M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I told Fitzgerald that we should keep all possibilities open, Abu Adas, fundamentalist groups, Lebanese intelligence, Syria, Israel... - PART TWO
Al-Hayat - 05/07/05//
In Part 2 of the interview, the former Director General of Sûreté Générale, Major General Jamil el Sayyed talks about the discussion between him and the Irish officer Peter Fitzgerald, the head of the fact-finding committee formed by the UN Security Council in the wake of the assassination of the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafiq al-Hariri on 14 February.
Fitzgerald asked who killed Hariri, and el Sayyed responded by saying that all parties should remain under suspicion: Abu Adas, fundamentalist groups, Lebanese leaders and security organizations, Syria, Israel, and anyone who might have an interest. During the interview, el Sayyed presented Fitzgerald with a two-page report he delivered to ambassadors and security attaches in Lebanon; it deals with the possible negative repercussions of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 on Lebanon. The paper said that "the resolution would hurt security and stability in Lebanon and your countries do not need to add Lebanon to the list of countries experiencing unrest in the Middle East."
El Sayyed denied that he played any role in prompting Lebanon's Ambassador to Washington to restrict the activity of the international probe into Hariri's killing. He also denied receiving any request from any security-related bodies to increase concern with Hariri's security following the passing of Resolution 1559.
Part Two:
Al-Hayat: Who normally issues orders at the crime scene?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Let me clarify something. According to Lebanese law, the judiciary is responsible for the crime scene; it delegates officers to investigate and they work under the supervision and orders of the judiciary. When the judiciary issues orders, the responsibility for the crime scene and other things belongs exclusively to those two parties. The Director General of Internal Security, General Ali Hajj, was not the source of the orders regarding the crime scene, the moving of cars, or other investigation issues. I don't think that General Hajj makes mistakes in such matters.
Al-Hayat: What did Hajj tell you?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I didn't question him, but I did give him some advice, and I think General Hajj can clarify later whether the advice or the order came from.
Al-Hayat: You met with the head of the fact-finding commission that was formed after the assassination of Hariri. What was discussed between you and the Irish officer, Peter Fitzgerald?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Fitzgerald met with many officials and members of the opposition; I'm one of those who met with him. Certainly, the results of his meetings with all parties will be at the disposal of the international investigating committee, which I believe will probe deeply into areas that it considers useful in order to reveal the circumstances of the crime.
Fitzgerald visited me with his team. He began with a clarification of his task, saying it was based on a Security Council resolution and that he was concerned with the reasons for Prime Minister Hariri's assassination and its consequences. Then he posed a series of questions, first of which was "Who killed Hariri?" This was followed by questions such as "Have you, as a security body, received information after the crime and sent it to the judiciary?" and a discussion of the political circumstances behind Resolution 1559.
Al-Hayat: What did you say to him about Resolution 1559?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I said the Lebanese State received drafts of the resolution during deliberations in the Security Council. It was clear that a part of the text dealt with Lebanon's sovereignty, while another part spoke about a withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, in addition to disarming militias, the resistance and the (Palestinian refugee) camps, and the State's exercising its authority throughout the country, and particularly in the south, meaning the deployment of the Army there. I told him that it was clear to us, at the beginning, that the resolution would lead to a total change in the existing climate in Lebanon, because our stability and security following the Taif Accord was built on strategic foundations, such as the relationship with Syria and supporting the resistance in the framework of the Arab-Israeli conflict. I explained to him that based on our estimate at the time, Resolution 1559 would eliminate this strategy, as each provision would have repercussions on the ground if implemented. Thus, we had fears that the resolution would create a radically new climate, different from the foundations of the previous phase, which might lead to harming security and stability in Lebanon. Of course, recently, Lebanon has enjoyed a measure of security stability despite the existing unrest in the region. Lebanon was a safe refuge, to the degree that last year's tourist sector saw exceptional activity, which boded well for the future. Naturally, one can say that when the pillars of this strategy moved, the foundations of security and stability would move as well. Thus, I told Fitzgerald that I had an initiative, with the State's approval, since Sûreté Générale is connected to embassies. We met with security attaches from embassies and various ambassadors, particularly those with membership in the Security Council, and explained the likely repercussions of Resolution 1559 for Lebanon's security and stability. The Foreign Ministry explained the issue from a different angle. In fact, I delivered a two-page paper to the ambassadors, outlining the probable negative repercussions of Resolution 1559 for security and stability, and gave a copy of it to Fitzgerald. In the paper, I said that the resolution would hurt security and stability in Lebanon and your countries did not need to add Lebanon to the list of countries experiencing unrest in the Middle East.
