In the Palestinian Diaspora, ... “International Jihad” Accelerates its Steps in the West Bank and Gaza, after “National Jihad” Formed its Government
(Part II of II)
Hazem al-Amin Al-Hayat - 10/04/06//
AMMAN- Jordan - After the first installment of this two-part series dealt with al-Qaida in the Palestinian Diaspora and the attempts to see it reach Palestine, this final installment will deal with the salafi jihad movements in Gaza and regions of the West Bank. It will outline the difference between "international jihad," adopted by al-Qaida, and "national jihad," undertaken by Islamist parties and movements like Hamas and Islamic Jihad. It will also treat the issue of the Islamic environment that gives rise to jihadist ideas and information about the beginning of al-Qaida's penetration of Gaza.
Security and "jihad" sources in Amman believe it likely that the internet is playing a big role in building networks for al-Qaida within the West Bank and Gaza. A Palestinian Islamist activist says, "We're not talking about communicating our ideas via the internet. Our ideas have arrived; now we're talking about building an organization, which requires capabilities that are present today, more so than any previous time. Evading surveillance is something that's possible only on the net." A Jordanian security official says that the new al-Qaida generation is professional and enjoys high-level "communications" capacities, allowing them to get to places outside security surveillance.
Researcher Hassan Haniyya believes that the time is right for al-Qaida to begin establishing itself in the territories. However, he expects this phase to take a few years, before actual operations begin. "Regarding their modus operandi at the beginning of the 1990s," he says, "supporters of al-Qaida and salafi jihadist thought represented only a very small group in Jordan. After the decision to begin work was taken, only a few years passed and al-Qaida had spread, and now it has groups and partisans." Haniyya's comments are backed by an activist in the salafi jihadist current; he says that "any action attributed today to al-Qaida in the West Bank and Gaza will represent an individual initiative by disorganized groups. The Palestinian branch of al-Qaida has not begun operations yet, because the preparations aren't complete."
However, what is this moment referred to by more than one source? Why has it come time for al-Qaida to become active in the West Bank and Gaza? The usual answers range from the truce declared by Hamas to its involvement in the political process, and its recent election victory. This does not mean mere theoretical speculation, but a conclusion based on information held by a number of political groups and security bodies, indicating the beginning of penetration of leaderships and the rank and file of the military wing of Hamas. This is particularly because the move to political action and negotiations will leave many Hamas activists open to targeting by Israel, a process that never stops; the political leadership has decided to switch efforts to another area. Hamas, whose election victory actually surprised its leadership, had not prepared itself and its cadres for the role it is playing today. As long as the transitional phases of organizations like Hamas are exposed to internal disruptions, these will result, according to more than one source, in a split within the radical groups. Israel's policy of targeting activists will increase pressure in this direction.
Abu Mohammed affirms that around 200 members of Hamas' military wing in Gaza, led by a well-known military official, have begun contacts with parties outside the territories, to protest the truce. Salafi jihadists in Jordan speak of a letter sent via the internet from the al-Qaida Organization (Tanzim al-Qaida) to mujahideen in Palestine, signed by al-Moqdad Omar. The letter contained advice and a call to ignore the truce and reject the political process. The Islamists say that the letter was sent to the military head of the al-Qassam Brigades, Mohammed Daif, and that he read it; it was published on al-Qaida's Palestine website (www.alommh.net).
Many reasons allow us to link the shock of Hamas' taking office and seeing al-Qaida able to penetrate the West Bank and Gaza. Salafi jihadist groups' ability to arrive and spread in the Jordanian and Palestinian environment took place under a similar logic. In Jordan, these groups are, in one way or another, radical splits from Jordan's own Muslim Brotherhood.
The sheikhs, propagators and activists felt that the Brotherhood did not meet their violent needs. The involvement of the Brotherhood in political life and its alliance with the King, followed by its members becoming government ministers and later its contesting parliamentary elections, constituted a deviation from their concept of their religious mission. At first, these divisions took place in Palestinian circles in Jordan. The salafi jihad movement did not move to Eastern Jordan until the mid-1990s. Hamas was the Palestinian extension of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, and perhaps the son had outstripped the scope and role of the father. However, the father's genes exist in Hamas the son. This formula grows in importance since Hamas was born with a push from the hawks and followers of Sayyed Qutb from among Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood members. Hamas is distinguished from "international jihad" salafi organizations by what Hassan Haniyya calls its "salafi nationalism." Here, we are entering a narrow area, in which it is easy to jump from slight differences to beliefs.
