meetings (between Hariri and Nasrallah) were not made public, although important figures knew about them.
Al-Hayat: Did you deal with Hariri as one of the instigators of Resolution 1559?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: The openly stated political positions at the time included accusations by politicians opposed to Prime Minister Hariri and others, while there were also positions defending him. The political atmosphere that accompanied Resolution 1559 was totally open to seeing mutual recriminations between the authorities and the opposition, without exception. In the opposition, there were those who openly supported 1559, while the authorities were openly against the resolution. Prime Minister Hariri dealt with the issue by preventing some of the opposition from going too far, which is what happened at a meeting of the opposition at the Bristol Hotel; Prime Minister Hariri's representative withdrew from the meeting, confirming that he was not irresponsibly in favor of 1559. It would be natural for a person like Prime Minister Hariri to favor some of 1559, regarding presidential elections and respect for the Constitution. However, he knew how to distinguish between the domestic (political) "ceiling" and the portion connected to the resistance, about which he reassured Sayyed Nasrallah. Prime Minister Hariri had the ability and international contacts to reduce the repercussions of 1559, particularly regarding the regional or external portion of the resolution. He didn't want Resolution 1559 to become a source of internal dissent or conflict in Lebanon.
Al-Hayat: Was the "safety valve" removed with the assassination of Hariri?
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| left to right: AbdelHalim Khaddam, Elias Hrawi, Rafic Hariri. |
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I wouldn't say that, so that people don't think that I'm being sycophantic. Resolution 1559 had two ceilings. To the extent that the domestic ceiling - respecting the Constitution and rejecting an extension (for Lahoud) - was satisfactory to Hariri, the external ceiling, related to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the resistance, represented a danger. Prime Minister Hariri had contacts with Syria and the leaders of the resistance to confirm that he would protect these fundamental policy choices and outline his role in preventing them from being harmed. In addition, Resolution 1559 had provisions that suited many Lebanese political actors. While Prime Minister Hariri and Minister Jumblatt leaned toward differentiating between the domestic and external ceilings of 1559, other opposition members went quite far regarding this topic, which is still a source of differences of opinion within the opposition itself.
Al-Hayat: The story circulated that Rafiq Hariri, Marwan Hamadeh and Ghassan Salameh participated in drafting Resolution 1559. Hariri was assassinated, there was an attempt on Hamadeh's life, and Salameh has opted to stay outside Lebanon. What is your opinion about this?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: This story circulated after the assassination attempt against Minister Hamadeh. My personal opinion is that Prime Minister Hariri would not write something in his own hand that involved the interest of Israel. He was not of this type of political school and I knew him from dozens of meetings. This (story) was a crime against Hariri, more so than the assassination. I do not know Ministers Hamadeh and Salameh as well as I knew Prime Minister Hariri, but I know their political positions, the seminars and lectures that they took part in. I believe that these two stories were spread to strengthen the accusation against Syria; they are all unsubstantiated.
Al-Hayat: It was said that Damascus took the decision to extend Lahoud's mandate based on a report. Is this true?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: This is simplifying things. A presidential decision on a matter as thorny as extension cannot be taken based on a report, and not even 200 reports. A decision on such a matter is taken based on a number of internal and external factors. In subjects as sensitive as these, there's a very thin line separating a correct decision from a mistaken one. With a sensitive issue such as extension, one report is insufficient to produce a decision.
Al-Hayat: According to one scenario, Hariri was preparing to turn against Syria via the elections, and a meeting took place in Baabda Palace, where it was discovered that the opposition was going to win.M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Who was Prime Minister Hariri's candidate for the presidency? The candidate closest to his heart was Foreign Minister Jean Obeid. That wasn't a secret. What is Obeid's relationship to Syria?
Al-Hayat: An ally...
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Merely saying that Hariri's candidate to confront the extension was Jean Obeid means that the late Prime Minister had a ceiling when it came to opposing Syria. If this weren't the case, he would have chosen someone hostile to Syria, openly so. The issue of the meeting that you mentioned was connected to the parliamentary election law, and not the presidential election. There was a difference of opinion about the election law among top politicians, as represented by Speaker Berri, President Lahoud, Prime Minister Omar Karami and the minister of interior (Suleiman Franjieh). Berri supported either the Governorate (Muhafazat) as the electoral district, or the Muhafazat plus proportional representation. President Lahoud and Minister Franjieh supported the Caza as the electoral district. Prime Minister Karami's position fluctuated between those of Berri and Lahoud. Speaker Berri said, "I'm with the Governorate (Muhafazat) and you're with the Caza; I don't guarantee (success); do you?" This discussion led to a meeting being convened and I was invited to discuss and outline the situation. It was not a security task, but a political one, and I was specialized, as director of Sûreté Générale, in political matters. Why weren't the heads of Army Intelligence and Internal Security invited? Because they had no connection with the issue. My presence resembled my presence at other meetings devoted to dealing with other issues, such as administrative appointments. All of my predecessors at Sûreté Générale have been tasked with such things, such as my immediate predecessor Raymond Roufayel, and all of them dealt with politics. The impression that I am a security official is connected to my former post (in Army Intelligence) and not as director of Sûreté Générale. This is what makes things confusing for some people.
These differences in opinion among top leaders themselves, prior to the discussion of the election law, in addition to the loyalists' need to take a unified position vis-à-vis the opposition, led to this meeting. During the meeting, the president, speaker and prime minister outlined their views regarding the election law. Why did Speaker Berri support the Governorate (Muhafazat) as a constituency? Why did President Lahoud and Minister Franjieh support the Caza? I was asked for my opinion. I said, literally - and there are minutes of the meeting - that we shouldn't rely in our analyses on the election figures from the 2000 round, but instead on the political conditions now prevailing in the country. If we want to speak as the authorities and loyalists, we will lose the elections, whether they are held on the basis of the Governorate (Muhafazat) or the Caza. If there isn't serious work done to organize the loyalists' camp, just like the opposition camp is being organized. If we enter the campaign disorganized, there will be a defeat. If we close ranks, there will be better conditions for success. The issue wasn't connected to the election law, but the fact that the loyalists would either win or lose according to each version (of the electoral law) based on how much it improved the conditions of its performance regarding alliances, or hurting such alliances.
Tomorrow: Part 4
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