In my capacity as a person representing a security institution, my reading of the political events and economic, social, security and other repercussions set off an alarm regarding the resolution's expected consequences. To the extent that the resolution harms our strategy, in trying to overturn it, it also creates incentives and benefits for Israel. Resolution 1559 brought Lebanon to direct Israel's attention: it could try to contain Lebanon by requesting the Syrian withdrawal, the disarming of the resistance and the camps, and seeing the Lebanese Army deploy in the south. The resolution created a direct Israeli interest in seeing events accelerate in Lebanon. Thus, the danger of the resolution was that it brought to the stable situation new factors, such as harm and benefit to a number of foreign and domestic parties; its magnitude on the Lebanese scene was harmful, as we expected. This was proven by subsequent events, including the assassination of the martyr Prime Minister Hariri, it has become clear that Resolution 1559 created a kind of "overload" for the country, and specifically its security. Security organs had been programmed for the last 15 years to handle a certain load - let's say 1 ton - and the resolution added another 10 tons to this. As part of this extra weight, to the extent that Resolution 1559 created an exceptional Israeli interest in its implementation as soon as possible, to obtain the disarming of the resistance and the camps and the deployment of the army in the south, it also damaged our policy, i.e. the strategic foundations we relied on regarding security and stability. This was the political-security explanation that we put forward.
As for the idea that we didn't anticipate anything, this is incorrect. Before the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri and the attempt to assassinate Minister Marwan Hamadeh, we sounded the alarm in our discussions with embassies and within the country. We said that something big was headed our way. Resolution 1559 was this big event for Lebanon and the region.
We told them "have mercy on us and on yourselves and avoid adding Lebanon to the list of countries experiencing unrest." I explained this to Fitzgerald. Unfortunately, after the resolution was issued, the only thing that was taken into consideration was the part containing political rumors and accusations. He spoke about the crime scene without identifying the party that was responsible or at fault. He said that some security personnel put parts of the Mitsubishi (truck, the presumed source of the explosion) in the crater. This sentence constitutes a crime against Lebanese security institutions. He should have identified the individuals and party (responsible) and let them take responsibility, even if the price turned out to be people "losing their heads," i.e. their positions.
I told Fitzgerald that we should keep everyone under suspicion and let the investigation cover all possibilities, instead of being content with accusations directed at a single party. I told him that we should keep all possibilities open, and let the possibility of Abu Adas and fundamentalist groups remain open, as well as the possibility of Lebanese and Syrian involvement, and the possibility of Israeli involvement; we should let the investigation be serious and not be content with a portion of the accusations. We are not trying to declare anyone innocent; we are requesting that this matter be dealt with according to the required procedures. We should figure out who truly benefited and who was harmed by the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri.
Resolution 1559 led to seeing those who benefited and those who were harmed. The assassination of Prime Minister Hariri also produced those who benefited and those who were harmed, so let's review these parties. Summing the matter up completely, I say that without exception, the harm affected a single area; it harmed the Lebanese regime and Syria.
Al-Hayat: What do you conclude from this?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I don't want to conclude anything. I'm saying that the perpetrator of the crime is either a fool or an Einstein, so let the international probe study all possibilities: fundamentalist groups, Lebanese political leaders and Lebanese intelligence, Syria, Israel, etc.
Al-Hayat: Can't an Einstein, for example, use a fool to commit the crime?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: This is all part of the analysis and not the investigation. In an analysis, you might be right or wrong, but in an investigation, you either put your finger on the issue or you don't, and analyzing in an investigation is not permitted. Prime Minister Hariri was not an ordinary person. Striking at him is not measured according the normal criteria of Lebanon. Didn't whoever wanted to strike at Rafiq Hariri know that the reaction would go beyond anger and arrive at madness, on the part of France and Saudi Arabia? These were the two countries that were most sympathetic to Syria in recent years.
Al-Hayat: Didn't whoever wanted to assassinate Hariri think about the balance in the French position and the sympathy expressed by Saudi Arabia's positions? Could that prompt them to stand against you, and what is the goal?
Despite all of these pretexts, I say let suspicion remain open, in all directions. However, we should take into consideration the existence of other suspected parties and let the international committee determine the perpetrator. I speaking here as a security official and I say let's keep all of the possibilities and keep everyone under suspicion. Political accusations without proof are a felony and provide cover for the real criminal, if another one is found.
