M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Abu Adas was considered dead, from a security point of view, either he was used in the execution or in the misleading - PART ONE

Ghassan Charbel     Al-Hayat     - 04/07/05//

Al-Hayat interviewed the man who came to the Sûreté Générale from the Intelligence Services and was at the heart of the decision-making process, before being at the heart of the storm?!

I read in the newspapers that the vehicles had been removed from the crime scene, I telephoned General Ali Hajj to advise and caution.

I knew it was going to be a thorny topic. As soon as the advertisements about the segments began to appear, a Lebanese politician telephoned me. "Do you know the weight of the accusations directed against the remnants of the security regime after the series of assassinations in Lebanon?" he asked me. "Does an Arabic newspaper with the weight of al-Hayat have the right to publish something this dangerous and sensitive before the international investigating committee announces its conclusion?" I responded by saying that out of loyalty to the blood of Rafiq Hariri, Bassel Fleihan, Samir Kassir and George Hawi, journalism should do its part to reveal the truth and gather versions, leaving the reader to compare and draw conclusions, while waiting for the international investigating committee. 

Why Jamil el Sayyed?

The answer is simple. Because he was at the heart of the decision-making process, before being at the heart of the storm. I knew that events were still hot and that the treasure-house of secrets couldn't be opened completely, even if the international investigating committee had begun its work in Beirut and would listen to many people, including el Sayyed. Merely hearing his name in the current political and emotional atmosphere raises objections, and perhaps accusations. El Sayyed's relationship with certain media, including al-Hayat, has seen disputes that have sometimes led to them standing against him.

I knew that Jamil el Sayyed's friends stress his success at the Sûreté Générale, where the logic of dividing up the spoils, patronage, bribery has been kept distant, something acknowledged by el Sayyed's rivals. However, they accuse him of setting ambushes for democracy and occasionally "putting together files." Politicians say that he was more than the Number 2 man at Army Intelligence during the presidency of Elias Hrawi, and was more than the director general of Sûreté Générale during that of Emile Lahoud.

The crime scene.

 El Sayyed has clashed with senior politicians and figures, who subsequently sought Damascus' help in removing him. They gave up on these efforts and achieved a measure of coexistence with him. I was aware of this, but I also knew that journalism is not excited by conversations with "saints." Before that, I knew that al-Hayat's readers have the right to know more about the man who would not have resigned were it not for the earthquake that changed the balance of forces, the situation of the country, and its features.
I thought el Sayyed would reject me to begin with. And this was the case. I thought the process of convincing him would be tiring. And this was the case. The absence of a relationship prior to the interview made things more difficult, since during earlier years, my personal experience with him was limited to two passing encounters.

*(Ghassan Charbel - Editor-in-Chief)

Al-Hayat: Where were you on 14 February 2005 and who informed you of the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: It was a Monday, and I had a normal schedule of appointments. I received officers from Sûreté Générale. Usually, after 10.30am, I receive various people, including foreigners, since most of Sûreté Générale's work is connected to foreigners. At 12.30pm, I received the security attaché from the British Embassy in Beirut, in the presence of a Sûreté Générale liaison officer.
We heard a loud explosion. At first, I thought it might be the sound of Israeli planes breaking the sound barrier. A few minutes later, I received a phone call from a friend who was passing near the Phoenecia Hotel, and then there were other calls, including the president and the minister of the interior. Afterward, it was confirmed that the target was the motorcade of Prime Minister Hariri, may God rest his soul.

Al-Hayat: What did you feel when Hariri's assassination was confirmed?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Shock and disbelief when I received the news.

Al-Hayat: What were you thinking at that point?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: In such circumstances, the first question is not "who's the perpetrator?" Such an assassination could produce reactions and repercussions. A security officer first thinks about the direct consequences. The first issue involves comprehending the situation that led to the crime, followed by the probable identity of the perpetrator.

Al-Hayat: You were one of the key figures in the State. What did you do?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: There were contacts among all state officials and I was one of those who spoke to the President and the minister of the Interior. The immediate action was to convene the Higher Defense Council, at Baabda Palace. President Emile Lahoud, Prime Minister Omar Karami, the ministers of Defense, Interior, Finance and Economy, and the heads of security organizations were on hand for the meeting. Everyone was in shock; the crime was beyond our imagination. We reviewed the possible repercussions for security and the economy. Later there was a discussion with Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh about the monetary situation. There was discussion of organizing a public funeral. There was also action by the judiciary the effort to reveal the facts surrounding the crime.

Al-Hayat: Didn't you contact the Syrians?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Of course, from the beginning the Syrians were concerned with following the developments. When the Central Security Council was convened by the minister of Interior, Syria's head of Beirut Security, Brigadier Mohammed Khallouf took part, as in previous meetings.

Al-Hayat: Who was suspected?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Security organizations do not make haphazard accusations; they search for facts and then follow them up. It wasn't a matter of suspicion or analysis. All possibilities must be entertained; some are then eliminated in light of information or evidence that is gathered. The explosion accompanied the broadcast of a telephone claim of responsibility, followed by a televised claim, by an unknown group.

Al-Hayat: Did the Higher Defense Council contemplate announcing a state of emergency?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: It wasn't raised as an idea that required implementation. The Council's meetings were kept open, to take decisions dictated by subsequent developments. The Higher Defense Council is not a substitute for the government; it makes recommendations. The Cabinet met and announced a period of official mourning and decided to hold a state funeral, which was immediately rejected by the martyr's family and certain members of the opposition.

