Ghassan Charbel interviews the Secretary General of Hizbullah on the Lebanese Cabinet crisis, the standoff affecting Lebanon, as well as domestic and regional issues.
(PARTS ONE & TWO)
Ghassan Charbel Al-Hayat - 20/01/06//
I have asked politicians in Lebanon about the possibility of seeing the Shiite ministers return to the Cabinet, to "rebuild" the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, and their answer has been: "Why don't you ask Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah (the Secretary General of Hizbullah)?" I asked them about the possibility of a flare-up in the street, because of the division over Syria and other issues, and received the same answer, which was repeated when I asked about the future of the situation in South Lebanon, UN Security Council Resolution 1559, and the weapons held by the resistance after liberation is completed. Nasrallah holds the key, they said. They didn't hesitate to discuss Hizbullah's regional ties, and specifically its alliance with Syria and Iran, and the danger of seeing Lebanon remain "a prisoner for many years."
There is the smell of fear in Lebanon. Fear of sectarian and religious mobilization, and general paralysis that warns of an economic crisis, or something worse.
The president of the Republic can no longer play his role. It's clear that natural and artificial land mines are hindering the government's ability to deal with difficult issues, from the investigation into the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri to ordinary citizens' daily concerns.
I took these questions and fears to the office of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, in Beirut's southern suburbs.
The following is Part One of the interview.
Al-Hayat: Sayyed Nasrallah, are we on the verge of a civil war in Lebanon?
Sayyed Nasrallah (Laughing): This interview is starting off with a difficult question.
Al-Hayat: The atmosphere in Lebanon encourages one to pose such a question.
Sayyed Nasrallah: You ask about a civil war. God forbid such a thing. Of course, I think that it this unlikely. It is true that Lebanon has recently experienced sharp tension, but I also believe that there is enough reason, wisdom, and guarantees to distance us from a bad situation of this sort.
Al-Hayat: Could Hizbullah see itself as forced to fire the first shot in a domestic conflict?
Sayyed Nasrallah: First of all, it would be impossible for Hizbullah to fire a shot in a domestic conflict. Furthermore, Hizbullah is making serious, decisive and strong efforts so that it doesn't become a victim of a plot to "point its weapons in another direction." The party categorically rejects this.
Al-Hayat: What is the problem for Hizbullah at the moment? Is it being asked to compromise regarding its regional role, so that it can become part of domestic accord?
Sayyed Nasrallah: At present, the problem in Lebanon does not involve Hizbullah in particular. It is Lebanon's problem. What kind of Lebanon do we want? Where do we want Lebanon to go? What is the future of Lebanon, its strategic options, and the policies that should govern the domestic situation and the country's foreign relations? This is the issue. Hizbullah has its point of view, with which some political forces in the government do not agree, and with which other political forces might agree. The issue isn't tied to Hizbullah's role as much as it linked to these fundamental and strategic options.
Al-Hayat: Can you clarify this further?
Sayyed Nasrallah: Today, there is a debate underway in Lebanon. Is Israel an enemy, or not? Does it pose a strategic threat to Lebanon, or not? Does Israel have aspirations regarding Lebanon, or not? How do we deal with daily Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty? How do we recover the remainder of our occupied territory? How can we repatriate Lebanese prisoners and detainees (from Israel)? There is an important debate underway about these issues - this is the part that concerns Israel. There's also a debate about the Palestinian issue - Palestinian weapons inside and outside the camps, the civil rights of refugees, the future of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, permanent settlement (of Palestinians here), and expulsion - these are the various issues being debated.
The third issue involves the relationship with Syria: the way we look at Syria, the future of our ties with that country, and Lebanon's national interests regarding this topic, in political, economic and social terms.
There is also the matter of international relations. Have we exited, as our brethren in the 14 March movement maintain, a period of Syrian tutelage, and entered, as the brethren in the 8 March movement say, a period of American-French tutelage over Lebanon? What are the limits of American and French interference in Lebanon? What is our viewpoint regarding the assistance being provided by our fellow Arabs, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Arab League? These are divisive issues. There are those who reject any kind of "Arabization" or Arab assistance, unless it serves their goals. However, they welcome any American or French intervention.