Al-Hayat: They accused you of prompting Lebanon's Ambassador to the US, Farid Abboud, to obstruct the Security Council resolution that formed an international investigation committee and specifying its prerogatives. It was said that you received reports from the ambassador, in violation of the law.
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Foreign Minister Mahmoud Hammoud is a person who doesn't lie and has no personal interest at stake. Minister Hammoud discussed this topic and openly denied it during a news conference. He knows that Lebanon's ambassadors to Washington and the United Nations have no direct or indirect relationship with someone named Jamil el Sayyed.
Al-Hayat: And the issue of the reports?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Minister Hammoud knows, as others do, that I don't receive any reports whatsoever from any embassy. When a matter requires the opinion of Sûreté Générale, the report comes to us, either through the Foreign Ministry or the Presidency of the Republic. We have never received a report directly from an embassy. There are no such contacts between Sûreté Générale and embassies.
Al-Hayat: Can you settle this matter decisively?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Of course I can, and I take full responsibility for what I am saying. When we are requested to provide our opinion about a report received by the Foreign Ministry or the Presidency of the Republic, we provide our opinion and return the report to the party that relayed it to us, either the Foreign Ministry or the Presidency of the Republic. Sometimes the opinion of the Justice Ministry or the Interior Ministry is requested. Today, others are responsible for heading Sûreté Générale, so let them reveal this if they exist, or if there are faxes or emails between Sûreté Générale and Lebanese embassies.
Al-Hayat: So, you didn't have a relationship with Farid Abboud?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: He would visit me when he came to Lebanon, and there is no working relationship between us when he is in Washington or New York. He has a hierarchy that he respects regarding his relationship with President Lahoud and the Foreign Ministry, and he operates according to procedures.
Al-Hayat: When did he tell you that leading world states were preparing to issue a resolution by the Security Council regarding Lebanon?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: At the beginning of the summer there were rumors. The media discussed it in detail and steps by the US Congress preceded the specific atmosphere that arose. Later, President George Bush told Le Figaro that he had discussed the matter with French President Jacques Chirac in June. We were following the matter and occasionally the Foreign Ministry or the Presidency would receive reports from Lebanon's ambassadors to certain countries. We were aware of the general outlines of the policy, i.e. the demand that Syrian forces withdraw from Lebanon and the Lebanese Army be deployed in the South.
Al-Hayat: After the resolution was passed, Prime Minister Hariri was accused of having worked to see its passing, or facilitated its passing. There are those who believe that these accusations facilitated Hariri's assassination.
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: This means that the opponents of 1559 killed him?
Al-Hayat: I didn't state this specifically, although this was said as well.
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Lebanon is an open arena for mutual recrimination between the authorities and members of the opposition, and within each group as well - accusations that have no limits and they're not limited to 1559. Earlier, Lebanon saw violent political disputes regarding the resistance, Israel and other matters. If we go back in time a bit, to the style of rule after the Taif Accord, we find amazing things. If each accusation justified an assassination, then no one from the political class would have remained alive. Of course, the debate over 1559 was sharper, because it coincided with the extension of President Lahoud's mandate. Unfortunately, what we expected turned out to be true, namely that 1559 produced a climate that aided unrest in Lebanon.
Al-Hayat: After 1559 was issued, did a foreign party approach you about Hariri's security?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: This didn't take place. Usually, foreigners do not come to us in order to draw our attention to threats against local officials. Usually, they raise the issue of threats against their embassies or nationals.
Al-Hayat: Weren't there fears about Hariri?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: There were fears for the entire country, and such fears continue to exist today. The country's atmosphere was charged due to 1559, and the extension. Earlier, there had been tension over other issues. Of course, in an atmosphere of tension, everyone becomes more cautious and officials take initiatives, each according to his post, regarding taking certain measures. Some of them have official protection bodies from the State, and some rely on their own security. A third group mixes the two. Each official has his own method of personal security, and Prime Minister Hariri was like most politicians in that he had his own private security detail, which organized his movements in isolation from state security bodies, which were not tasked with protecting him.
Al-Hayat: So, Hariri's private security detail undertook his immediate security in isolation from official security organizations?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Yes, he had a security detail that was completely independent of the State and didn't inform these agencies of his coming and goings and other movements.
Al-Hayat: But he had a detail from the ISF, didn't he?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: It was natural for him to have an ISF detail, whether as prime minister or former prime minister. The number of security personnel would rise or fall, depending on the situation. In general, ISF personnel work in stationary guard details or opening roads. As for immediate protection, each security organization had trained personnel and most private security personnel were usually trained for close protection.