Al-Hayat: The first impression was that Lebanese security organizations fabricated the tape made by Abu Adas.

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: As security bodies, we did not take the tape as proof. We considered it one of the possibilities to be taken into consideration. You can't take immediate positions on a tape, whether negatively or positively. You can say that the tape appeared at a time connected to the crime and at a time that does not allow you to believe that it was fabricated after the crime. We didn't believe the tape immediately; neither did we dismiss it immediately. The matter should be investigated. Everyone who took a position against the tape was wrong, and everyone who considered it to be proof was wrong a well. There was a rush by both sides, whether believing the tape or rejecting it.

Al-Hayat: I'd like a clear answer: was Sûreté Générale in any way connected to the Abu Adas tape?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: There was no relation of any kind, except that we obtained a statement from the director of al-Jazeera in Beirut, Ghassan Ben Jeddo, who provided the entire story about the tape; we relayed his statement, and the tape, to the judge, so that he could follow up the matter. Regarding the political accusations that were made, I repeatedly said at a news conference at the time that we would go along with any domestic or foreign investigation, and this was even before the State announced its approval of an international investigation. We are submitting to the investigation, not acting as if we are above it.

Al-Hayat: Where is Abu Adas and how did he disappear so quickly?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Speaking from a strictly security point of view, and based on the tape and the statement by Mr. Bin Jeddo, who received a series of calls from the party responsible for the tape, we have concluded that the tape was made prior to the crime. Thus, Abu Adas might be a principal party or might be a party in a bid to mislead people. Who will decide this? The investigation and the follow-up.
In addition, from a security point of view, Abu Adas is considered dead. His mere appearance on the tape in such a manner leads to two conclusions. Either he participated in the attack and was killed, as a suicide bomber, as he introduced himself on the tape, or he was a party to a bid to mislead the public, and might have been killed as well. In a security analysis, we can consider him dead. Abu Adas' story might be a very serious one, and it could be a very, very misleading one. Going further with the investigation will decide this matter. Thus, ignoring this incident due to certain sensitivities is a mistake, just as considering it decisive proof of the perpetrator's identity is also a mistake.

Al-Hayat: Was there no evidence of Abu Adas at the scene of the crime?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: We have reports by the foreign experts from all countries that examined the scene of the crime. An unofficial report sent to us by an embassy in Beirut said that an explosion of this type, with this amount of explosives, would mean that no trace of any part of the body would remain to allow us to perform a DNA test, the only element that provides confirmation (of the person's identity), in the absence of witnesses, of whether or not Abu Adas was killed at the scene. The report was based on conclusions from explosions in other countries; it said that it is very rare, if not impossible, to find cases where enough of the body is left to conduct a DNA test, on the presumed suicide bomber.

Al-Hayat: Who contacted the Hariri family regarding official participation in the funeral?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I tasked some parties enjoying good relations with the Hariri family and with Minister Fouad Seniora, who had ties with a number of ministers in Omar Karami's government. Deputy Prime Minister Issam Fares had a key role in the regard, and was authorized by the government. There were contacts through other channels. The answer was no, due to the family's bereavement, which coincided with a political position.

Al-Hayat: Was there hostility between members of the authorities and Prime Minister Hariri?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I don't want to speak about others. One's job often determines the various positions, and therefore, the resulting contradictions that arise. My post often put me in positions that were at variance with what Prime Minister Hariri wanted.
Changes always take place when it comes to politics. One day you have an alliance, and on another day you have a rivalry. Prime Minister Hariri, like others, went through such phases, whether it was with President Lahoud, Speaker Berri, or Minister Jumblatt, and others. But there's a big difference between hostility and rivalry. Rivalry is permitted, hostility is not. Even during the biggest disputes with Prime Minister Hariri, we would have meetings. There were liaison officers that relayed our consultations back and forth. The irony in my relationship with Prime Minister Hariri was that it was good when he was not in power, but would get worse when he was in power, particularly when the crisis grew between him and President Lahoud. I'd like to recall that after the 2000 elections, I was accused, even by people in Lahoud's circle, that I had embraced the opposition, was fulfilling Hariri's requests, and defending his allies. My last contact with Prime Minister Hariri before his assassination was two days prior to the crime, when he tasked his aide, Lieutenant Colonel Wissam al-Hasan, to contact me in order to contact the Public Prosecutor's Office regarding the release of some of his supporters, who had been distributing olive oil in Beirut. I made some contacts and answered by saying to wait for good news that very night. He relayed his thanks. I'd like to mention here the highly humanitarian side of Hariri's personality. Based on my experience with many politicians, with Prime Minister Hariri you felt that blood ran in his veins, but with other politicians in Lebanon, it was more like motor oil.

Al-Hayat: Was the idea of getting rid of Hariri discussed in any security meeting you attended?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Although this matter itself was never raised, I can say that this never took place. No such meeting of this kind ever took place, whether with my knowledge or participation.