Regarding the domestic front, there are also some big questions about policies: administrative, financial and political reform, corruption issues, and whether these are limited to the Madina Bank case, or are they wider than this. This is the debate. There are those who limit this matter to Madina Bank, and they have no readiness to discuss Lebanon's $40 billion debt, and how the money has been spent.
Al-Hayat: Doesn't raising these topics cause you some embarrassment?
Sayyed Nasrallah: No, we have no embarrassment about this.
Al-Hayat: At the least, your allies and friends might be embarrassed.
Sayyed Nasrallah: We have no problem with it. There is the project to build a functioning state, and implement the remaining provisions of the Taif Accord. Thus, Lebanon is "in labor." There is a debate about many topics. It is an extreme simplification to say that there is no problem in Lebanon except Hizbullah and its role, and how to treat this problem. The subject of Hizbullah is part of this process of "labor," because Hizbullah is a principal political force in the country, and has its point of view about all of these matters. At a minimum, the party says that it is loyal to the homeland and its people, and to Lebanese national interests. It is keen to preserve the country's unity and avoid any domestic strife. It is determined to see civil peace, the building of a state, and the real project that calls for building a state on sound foundations. Based on this, Hizbullah, in terms of what it represents, and the opinions it holds, might agree or disagree with others, so disputes and clashes arise.
The 8 March Movement
Al-Hayat: Don't you think that Hizbullah could have behaved differently after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, in a way that would have reduced the weight of the current atmosphere? Was the 8 March demonstration in Riad Solh (downtown Beirut) necessary?
Sayyed Nasrallah: Definitely. It was very necessary, if we go back to the atmosphere that prevailed at the time. There is a group of political forces who became known later on as "14 March," or forces opposed (to the Syrian presence). Of course, Hizbullah was not in the pro-regime group, and wasn't a member of the government. It didn't vote confidence in the government of then-Prime Minister Omar Karami. However, it wasn't in the opposition that existed at the time. The atmosphere that prevailed then involved accusations against Syria. Saying that Syria killed Prime Minister al-Hariri involved an accusation, a trial, and a verdict. Based on this, there were pressures that led to the exit of Syrian forces from Lebanon in the way that they did. Then, the Lebanese street saw a harsh wave of political, media and psychological incitement, against not only the Syrian regime, but the Syrian people as well. I can say quite courageously that this campaign was characterized at times by racism in some media and some speeches that were delivered. We felt first-hand that this movement would lead to the creation of intense hostility between the Syrian and Lebanese peoples. This is not just an assumption, but something that we felt ourselves. We have Lebanese students in Syrian universities and there are many Lebanese who go to Syria and live there, and they felt this from ordinary people, even from those who oppose the regime in Syria. In whose interest is this? Something needed to be done to express the thanks and appreciation of Lebanese for everything that Syria offered to Lebanon, although they had reservations about the mistakes that were committed in Lebanon. This is what President Bashar al-Assad said in his address. The demonstration of 8 March came after President al-Assad's speech, when he spoke about mistakes. Between 8 March and 14 March, what happened? We are all calling for the truth, and the investigation into al-Hariri's assassination, and we want national unity, civil peace, building the state, and the Taif Accord. We do not disagree about these things. However, there were those who said thank you to Syria and those who cursed Syria, and tried it without evidence, building a wall of hatred between two peoples that cannot be separated from each other. In our estimation, fairness and justice require that no one be sentenced before a guilty verdict. Lebanon's national interest requires that there be no hostility between the two governments and peoples, and above all between the two peoples. Governments come and go, but peoples remain. We didn't want to arrive at a situation in which this hatred would become rooted and passed down from generation to generation. This is why there was a need for the 8 March demonstration, regarding Syria.
As for the domestic consideration, the 8 March Movement, in the street, worked to absorb the very considerable and important psychological aspect of this state of tension. In other words, the rhetoric of the opposition wasn't just targeting the regime in Syria, but also a number of political forces in Lebanon, with very, very harsh and provocative language. These forces have their extensions in the street, and naturally this rhetoric even dealt with the resistance. These forces have a big following among the public, who listen to these speeches, day after day, and month after month. The public was being "pumped up." Also, the street was being "pumped up" and there was a need for a movement to re-exert control over this street, and its psychological balance, so that it could express itself, express the fact that it existed, express its slogans, to say that it was not weak and could not be eliminated from the scene. In our opinion, the timing of the 8 March demonstration was important in order to "absorb" the other street, in order to maintain the existing rivalry at a political level and in the media, without this leading to clashes in the street. In our opinion, if the 8 March demonstration hadn't taken place, the (political) clash could have ended up in the street, which of course for us is a red line. We do not want Lebanon to arrive at this stage. In both considerations, the national-Lebanese one, and the consideration of Lebanon's interests and the relationship between the Lebanese and Syrian peoples, we had to have an 8 March Movement.