Al-Hayat: Was Hariri's immediate protection handled by Lebanese or foreigners?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I have not seen a Lebanese politician with immediate protection handled by foreigners. The trained personnel might be foreigners, which takes place with official agencies, which send their personnel abroad, and in many cases, foreign trainers come to Lebanon to train people. I don't think that Hariri's personal security detail differed from that of others.
Al-Hayat: Did security organizations have information about an attempt to assassinate Minister Marwan Hamadeh?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: This attempt took place under the government of Prime Minister Hariri. Immediately, a torrent of political accusations was made against a certain party. The directorate of Internal Security took up the investigation, then it moved to Army Intelligence, based on a judicial order. Sûreté Générale and State Security received judicial fact-finding motions, meaning that if information were gathered, the two bodies would relay this to the concerned parties. We did not receive an investigation motion and thus all information about an assassination attempt remained in the hands of the ISF, Army Intelligence, and the judiciary. Of course, the assassination was a dangerous indication of the new phase and came amid a climate of overload that 1559 produced for Lebanon.
Al-Hayat: What's the story of the tape connected to the Hamadeh assassination attempt? It was said that Army Intelligence got a hold of it and took it.
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: "Got a hold of it" is going too far. This point was raised by Ministers Jumblatt and Hamadeh and other parties in the opposition; there were reactions. I reiterate that trust has been lost between the accuser and the accused and everything is open to interpretation. Like others, I heard these accusations and reactions and I believe that the judiciary has a clear response about the existence of a tape. Going deeper into the investigation could settle the matter. Based on what I know, I can say that it is very difficult and very dangerous for any party to fool around with the story of the tape.
Al-Hayat: Did Fitzgerald ask you about this story?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: In a general way, and in the context of my clarification. He asked about the incident and not the tape, because he knew that we were not among the parties concerned with (carrying out) the investigation.
Al-Hayat: You have long experience in the security field. On a completely personal level, do you believe that Prime Minister Hariri became a martyr due to a suicide operation?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: In the security field, I do no engage in such analysis. I set down the possibilities, as an investigative technique, in order to arrive at conclusions. I don't talk about probabilities, I talk about conclusions. In the world of security, it's not permitted to play around with possibilities.
We are supposed to present witnesses, facts and evidence. Interconnected items in the analysis and those that are unsupported by evidence or witnesses have a value of zero. One's work in the field of security is aimed at the judge, and the judge's work is aimed at the court. The preliminary investigation has a wide responsibility; it can expand the scope of possibilities and suspicion. As the investigation moves from security organizations to the judiciary, the responsibility grows narrower, until it reaches the court, where the investigation is presumed to be as unified and interconnected as possible. The gaps that appear in the preliminary investigation are to the detriment of the accused; if they continue to exist during the trial, it is to the benefit of the accused. The accused benefits from doubt during the trial and is hurt by suspicion during the investigation. One hands over to the court individuals who are under suspicion, not convicted. Who determines the way in which the explosion took place in the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri? The experts, and the investigation, that's all. Not even people with experience in the field of security.
Al-Hayat: Does this mean that you don't want to answer the question?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Do you want a responsible answer or media analysis?
The hypothesis of a suicide bomber or someone else must be investigated. There are films, there is the analysis of the films, and an analysis of the crime scene and the nature of the explosion and resulting debris. This is all the work of experts and their conclusions might be contradictory. Even explosives experts in the Army and ISF had contradictory ideas about identifying the explosion, so how do you expect me to answer the question so easily?
Al-Hayat: Was the explosion below or above ground?
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Fitzgerald brought experts from Switzerland and elsewhere and said it was most likely that the explosives were above ground, but he was not certain about this; everyone continued to have doubts. The difference is that no one accused Fitzgerald of misleading the public when he spoke of a surface explosion. If a Lebanese expert had done that, he would have been arrested, investigated and under accusation.
Recently, the head of the international investigating committee, Judge Detlev Mehlis, confirmed that the explosion came from a truck, above ground, at the scene of the crime, settling the earlier debate. I didn't hear anyone in Lebanon who had previously adopted the theory of the below-ground explosion, or who had previously accused the security agencies of misleading people, because the below-ground explosion theory was prevalent at the time - none of them was bold enough to comment on the conclusion of the international probe or apologize for the earlier false accusations.
Al-Hayat: Let's go back to the suicide bomber theory.
M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I believe in keeping all hypotheses open until the investigation settles the matter.
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