Al-Hayat: The authorities had a complex about Hariri, whether he was in office or in the opposition. Was he an obstacle to seeing the other side achieve complete control?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: You can't achieve (total) control over Lebanon,

B.G. el Sayyed with Late PM Hariri.

whether you are a political team, even headed by Hariri, or a security team, even if headed by President Lahoud. Lebanon has a special, exceptional make-up. Any person claiming to control Lebanon is committing an error. We can speak of a struggle between conflicting points of view regarding politics, the economy, and administrative affairs between Prime Minister Hariri and others inside and outside power. Of course, we're talking about politics here. Each party seeks to be present in force in the power structure, to impose its point of view. This has always been the case with President Lahoud, as well as Prime Minister Hariri. The balance of power sometimes obliges one to leave office or accept certain compromises in office, and this applies to everyone. It's not about having a "complex"; it's about who is able, under the prevailing conditions, to be the strongest in the game of power. Sometimes it was President Lahoud, sometimes it was Prime Minister Hariri, and other times it was other players. We should remember that there are major players outside power, in the various groups and sects; sometimes they are stronger.

Al-Hayat: Legally speaking, who is responsible for a crime scene?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: There are four security organizations in Lebanon: the Internal Security Forces, Army Intelligence, Sûreté Générale and State Security. Sûreté Générale and State Security do not deal with "crime scenes" and related matters. After a high-profile crime is committed, they are asked to provide information through judicial orders or motions. The crime scene is the specialization of the ISF and the concerned judiciary. If Army Intelligence is concerned with the investigation, it can take place under its supervision, based on a mission defined by the judge. In Lebanon, the ISF is usually responsible and in special cases it's Army Intelligence.

Al-Hayat: In the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri, who was responsible for the crime scene?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: The judiciary and the ISF. Army Intelligence took part during the inspection phase, since the Army was deployed on the scene and had a role in preventing any incidents. Later, it was the exclusive task of the ISF, under the supervision of Military Justice, and then later it was transferred to the Judicial Investigator.

Al-Hayat: The crime scene was not examined well; was this due to a lack of seriousness or a lack of qualifications?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Frankly speaking, the idea of a lack of seriousness regarding a crime that targeted a person as important as Prime Minister Hariri in such an ugly fashion does not apply to the feelings of any official. Thus, I can confirm that there was no intentional lack of seriousness. However, I can say that there was considerable confusion, due to the scale of the incident, the crime, the many people who arrived at the scene, people's reactions, and the immediate pressure that arose.
The magnitude of the crime was greater than the capacities that went into action at the same moment to investigate. Each crime scene is the joint responsibility of the judiciary and the ISF. We can speak about shortcomings that shouldn't have taken place. To the degree that the crime scene is protected, the necessary elements needed for the investigation are protected.
After the press ran accusations about shortcomings at the crime scene, I asked the director general of the ISF, General Ali Hajj, and officers from the investigating arm, such as Brigadier Hisham al-Aawar (of the Judicial Police) about the matter. The answer was that they sometimes found themselves facing two options: they could dig in order to search for bodies and evidence, with the danger of digging leading to compromising the crime scene, or they could deal with what was evident and not approach anything covered by dirt. In fact, there were tremendous pressures and the sword of accusations was suspended over the heads over those concerned. I don't want to say that there wasn't any negligence; this should be left to the investigation. Of course, we know that Interior Minister Suleiman Franjieh took steps. Naturally, the concerned officials must justify their behavior with investigators, who will ask whether anything took place intentionally (in terms of negligence), or whether fear, inspired by the accusations, led to something that can be considered a failure to do the job thoroughly. I think that the officials concerned with the crime scene should answer questions related to any shortcomings. I believe that there were shortcomings, but did they take place with criminal intent? Was it due to the pressure of the accusations, or was there a failure to do the job thoroughly? I leave the answer to the judiciary.

Al-Hayat: When it was decided to close off the crime scene, who was in charge?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: The judiciary and the ISF; only the external perimeter was the Army's responsibility.

Al-Hayat: And the story of covering up the crime scene?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: On the morning following the crime, I read in the newspapers that the vehicles in the martyr Rafiq Hariri's motorcade had been taken during the night from the crime scene. The accusations were directed against all security bodies, perhaps because people didn't know who was responsible for the crime scene.
Sûreté Générale was "outside" the crime scene, both in terms of responsibility and an actual presence on the ground. Sûreté Générale personnel were not tasked with going to the crime scene. The problem was that the accusations were directed against security bodies in general. The vehicles were taken to "Helou" Barracks and officials said that they had been photographed, according to procedure. I telephoned General Ali Hajj and asked him about what the newspapers had said. He answered that he had received advice to open the road and that measures were taken based on this advice. I advised him to not continue in this manner, and said the issue was not a car accident or an overturned truck. This was a big crime. "Don't make a mistake," I said. "Whoever gave you this advice, don't carry it out. I'll call the minister of Interior right away to draw his attention to the fact that this crime will interest the world and the crime scene should be protected."
Naturally, I was giving advice; I had no authority, as the director general of Sûreté Générale. I said to myself, perhaps advice isn't enough. I telephoned Minister Franjieh and expressed my hope that he would an issue an order. I should say that Minister Franjieh was the most affected by the crime, and was despondent. The minister acted immediately and his intervention was key in securing the crime scene. I was told later that he intervened to protect any toying with the crime scene, and had acted even before I contacted him.

Al-Hayat: Who has the right to issue orders to General Ali Hajj?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Regarding the crime scene, the concerned judiciary. At the time, there was a military investigating judge and later, the investigation was transferred to the judicial investigator. I don't know if any judge was involved in such details. My previous experience in intelligence prompted me to warn about disturbing the crime scene.