Hamas today represents the community of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank and Gaza and it is their community in the Palestinian refugee camps of Jordan. These pro-Muslim Brotherhood camps were the actual incubator of international jihad groups, which had exited the Brotherhood circle. This Brotherhood community in the West Bank today is the incubator, if not localization, for those exiting Hamas, those who have been pushed by the circumstances of the confrontation with Israel to become likely targets for assassination and murder. Movement toward a settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict faces a true dilemma today, represented by the fact that hundreds of activists (and perhaps more) from Hamas and other groups cannot easily move toward political action, despite Hamas' adopting this option and the formation of a Cabinet. A Jordanian security source says that "al-Maqdasi (Issam al-Barqawi) and al-Zarqawi have never worked before in the West Bank and Gaza. In the past, the war was limited to Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Fatah, on the one side, and Israel, on the other. There was no time or leisure to build cells via books and convince people (of the cause). al-Qaida's targets were western interests; if this had taken place in Palestine, there would have been a clash with the interests of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. What has changed today is Hamas' participation in Palestinian elections and forming a government. This will be resented among those in the military wing."
Jordanian security has no specific information about activity by al-Qaida in the West Bank, even though officials lean toward believing the development to be possible. In Gaza, these security sources are certain that some have begun preparing themselves for joining al-Qaida. These sources revealed that a group of ten al-Qaida activists in Gaza were recruited via the internet and that they are in the preparation stage. This group will use unprecedented camouflage measures, such as tasking women with communications and transporting weapons, said the sources, who see this step as coinciding with the use by Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi in Iraq of women for a number of missions and movements. In the context of linking this information about the movement of these groups in Gaza and what is taking place in Iraq, the Jordanian sources pointed out that the name of the Takfir group [which believes in killing Muslim "unbelievers"] the Salaheddine Brigades, which is active in Gaza and led by Jamal Abu Samhadan, is also used by a group in Iraq, and puts out statements taking responsibility for operations against the Americans and the Iraqi Army. Jordanian security has no information about a connection between the two organizations, but the matter does require their notice, they believe; it indicates a coalescence between groups in Iraq and Gaza.
The reason for Gaza's taking precedence over the West Bank in receiving salafi jihadist thought and its security and military organizations is linked to a great extent to the area's high population density and the spread of Islamist parties since the beginning of the first Intifada. Also, Israeli surveillance of the West Bank has been stricter than in Gaza. Here, we should note the Israeli role in spreading Islamist currents at the end of the 1970s in an attempt to confront Fatah and the pan-Arab and leftist currents, which played roles in the first Intifada. Israel tested the Muslim Brotherhood and its traditional options, considering it a pragmatic group that could lead to Palestinian representation distant from the PLO. However, the Israelis were surprised by the rapid spread of Islamist movements and their transformation into resistance movements. It realized late that the coming confrontation would be with these currents and the first step lay in expelling Hamas activists to the Marj Zuhour area of Lebanon at the beginning of the 1990s.
Gaza was the scene of both the first Israel tendency toward calmly dealing with the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the first confrontation with this group. At the end of the 1970s, the Israeli authorities did not object to the formation of the Islamic University in Gaza. This university turned into one of the true incubators of the Islamist movements in the city. Israel tried to play on the contradiction between the territories and the Diaspora, wagering on the territories becoming an alternative to the PLO; the Muslim Brotherhood was a part of this "interior" part of the equation.
The Israelis later realized their failure and learned late that this environment would be used by the radicals. Of course, this delay reminds us of the Americans' delay in expecting what the Afghan Arab phenomenon, which they helped build up, would lead to in the end.
With the beginning of the Intifada, Gaza turned into the area where an Islamist movement was described as calling for accelerating jihad. At the same time, Hamas saw a debate between wings of the Brotherhood: the Gaza wing called for speeding up jihad and announcing the formation of the movement, while the West Bank wing preferred at first to see education and instruction precede the announcement and prepare the way for it. The former group was able, in the end, to get its way.
The above presentation does not mean that the beginning of the growth of the Palestinian Islamic resistance in Gaza involves a link between the organizational structures of these movements and the international jihad and al-Qaida networks. However, the social and religious structures are similar; researchers cannot find al-Qaida with a foothold in Gaza or the West Bank unless they first examine the Islamic movement's environment. We can see the same trajectory in most radical movements. But in the Palestinian case, we can see an opposed movement as well. While radical Palestinian Islamist figures began their activities in the Palestinian cause, they overcame it or performed an "exodus" to Afghanistan (Abdullah Azzam) or "Londonistan" (Abu Qutada); i.e. they moved from the national jihad to the international one, there are those who moved in the opposite direction, from international to nation, such as the leaders of Islamic Jihad (Abdel-Aziz Awdeh, Fathi Shiqaqi, and Ramadan Shallah). This latter group went to Egypt at the beginning of the 1970s for study; there, they met the leaders of Qutb-ist Islamist groups (after Sayyed Qutb), which became active in Egyptian universities, influenced by Saleh Siriyya, their colleague there, Mohammed Salem Rahhal, and Egyptian activists like Abdel-Salam Faraj.