Al-Hayat: Where do we stand today when it comes to the withdrawal of the Shiite ministers from the Cabinet? Has dialogue ended?
Sayyed Nasrallah: Until now, there have been two attempts at an accord. The first attempt was in Riyadh, and in fact our Saudi brethren did not get involved; Riyadh was just the location, due to circumstances, since Sheikh Saad al-Hariri could not come to Lebanon, and communicating through mediators or over the telephone isn't useful. He requested that delegates from Hizbullah and Amal go to him, and two individuals did go. There were 48 hours' worth of meetings and dialogue, as al-Hariri consulted with his allies in Lebanon over the telephone. An agreement was reached, by those Lebanese, and it was blessed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. However, when our brethren returned, and the agreement was to be announced the following day, the agreement began to be attacked by some allies of Sheikh Saad, particularly Walid Jumblatt. We were surprised when the media gathered at the home of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and he said that he would be unable to go ahead with this agreement, due to the reservations of some of his allies. The next day, a number of ministers arrived to consult with the prime minister, and we saw the beginning of a harsh media campaign against the agreement that had been reached. Sometimes, the problem was that the agreement was reached outside Lebanon, as if the Taif Accord were concluded in Lebanon, as if the (Saudi Arabian) city of Taif is located in Mount Lebanon. Sometimes, the problem was that the agreement would lead to a new Cairo Accord (the 1969 agreement that legitimized armed Palestinian resistance from Lebanon).
Practically speaking, the agreement was aborted and for several days we were conducting dialogue; then, contact was re-established. The prime minister presented a formula that we had discussed, and to which we had made a few simple amendments. We reached an understanding. I can say that we were in agreement. However, to be precise, Prime Minister Siniora said that this was good, and positive, but that he needed to consult his allies. Speaker Nabih Berri (the head of Amal) went to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for the hajj, and met with Sheikh Saad al-Hariri in Jeddah. Prime Minister Siniora was supposed to go also, and a meeting would be held there. The formula that was agreed to with Prime Minister Siniora, and which should have remained a tacit one, in order for more discussion and consultation to take place, was revealed two days later by Walid Jumblatt, during one of his meetings in Mukhtara, as a text, and in front of the media. He began to give a speech, and comment on it. Practically speaking, we had been waiting for a response from Prime Minister Siniora about the new agreement, and we still have yet to receive an answer. Recently, when Siniora was contacting Speaker Berri and Walid Jumblatt, in order to discuss how to absorb the media climate and recent escalation in the country, we asked Prime Minister Siniora where we all stood on the basic matter at hand. He said wait a few days and God willing, we would be in contact. We haven't received an answer about the second agreement, and I can't be optimistic about this, since those who aborted the first agreement might abort the second one as well. They want to escalate things, and I believe that there are those who are working hard on this so that there is no agreement between, on the one hand, Hizbullah and Amal, and (Hariri's) Future Movement on the other.
Al-Hayat: For what purpose?
Sayyed Nasrallah: Ever since the dispute that arose in the Cabinet, during the extraordinary session convened on Monday, after MP Gebran Tueni was assassinated, we have had reservations about expanding the work of the international investigation (into al-Hariri's assassination), for reasons that are connected to Lebanon's security. The reasons that our brethren raised are not convincing - that if we expand the investigation, we can bring the security situation Lebanon under control and stop the assassinations. We told them that the majority of assassinations took place after the formation of the international investigating commission. This means that the government is declaring its inability and failure to control the security situation in Lebanon. This is dangerous, and bad for Lebanese and investors in Lebanon, and for those who want to invest here. As for the international court, a topic raised in "emergency" fashion, this matter was on the agenda of the Cabinet's Thursday meeting. We told them fine, today's Monday and we can wait until Thursday, and we should hear from you about the formula governing this international court, because I can affirm that up to today, no text, not even a small one, has been presented to any minister, saying what this international court entails.