Al-Hayat: It's said that General Ali Hajj received advice from a high-ranking officer at the Presidential Palace.

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: General Hajj is better suited to confirm or deny this. He has an interest in clarifying what happened. Each official should clarify to the judiciary or the international investigation why he did what he did, or did not do. I received no call, whether from the Presidential Palace or elsewhere. I undertook an initiative and I believe that my call to the interior minister prevented any serious error at the crime scene due to "the need to open the road," as if a traffic accident had taken place. If there were any good or bad intentions at play, those responsible should clear up the matter. I intervened from a technical standpoint and due to my feelings about what might happen if any irresponsible fooling with the crime scene took place. I believe I did General Ali Hajj and many others a service when I read in the morning about the cars having been moved overnight.

Al-Hayat: Were the actions of the heads of security bodies in sync and did you have a desire to resign?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Over a period of 37 years in the Army and Sûreté Générale, I worked in military security, then security in political, economic and social matters, which are the prerogatives of Sûreté Générale, for a total of 27 years. I worked in various security fields, and my responsibilities were based on my rank. There were accomplishments, and setbacks. A feeling of guilt only appears when one is truly negligent in his actions. There is a feeling of being hurt when a security incident takes place, especially if it is a large-scale one. My first personal reaction was feeling as if I had been hit. Security takes a blow, in parallel with the person targeted. I felt as if I had taken a blow. In an incident of these proportions, as a security official you feel as if you've taken a hit, whether the target is Prime Minister Hariri or someone else. There are differences among the feelings of guilt, having taken a blow, and negligence. The feeling of having taken a blow affects one's morale, in the first degree. The feeling of guilt results from being implicated, in collusion, or having disregarded something. This was not the case, Thank God. The feeling of negligence is connected to one's prerogatives.

Al-Hayat: Did responsibility for security on the ground lie within your jurisdiction or someone else's?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: The prerogatives of Sûreté Générale personnel are 99% about gathering information about political, economic and social affairs, information about unions, parties and families, in the interest of the state. Since Independence in 1943, Sûreté Générale has not investigated crimes, whether before they take place or afterward. However, as a security body, if there is any information connected to a crime, we don't say that "this is not my specialization"; rather, we relay the information to the judiciary or the concerned body, or both. Thus, negligence or involvement takes place if we find information connected to the crime and do not deal with it. We had taken a blow to our morale, as a security body concerned with the country's security. Perhaps people sometimes have the right to fail to differentiate between who is the competent body and who isn't. With a crime of this scope, people put the security bodies in a single basket and forget both past achievements and the differing jurisdictions.

Al-Hayat: Are you worried about the international probe?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I was angry at the delay regarding the international investigation; now it has begun its work. I hoped it would have begun a month earlier. This delay keeps many politicians and security officials shackled in their ordinary and professional life. The political accusations directed at people, including me, were so great that a person like me would hope that the investigation would take place yesterday, not tomorrow, to reveal the truth. We consider the accusations to have mixed between the crime and politics, which is a big mistake. At stake are people's reputation, morale, family and career history. No one would accept seeing all these things impinged just because some parties made accusations.

Al-Hayat: Immediately after the crime, MP Walid Jumblatt accused the Syrian-Lebanese security regime of having committed it. What is your response?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Since the accusation was made immediately following the crime, which means it's political. A political accusation is one thing, and confirming the identity of the perpetrators is another. It's a political accusation springing from the nature of who is responsible for security in Lebanon, affected by the political bickering that preceded the crime.

Al-Hayat: There was a focus on the security organizations, which includes you, due to feeling in the country that you were the "maestro" of these security bodies.

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Let me say this: accusing a person or an institution of a crime, of whatever type, is not easy and is not a joke. A person who casually accuses others of a crime is a criminal. A person who is used to crime easily accuses others.
I am more experienced, due to my former work in the Army, and I am among the most senior-ranking security chiefs. I take defensive initiatives regarding security when I feel that there is an injustice, or political accusations. This puts the spotlight on me. Everything up to this point involves political accusations. Some of the issues related to problems at the crime scene involve "technical" accusations. The judiciary and the international probe should determine what happened and who was responsible.

Al-Hayat: Do you have anything significant to tell the international probe?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Everything I have is at its disposal. My comments will be important or unimportant depending on the questioning of others. I will speak the truth. Perhaps what I say will direct the investigation to things that it might otherwise not notice.

Al-Hayat: When you telephoned Minister Franjieh, did he know about the moving of the vehicles from the crime scene?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I didn't ask him. I went straight into the basic matter at hand. I have no capacity to issue orders to Ali Hajj. The interior minister is the source of reference, and this is why I telephoned him. Perhaps he issued a directive preventing the moving of vehicles before I called him.

Al-Hayat: Can you confirm that the advice to General Hajj did not come from Franjieh?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Yes, I can confirm that Minister Franjieh exercised his prerogatives to prevent any damage to the crime scene.

Al-Hayat: Thus, the advice came from a party that did not have, legally speaking, the right to issue orders to Hajj?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I can't speak on his behalf. This might be proved or disproved.

Al-Hayat: What did Hajj tell you?

M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I didn't question him, but I did give him some advice, and I think General Hajj can clarify later where the advice or the order came from.