The Egyptian Awdeh and Shiqaqi were arrested by Egyptian security as a result of their relationship with the Egyptian Jihad Movement. The leaders of the Islamic Jihad in Palestine were later linked to the Iranian Revolution and visited Tehran at the beginning of the revolution. However, despite their contact with international jihad, they returned and set up their "Palestinian" movement in Gaza.
Here, we can note the difference between those who have embraced international jihad after national experiences, and those who return from international jihad to national jihad. Most of the first group's members are from the Palestinian Diaspora, and particularly refugee camps in Jordan, while the others are from the territories, and specifically Gaza.
We can apply this relationship between the national and international jihads to the beginnings of Hamas in a different way. The movement, according to those close to it from this time, saw a struggle between leaderships from outside the territories, coming from Kuwait after the Second Gulf War (Khaled Meshaal, Mohammed Nazzal, Imad al-Alami, and Musa Abu Marzouq) and those within Gaza (Abdel-Aziz Rantissi, Mahmoud Zahhar, Ismail Abu Haniyya. The leadership outside the territories wanted to move from a negative "resistance" through popular networks and protest movements to a "positive" resistance, i.e. direct military reaction.
The leadership inside the territories wanted to take its time. The "outside" was more radical than the "inside," which also explains some aspects of the delay of al-Qaida's arrival inside the territories; the delay, according to some of those frequenting al-Qaida circles, caused considerable confusion in the salafi jihadist center and raised doubts regarding the role and function of these groups.
Just as the "international" nature of Abdullah Azzam's jihadist calls were not separate from the Palestinian dilemma, the Palestinian nature of Islamic Jihad and Hamas (to a lesser degree) were not free of an international aspect, as long as conflicts in faraway lands were moved to the heart of the Palestinian cause. In this situation of status quo, al-Qaida has a chance with the Palestinian issue. It is an area in which the borders between Palestine as a homeland and Palestine as a "holy trust" are blurred; this dichotomy might be a fixed one in Palestinian identity. However, it might involve losing territory and retaining the idea. This hypothesis runs in exact parallel to national salafism and international jihadist salafism, and moving between them. What would be the case if the former has no firm origin in the books of the salafis and the judgments of their followers? Perhaps the answer is represented in the post-Palestinian elections period, in that it is easy to perform an exodus and join the international jihad.
In addition to the salafi nature of the "national" Hamas, salafi groups outside the Muslim Brotherhood have always spread in the West Bank and even within the Green Line. On more than one occasion, jihadist individuals and groups have existed some of these groups; some groups were dismantled and others have moved toward propagation of the call. In 1979, Sheikh Abdullah Nimr Darwish, an Arab Israeli, established the Families of Jihad (Usar al-Jihad) group, which carried out a number of military operations before its founder was imprisoned for five years. After his release he announced his abandonment of his ideas and set up the Islamic Movement in Palestine and became involved in the Israeli political process. Another person, on the West Bank, was Dia al-Din al-Qudsi, one of those who went to Afghanistan and returned to the West Bank, setting up a group of supporters. However, he is now in prison.
A former Palestinian Authority official, who declined to reveal his identity, says that "the salafi jihadist thought that we know was late in penetrating the West Bank. Small groups have begun to form in more than one region, via the internet and books and publications that arrive from Jordan and Egypt. This has been occupying Israeli security organizations for the last three years." Meanwhile, a Jordanian security official says that the Jordanian authorities are not following salafi jihad groups in Gaza; it is important to discover their networks for contacting the outside, so that their capabilities and objectives can be discovered."
"The three coming years will be the years of al-Qaida in the West Bank and Gaza." This is repeated in Jordan by political and security officials and those who follow al-Qaida and jihadists. The election win by Hamas, and the lack of likely progress on a settlement, have awakened this hypothesis.
Regional Divisions Within al-Qaida . . . al-Zarqawi challenged al-Maqdisi with the Amman Bombings
A Jordanian security official told al-Hayat about al-Qaida's work methods in recent months, as it was under surveillance by Jordanian security. He said that al-Qaida has carried out three types of operations in the world. The first is the kind where Ayman al-Zawahiri gives direct orders for execution. The second is when decisions are left to groups and networks spread throughout the world. The third is the kind that is inspired via jihadist websites, whose pages often contain coded messages to specific people, a type of designation that they have been tasked with certain missions and operations.
The security official affirmed that Osama bin Laden and al-Zawahiri are hiding in the province of Waziristan, in Pakistan.