Al-Hayat: Is it true that you gave your approval in principle to an international court, and suggested Moscow as a venue?
Sayyed Nasrallah: No, that's not true. I haven't heard anything about Moscow. But when the problem with the Syrian officers took place, regarding (their giving testimony to) the investigation, and Mr. (Detlev) Mehlis proposed that this take place in Monteverde (in Lebanon), I was one of the people who asked, in some private discussion sessions, "What is it that we want? Do we want to arrive at the truth or do we want to embarrass each other? Do we want to learn the truth or embarrass Syria?"
If we want to hear testimony from the Syrian officers, let that take place anywhere, to reassure Syria, for example in Moscow, or Cairo. This is my personal opinion. Regarding the international court, I told them yes, we in principle have reservations. We don't know whom this court will listen to. However, if you inform us about the nature of this court, its mechanisms, source of authority, and the law on whose basis it will function, we might overcome some of our reservations. Thus, we assumed that MP Bahij Tabbara would visit me on Monday or Tuesday, to provide us with the proposed formulas, so that we could settle the matter in the Thursday session of the Cabinet. They insisted, during Monday's extraordinary session, that the ministers vote on the request for an international court, without our understanding what this court would entail. We opposed this way of doing things, and left the session. We suspended our membership in the Cabinet. Since that time, dialogue has not been halted, and we haven't escalated things, whether in the media, or politically, and we haven't attacked anyone. We used to be asked, why did you leave? We would explain things and say, give us time, and give us something written (about the court). But since that time, Walid Jumblatt has been attacking on a daily basis.
Al-Hayat: Why?
Sayyed Nasrallah: You should ask him.
Mediation Between Jumblatt and al-Assad
Al-Hayat: You undertook mediation with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad regarding Walid Jumblatt in 2005. Why did it fail?
Sayyed Nasrallah: It's a good thing to talk about mediation. First of all, I have many, many things to do, and many concerns. In the year before al-Hariri's assassination, there was a serious and friendly relationship established between us. Walid Jumblatt told me, "Things have changed in Damascus. We used to meet with General Hikmat Shehabi, and he's now outside the country. We used to meet with Abdel-Halim Khaddam, and now he's not involved. I now go and meet with X, Y and Z, and I don't know if they are relaying what I say to President Bashar al-Assad. I would like from you, if the opportunity for contact between yourself and President al-Assad arises, to specify the channel of communication in precise fashion. I raised the matter with President al-Assad, who said "No problem. Those with whom he is in contact are the ones who are involved, and they're officials. However, if he wants to establish contact in a private matter, that doesn't go through Anjar (the former headquarters of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon), I'm ready to receive any message on any topic. I'm ready to do so via so-and-so," and he specified a certain official.
Al-Hayat: A Syrian official?
Sayyed Nasrallah: Of course, from Damascus. Meaning, that if Walid Beyk wanted to go to Damascus and meet with so-and-so, he could do so at any time. Unfortunately, this took place in the week that the issue of renewing the mandate of President Emile Lahoud re-appeared. I say re-appeared, since this was truly the case. The climate was not one of extending Lahoud's mandate, then it turned into a decision to extend, or moving in the direction of extension.
Al-Hayat: Did you participate in the decision to extend Lahoud's mandate?
Sayyed Nasrallah: We cast "a blank ballot." We had no objection to extension. We didn't insist on it, and we didn't oppose it. Therefore, we always dealt with the matter as if the option was open, and subject to discussion. The extension took place, and when the second term officially began, it came time to form a new government. For the first time, unlike the previous Cabinets, we felt that Prime Minister al-Hariri should form the new government. I encouraged him to do this, and he was somewhat reluctant. We even worked with our Syrian brethren to clarify that the circumstances, and the country's interest, after the extension, required that Prime Minister al-Hariri form the new government. However, al-Hariri said to me, "I have a problem with forming a government without Walid Jumblatt. In light of the difficult climate between Jumblatt and the Syrians, it will be hard to form a Cabinet. I want you to help me regarding Jumblatt, and his relationship with the Syrians."