<h1>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Abu Adas was considered dead, from a security point of view, either he was used in the execution or in the misleading - PART ONE</h1> <h4>Ghassan Charbel     Al-Hayat     - 04/07/05//</h4> <p> <p>Al-Hayat interviewed the man who came to the Sûreté Générale from the Intelligence Services and was at the heart of the decision-making process, before being at the heart of the storm?!</p> <p>I read in the newspapers that the vehicles had been removed from the crime scene, I telephoned General Ali Hajj to advise and caution.</p> <p>I knew it was going to be a thorny topic. As soon as the advertisements about the segments began to appear, a Lebanese politician telephoned me. "Do you know the weight of the accusations directed against the remnants of the security regime after the series of assassinations in Lebanon?" he asked me. "Does an Arabic newspaper with the weight of al-Hayat have the right to publish something this dangerous and sensitive before the international investigating committee announces its conclusion?" I responded by saying that out of loyalty to the blood of Rafiq Hariri, Bassel Fleihan, Samir Kassir and George Hawi, journalism should do its part to reveal the truth and gather versions, leaving the reader to compare and draw conclusions, while waiting for the international investigating committee. </p> <p> <h3>Why Jamil el Sayyed?</h3> </p> <p>The answer is simple. Because he was at the heart of the decision-making process, before being at the heart of the storm. I knew that events were still hot and that the treasure-house of secrets couldn't be opened completely, even if the international investigating committee had begun its work in Beirut and would listen to many people, including el Sayyed. Merely hearing his name in the current political and emotional atmosphere raises objections, and perhaps accusations. El Sayyed's relationship with certain media, including al-Hayat, has seen disputes that have sometimes led to them standing against him.</p> <p>I knew that Jamil el Sayyed's friends stress his success at the Sûreté Générale, where the logic of dividing up the spoils, patronage, bribery has been kept distant, something acknowledged by el Sayyed's rivals. However, they accuse him of setting ambushes for democracy and occasionally "putting together files." Politicians say that he was more than the Number 2 man at Army Intelligence during the presidency of Elias Hrawi, and was more than the director general of Sûreté Générale during that of Emile Lahoud.</p> <p> <table width="200" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="3" border="0" align="left" class="image"> <tr> <td><img alt="The crime scene." src="Seen_10.jpg_200_-1.jpg" hspace="0" border="0"></td> </tr> <tr> <td class="caption">The crime scene.</td> </tr> </table> El Sayyed has clashed with senior politicians and figures, who subsequently sought Damascus' help in removing him. They gave up on these efforts and achieved a measure of coexistence with him. I was aware of this, but I also knew that journalism is not excited by conversations with "saints." Before that, I knew that al-Hayat's readers have the right to know more about the man who would not have resigned were it not for the earthquake that changed the balance of forces, the situation of the country, and its features.<br>I thought el Sayyed would reject me to begin with. And this was the case. I thought the process of convincing him would be tiring. And this was the case. The absence of a relationship prior to the interview made things more difficult, since during earlier years, my personal experience with him was limited to two passing encounters.</p> <p>*(Ghassan Charbel - Editor-in-Chief)<br> <br> <h3>Al-Hayat: Where were you on 14 February 2005 and who informed you of the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: It was a Monday, and I had a normal schedule of appointments. I received officers from Sûreté Générale. Usually, after 10.30am, I receive various people, including foreigners, since most of Sûreté Générale's work is connected to foreigners. At 12.30pm, I received the security attaché from the British Embassy in Beirut, in the presence of a Sûreté Générale liaison officer.<br>We heard a loud explosion. At first, I thought it might be the sound of Israeli planes breaking the sound barrier. A few minutes later, I received a phone call from a friend who was passing near the Phoenecia Hotel, and then there were other calls, including the president and the minister of the interior. Afterward, it was confirmed that the target was the motorcade of Prime Minister Hariri, may God rest his soul.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: What did you feel when Hariri's assassination was confirmed?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Shock and disbelief when I received the news.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: What were you thinking at that point?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: In such circumstances, the first question is not "who's the perpetrator?" Such an assassination could produce reactions and repercussions. A security officer first thinks about the direct consequences. The first issue involves comprehending the situation that led to the crime, followed by the probable identity of the perpetrator.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: You were one of the key figures in the State. What did you do?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: There were contacts among all state officials and I was one of those who spoke to the President and the minister of the Interior. The immediate action was to convene the Higher Defense Council, at Baabda Palace. President Emile Lahoud, Prime Minister Omar Karami, the ministers of Defense, Interior, Finance and Economy, and the heads of security organizations were on hand for the meeting. Everyone was in shock; the crime was beyond our imagination. We reviewed the possible repercussions for security and the economy. Later there was a discussion with Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh about the monetary situation. There was discussion of organizing a public funeral. There was also action by the judiciary the effort to reveal the facts surrounding the crime.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: Didn't you contact the Syrians?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Of course, from the beginning the Syrians were concerned with following the developments. When the Central Security Council was convened by the minister of Interior, Syria's head of Beirut Security, Brigadier Mohammed Khallouf took part, as in previous meetings.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: Who was suspected?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Security organizations do not make haphazard accusations; they search for facts and then follow them up. It wasn't a matter of suspicion or analysis. All possibilities must be entertained; some are then eliminated in light of information or evidence that is gathered. The explosion accompanied the broadcast of a telephone claim of responsibility, followed by a televised claim, by an unknown group.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: Did the Higher Defense Council contemplate announcing a state of emergency?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: It wasn't raised as an idea that required implementation. The Council's meetings were kept open, to take decisions dictated by subsequent developments. The Higher Defense Council is not a substitute for the government; it makes recommendations. The Cabinet met and announced a period of official mourning and decided to hold a state funeral, which was immediately rejected by the martyr's family and certain members of the opposition.