He revealed that bin Laden recently appointed an official for al-Qaida's foreign relations; he is an Egyptian named Said, who previously worked as a financial official for the group.
He said that there are divisions that have taken place in al-Qaida recently, most important the split by Abu Laith al-Libi, who took some of his supporters with him and preferred to work alone within Afghanistan. It is believed likely that the divisions have prompted bin Laden to bring Egyptians closer to him, at the expense of his supporters from other nationalities.
The security official indicated that bin Laden had reappointed emirs for certain regions; one was named for Europe and another for Bilad al-Sham (Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan), a Syrian who moves between Lebanon and Syria and tries to recruit activists from both countries.
The security official said that al-Zarqawi was the emir of Iraq alone and that the operations that he carried out or tried to carry out in Jordan are part of a process of al-Zarqawi's own revenge against Jordan.
Another source described the bombings of hotels in Amman carried out by al-Zarqawi as internal messages that he wanted to send to his sheikh, Abu Mohammed al-Maqdasi, who had written a letter to al-Zarqawi from his prison. In it, he hinted that the siege that jihadists in Jordan were suffering from was because al-Zarqawi had made them objects of suspicion.
al-Zarqawi mentioned that it was difficult to use Jordanians in his operations inside the country. It appears that the letter produced bitterness between the two men, and that al-Zarqawi wanted to tell his sheikh: "I can still move in Jordan." He carried out the hotel bombings via Iraqis.
A Palestinian Jihadist Journeys to the Hindu Kush
The following is the account of a Palestinian who has returned from Afghanistan:
"When I decided to go to Afghanistan in 1987, it wasn't because of a conviction that was generated by my contact with mujahideen sheikhs. I myself decided to go. I was here in Jordan, following the news of the mujahideen in Afghanistan and reading their pamphlets, which were distributed by the Muslim Brotherhood. Palestine was unattainable. I went to the Pakistani Embassy in Amman; the Pakistani prime minister at the time was Zia al-Haq, and he encouraged going to Pakistan for jihad. However, this took place through Islamic parties and associations, not through individual initiatives. Thus, the Embassy didn't agree to give me a visa at first. I made another attempt, saying I wanted to go to apply to one of the Islamic universities in the capital, and I received the visa.
I traveled by plane to Karachi Airport, and from there took another to Peshawar. As soon as I arrived, I contacted Beit al-Ansar (House of Partisans), which had been established to receive Arab mujahideen. I got the number for Beit al-Ansar from a magazine published by the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. I was received by one of the brethren who was tasked with organizing the arrival of Arab mujahideen. I arrived at the guest house affiliated with Beit al-Ansar, where I spent a few days before we were sent to various training camps and later to the front.
There were many Palestinians at the Beit al-Ansar, set up by Sheikh Abdullah Azzam. At first, the institution's operations rested on the efforts of Sheikh Abdullah and his Palestinian partisans, such as his assistant Abdullah Tamimi and others who I perhaps shouldn't mention here. It was clear that the Palestinian element was dominant; later, I learned that Osama bin Laden preferred Palestinians to other nationalities, even in his companies and commercial business, whether in Saudi Arabia or later Sudan.
After a few days at the guest house, where I met Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, we were sent to training camps, where we were supposed to spend six months. However, this was shortened to two months, due to pressure of missions outside the training camps. During this period, the bickering began between the Hizb al-Islami, led by Gulbeddin Hekmatyar, and the Islamic Association (al-Jam'iya al-Islamiyya) led by Rabbani. The forces of Ahmad Shah Masoud stood with Rabbani. The Afghan disputes were a source of great frustration. We were in Jordan and believed that when we went to Afghanistan we would find angels fighting with us, and that our jihad in that country was a prelude to our jihad in Palestine.
I was assigned to the provinces of Najjar, Taliqan, and the eastern and southern provinces. There, I found tribal loyalty as the top priority, overshadowing everything else. The Afghan mujahideen, for example, captured an Afghan communist general, and treated him well, which led to questions on my part. One day, I approached an official and asked him why we didn't execute the general, who had caused the deaths of hundreds of mujahideen. He answered that (the general) was a member of a big tribe, which we couldn't provoke. Loyalty to the tribe was more important than any other loyalty; many accounts were settled on this path of Afghan jihad.
Our sheikhs should have told us the reality of the situation before we left for this country. This wouldn't have diminished our determination to wage jihad, but it would have limited our frustration when coming into contact with the (Afghan jihad) experience.
I returned after spending six months there. At first, I was overwhelmed by the disappointments from which I suffered from Afghanistan. However, a few months later I once again began to feel a yearning for that country."
End
Part two of two
Also Read:
In the Palestinian Diaspora, They Joined Early . . . In the Territories, They Delayed in Receiving It (Part I of II)
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