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: The first impression was that Lebanese security organizations fabricated the tape made by Abu Adas.</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: As security bodies, we did not take the tape as proof. We considered it one of the possibilities to be taken into consideration. You can't take immediate positions on a tape, whether negatively or positively. You can say that the tape appeared at a time connected to the crime and at a time that does not allow you to believe that it was fabricated after the crime. We didn't believe the tape immediately; neither did we dismiss it immediately. The matter should be investigated. Everyone who took a position against the tape was wrong, and everyone who considered it to be proof was wrong a well. There was a rush by both sides, whether believing the tape or rejecting it.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: I'd like a clear answer: was Sûreté Générale in any way connected to the Abu Adas tape?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: There was no relation of any kind, except that we obtained a statement from the director of al-Jazeera in Beirut, Ghassan Ben Jeddo, who provided the entire story about the tape; we relayed his statement, and the tape, to the judge, so that he could follow up the matter. Regarding the political accusations that were made, I repeatedly said at a news conference at the time that we would go along with any domestic or foreign investigation, and this was even before the State announced its approval of an international investigation. We are submitting to the investigation, not acting as if we are above it.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: Where is Abu Adas and how did he disappear so quickly?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Speaking from a strictly security point of view, and based on the tape and the statement by Mr. Bin Jeddo, who received a series of calls from the party responsible for the tape, we have concluded that the tape was made prior to the crime. Thus, Abu Adas might be a principal party or might be a party in a bid to mislead people. Who will decide this? The investigation and the follow-up.<br>In addition, from a security point of view, Abu Adas is considered dead. His mere appearance on the tape in such a manner leads to two conclusions. Either he participated in the attack and was killed, as a suicide bomber, as he introduced himself on the tape, or he was a party to a bid to mislead the public, and might have been killed as well. In a security analysis, we can consider him dead. Abu Adas' story might be a very serious one, and it could be a very, very misleading one. Going further with the investigation will decide this matter. Thus, ignoring this incident due to certain sensitivities is a mistake, just as considering it decisive proof of the perpetrator's identity is also a mistake.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: Was there no evidence of Abu Adas at the scene of the crime?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: We have reports by the foreign experts from all countries that examined the scene of the crime. An unofficial report sent to us by an embassy in Beirut said that an explosion of this type, with this amount of explosives, would mean that no trace of any part of the body would remain to allow us to perform a DNA test, the only element that provides confirmation (of the person's identity), in the absence of witnesses, of whether or not Abu Adas was killed at the scene. The report was based on conclusions from explosions in other countries; it said that it is very rare, if not impossible, to find cases where enough of the body is left to conduct a DNA test, on the presumed suicide bomber.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: Who contacted the Hariri family regarding official participation in the funeral?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I tasked some parties enjoying good relations with the Hariri family and with Minister Fouad Seniora, who had ties with a number of ministers in Omar Karami's government. Deputy Prime Minister Issam Fares had a key role in the regard, and was authorized by the government. There were contacts through other channels. The answer was no, due to the family's bereavement, which coincided with a political position.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: Was there hostility between members of the authorities and Prime Minister Hariri?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I don't want to speak about others. One's job often determines the various positions, and therefore, the resulting contradictions that arise. My post often put me in positions that were at variance with what Prime Minister Hariri wanted.<br>Changes always take place when it comes to politics. One day you have an alliance, and on another day you have a rivalry. Prime Minister Hariri, like others, went through such phases, whether it was with President Lahoud, Speaker Berri, or Minister Jumblatt, and others. But there's a big difference between hostility and rivalry. Rivalry is permitted, hostility is not. Even during the biggest disputes with Prime Minister Hariri, we would have meetings. There were liaison officers that relayed our consultations back and forth. The irony in my relationship with Prime Minister Hariri was that it was good when he was not in power, but would get worse when he was in power, particularly when the crisis grew between him and President Lahoud. I'd like to recall that after the 2000 elections, I was accused, even by people in Lahoud's circle, that I had embraced the opposition, was fulfilling Hariri's requests, and defending his allies. My last contact with Prime Minister Hariri before his assassination was two days prior to the crime, when he tasked his aide, Lieutenant Colonel Wissam al-Hasan, to contact me in order to contact the Public Prosecutor's Office regarding the release of some of his supporters, who had been distributing olive oil in Beirut. I made some contacts and answered by saying to wait for good news that very night. He relayed his thanks. I'd like to mention here the highly humanitarian side of Hariri's personality. Based on my experience with many politicians, with Prime Minister Hariri you felt that blood ran in his veins, but with other politicians in Lebanon, it was more like motor oil.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: Was the idea of getting rid of Hariri discussed in any security meeting you attended?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Although this matter itself was never raised, I can say that this never took place. No such meeting of this kind ever took place, whether with my knowledge or participation.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: The authorities had a complex about Hariri, whether he was in office or in the opposition. Was he an obstacle to seeing the other side achieve complete control?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: You can't achieve (total) control over Lebanon, <table width="200" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="3" border="0" align="right" class="image"> <tr> <td><img alt="B.G. el Sayyed with Late PM Hariri." src="hariri_10.jpg_200_-1.jpg" hspace="0" border="0"></td> </tr> <tr> <td class="caption">B.G. el Sayyed with Late PM Hariri.</td> </tr> </table>whether you are a political team, even headed by Hariri, or a security team, even if headed by President Lahoud. Lebanon has a special, exceptional make-up. Any person claiming to control Lebanon is committing an error. We can speak of a struggle between conflicting points of view regarding politics, the economy, and administrative affairs between Prime Minister Hariri and others inside and outside power. Of course, we're talking about politics here. Each party seeks to be present in force in the power structure, to impose its point of view. This has always been the case with President Lahoud, as well as Prime Minister Hariri. The balance of power sometimes obliges one to leave office or accept certain compromises in office, and this applies to everyone. It's not about having a "complex"; it's about who is able, under the prevailing conditions, to be the strongest in the game of power. Sometimes it was President Lahoud, sometimes it was Prime Minister Hariri, and other times it was other players. We should remember that there are major players outside power, in the various groups and sects; sometimes they are stronger.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: Legally speaking, who is responsible for a crime scene?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: There are four security organizations in Lebanon: the Internal Security Forces, Army Intelligence, Sûreté Générale and State Security. Sûreté Générale and State Security do not deal with "crime scenes" and related matters. After a high-profile crime is committed, they are asked to provide information through judicial orders or motions. The crime scene is the specialization of the ISF and the concerned judiciary. If Army Intelligence is concerned with the investigation, it can take place under its supervision, based on a mission defined by the judge. In Lebanon, the ISF is usually responsible and in special cases it's Army Intelligence.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: In the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri, who was responsible for the crime scene?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: The judiciary and the ISF. Army Intelligence took part during the inspection phase, since the Army was deployed on the scene and had a role in preventing any incidents. Later, it was the exclusive task of the ISF, under the supervision of Military Justice, and then later it was transferred to the Judicial Investigator.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: The crime scene was not examined well; was this due to a lack of seriousness or a lack of qualifications?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Frankly speaking, the idea of a lack of seriousness regarding a crime that targeted a person as important as Prime Minister Hariri in such an ugly fashion does not apply to the feelings of any official. Thus, I can confirm that there was no intentional lack of seriousness. However, I can say that there was considerable confusion, due to the scale of the incident, the crime, the many people who arrived at the scene, people's reactions, and the immediate pressure that arose.<br>The magnitude of the crime was greater than the capacities that went into action at the same moment to investigate. Each crime scene is the joint responsibility of the judiciary and the ISF. We can speak about shortcomings that shouldn't have taken place. To the degree that the crime scene is protected, the necessary elements needed for the investigation are protected.<br>After the press ran accusations about shortcomings at the crime scene, I asked the director general of the ISF, General Ali Hajj, and officers from the investigating arm, such as Brigadier Hisham al-Aawar (of the Judicial Police) about the matter. The answer was that they sometimes found themselves facing two options: they could dig in order to search for bodies and evidence, with the danger of digging leading to compromising the crime scene, or they could deal with what was evident and not approach anything covered by dirt. In fact, there were tremendous pressures and the sword of accusations was suspended over the heads over those concerned. I don't want to say that there wasn't any negligence; this should be left to the investigation. Of course, we know that Interior Minister Suleiman Franjieh took steps. Naturally, the concerned officials must justify their behavior with investigators, who will ask whether anything took place intentionally (in terms of negligence), or whether fear, inspired by the accusations, led to something that can be considered a failure to do the job thoroughly. I think that the officials concerned with the crime scene should answer questions related to any shortcomings. I believe that there were shortcomings, but did they take place with criminal intent? Was it due to the pressure of the accusations, or was there a failure to do the job thoroughly? I leave the answer to the judiciary.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: When it was decided to close off the crime scene, who was in charge?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: The judiciary and the ISF; only the external perimeter was the Army's responsibility.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: And the story of covering up the crime scene?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: On the morning following the crime, I read in the newspapers that the vehicles in the martyr Rafiq Hariri's motorcade had been taken during the night from the crime scene. The accusations were directed against all security bodies, perhaps because people didn't know who was responsible for the crime scene.<br>Sûreté Générale was "outside" the crime scene, both in terms of responsibility and an actual presence on the ground. Sûreté Générale personnel were not tasked with going to the crime scene. The problem was that the accusations were directed against security bodies in general. The vehicles were taken to "Helou" Barracks and officials said that they had been photographed, according to procedure. I telephoned General Ali Hajj and asked him about what the newspapers had said. He answered that he had received advice to open the road and that measures were taken based on this advice. I advised him to not continue in this manner, and said the issue was not a car accident or an overturned truck. This was a big crime. "Don't make a mistake," I said. "Whoever gave you this advice, don't carry it out. I'll call the minister of Interior right away to draw his attention to the fact that this crime will interest the world and the crime scene should be protected."<br>Naturally, I was giving advice; I had no authority, as the director general of Sûreté Générale. I said to myself, perhaps advice isn't enough. I telephoned Minister Franjieh and expressed my hope that he would an issue an order. I should say that Minister Franjieh was the most affected by the crime, and was despondent. The minister acted immediately and his intervention was key in securing the crime scene. I was told later that he intervened to protect any toying with the crime scene, and had acted even before I contacted him.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: Who has the right to issue orders to General Ali Hajj?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Regarding the crime scene, the concerned judiciary. At the time, there was a military investigating judge and later, the investigation was transferred to the judicial investigator. I don't know if any judge was involved in such details. My previous experience in intelligence prompted me to warn about disturbing the crime scene.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: It's said that General Ali Hajj received advice from a high-ranking officer at the Presidential Palace.</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: General Hajj is better suited to confirm or deny this. He has an interest in clarifying what happened. Each official should clarify to the judiciary or the international investigation why he did what he did, or did not do. I received no call, whether from the Presidential Palace or elsewhere. I undertook an initiative and I believe that my call to the interior minister prevented any serious error at the crime scene due to "the need to open the road," as if a traffic accident had taken place. If there were any good or bad intentions at play, those responsible should clear up the matter. I intervened from a technical standpoint and due to my feelings about what might happen if any irresponsible fooling with the crime scene took place. I believe I did General Ali Hajj and many others a service when I read in the morning about the cars having been moved overnight.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: Were the actions of the heads of security bodies in sync and did you have a desire to resign?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Over a period of 37 years in the Army and Sûreté Générale, I worked in military security, then security in political, economic and social matters, which are the prerogatives of Sûreté Générale, for a total of 27 years. I worked in various security fields, and my responsibilities were based on my rank. There were accomplishments, and setbacks. A feeling of guilt only appears when one is truly negligent in his actions. There is a feeling of being hurt when a security incident takes place, especially if it is a large-scale one. My first personal reaction was feeling as if I had been hit. Security takes a blow, in parallel with the person targeted. I felt as if I had taken a blow. In an incident of these proportions, as a security official you feel as if you've taken a hit, whether the target is Prime Minister Hariri or someone else. There are differences among the feelings of guilt, having taken a blow, and negligence. The feeling of having taken a blow affects one's morale, in the first degree. The feeling of guilt results from being implicated, in collusion, or having disregarded something. This was not the case, Thank God. The feeling of negligence is connected to one's prerogatives.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: Did responsibility for security on the ground lie within your jurisdiction or someone else's?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: The prerogatives of Sûreté Générale personnel are 99% about gathering information about political, economic and social affairs, information about unions, parties and families, in the interest of the state. Since Independence in 1943, Sûreté Générale has not investigated crimes, whether before they take place or afterward. However, as a security body, if there is any information connected to a crime, we don't say that "this is not my specialization"; rather, we relay the information to the judiciary or the concerned body, or both. Thus, negligence or involvement takes place if we find information connected to the crime and do not deal with it. We had taken a blow to our morale, as a security body concerned with the country's security. Perhaps people sometimes have the right to fail to differentiate between who is the competent body and who isn't. With a crime of this scope, people put the security bodies in a single basket and forget both past achievements and the differing jurisdictions.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: Are you worried about the international probe?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I was angry at the delay regarding the international investigation; now it has begun its work. I hoped it would have begun a month earlier. This delay keeps many politicians and security officials shackled in their ordinary and professional life. The political accusations directed at people, including me, were so great that a person like me would hope that the investigation would take place yesterday, not tomorrow, to reveal the truth. We consider the accusations to have mixed between the crime and politics, which is a big mistake. At stake are people's reputation, morale, family and career history. No one would accept seeing all these things impinged just because some parties made accusations.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: Immediately after the crime, MP Walid Jumblatt accused the Syrian-Lebanese security regime of having committed it. What is your response?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Since the accusation was made immediately following the crime, which means it's political. A political accusation is one thing, and confirming the identity of the perpetrators is another. It's a political accusation springing from the nature of who is responsible for security in Lebanon, affected by the political bickering that preceded the crime.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: There was a focus on the security organizations, which includes you, due to feeling in the country that you were the "maestro" of these security bodies.</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Let me say this: accusing a person or an institution of a crime, of whatever type, is not easy and is not a joke. A person who casually accuses others of a crime is a criminal. A person who is used to crime easily accuses others.<br>I am more experienced, due to my former work in the Army, and I am among the most senior-ranking security chiefs. I take defensive initiatives regarding security when I feel that there is an injustice, or political accusations. This puts the spotlight on me. Everything up to this point involves political accusations. Some of the issues related to problems at the crime scene involve "technical" accusations. The judiciary and the international probe should determine what happened and who was responsible.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: Do you have anything significant to tell the international probe?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Everything I have is at its disposal. My comments will be important or unimportant depending on the questioning of others. I will speak the truth. Perhaps what I say will direct the investigation to things that it might otherwise not notice.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: When you telephoned Minister Franjieh, did he know about the moving of the vehicles from the crime scene?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I didn't ask him. I went straight into the basic matter at hand. I have no capacity to issue orders to Ali Hajj. The interior minister is the source of reference, and this is why I telephoned him. Perhaps he issued a directive preventing the moving of vehicles before I called him.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: Can you confirm that the advice to General Hajj did not come from Franjieh?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: Yes, I can confirm that Minister Franjieh exercised his prerogatives to prevent any damage to the crime scene.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: Thus, the advice came from a party that did not have, legally speaking, the right to issue orders to Hajj?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I can't speak on his behalf. This might be proved or disproved.</p> <p> <h3>Al-Hayat: What did Hajj tell you?</h3> </p> <p>M.G. Jamil el Sayyed: I didn't question him, but I did give him some advice, and I think General Hajj can clarify later where the advice or the order came from.</p> </p>