Prime Minister al-Hariri asked me that day for an urgent appointment, and I met him in the southern suburbs of Beirut. He said, "You need to intervene, today, immediately."
That day, Jumblatt had attacked the Syrians, and the day after al-Hariri's visit to me, it had been decided to convene a meeting of political forces and parties at the Commodore Hotel, against Walid Jumblatt. On the same night, Jumblatt was a guest on the political talk show Kalam al-Nas, on LBC.
I asked al-Hariri, "Why today?"
He responded, in these very words, "Because tomorrow, at the Commodore, they're going to skin him alive, so tonight he's going to attack them, and go all the way. This means that (tomorrow) there won't be any opportunity to correct the relationship. I thought about this all last night, and didn't sleep a wink. I arrived at the conclusion that you are the one who can deal with the situation. I would like you to talk to Walid Beyk, and ask him to calm things down."
I telephoned Walid Beyk, and spoke to him. I told him, "I hope you think things over, and calm down, and I'll deal with things tomorrow."
On the same night, I made the necessary contacts to calm the atmosphere at the next day's event at the Commodore. Also, Walid Jumblatt softened his attack and said on television, "I'm committed to Sayyed Hassan." He repeated this three or four times. Thus, I did enter into the mediation. It wasn't complicated. The only thing required was to arrange a meeting between President al-Assad and Walid Jumblatt, so that they could sit together and reach an understanding.
In the beginning, President al-Assad was angry about the way that man dealt with him. But as a result of repeated attempts, President al-Assad was positive regarding receiving Jumblatt at that time. This is the first time that I'm disclosing this. al-Assad relayed the idea to me in the end that "Jumblatt was attacking us, and the regime, and the person most subject to the attacks was our representative in Lebanon, General Rustom Ghazaleh, so I was able to fix the issue, even if out of courtesy, so that Walid Jumblatt can meet with Rustom Ghazaleh. Then, Jumblatt would be welcome in Damascus." I thought that this was excellent. I sent this message to Walid Beyk - it was a Saturday, but I don't remember the date, but it was prior to PM Hariri's assassination and before he excused himself from forming a government. On Monday, there was going to be a conference at the Bristol Hotel. On Saturday, I sent one of our brethren to Mukhtara, and he telephoned me, and I told him, "New things have arisen. I hope that you receive this person, listen to him, and give him an answer. Hajj Hussein Khalil went and told him that as a result of (my) mediation, the atmosphere in Syria was good, and positive. "President Bashar al-Assad," he said, "is ready and we'll set up appointments, so you and Sayyed Nasrallah go together. However, Sayyed Nasrallah believes that, out of courtesy, and not a condition set by Dr. al-Assad, that either Rustom Ghazaleh should invite us to lunch, and we'll stop and see him on our way to Damascus, or Sayyed Nasrallah will invite you and Ghazaleh to lunch, so we'll put an end to this climate and then we'll meet al-Assad afterward."
Jumblatt told me, "Let me think about it and conduct my consultations."
Hajj Hussein telephoned me from Mukhtara and told me what happened. I told him, "Good, let's keep it between ourselves, so that if he doesn't accept, we'll know how to deal with the matter afterward."
Then, at the Bristol Conference, Jumblatt revealed everything that had happened. At that moment, I realized that Walid Jumblatt had no serious intention of reconciling with the Syrians, even prior to PM Hariri's assassination, and that Walid Jumblatt had taken the decision to enter into a conflict with this regime. Even so, I believe that what he said at the Bristol was hurtful to me personally, as a mediator, and to Prime Minister al-Hariri, who was enthusiastic about the mediation, and to the Syrians themselves. It was clear, and I can attest to the fact that this was the climate prior to PM Hariri's assassination. President al-Assad demonstrated the required positive reaction to overcome the problem with Walid Jumblatt, but Walid Jumblatt insisted on clashing with the regime in Syria. After al-Hariri's assassination, things became more difficult. It was no longer possible to talk about mediation. Yes, I and others made personal efforts, not based on a request by anyone, in order to fix things and calm the atmosphere, but things were difficult.
Al-Hayat: During this period, was there approval for Walid Jumblatt to be received by Syrian officials, without meeting President al-Assad?
Sayyed Nasrallah: This took place afterward, after al-Hariri's martyrdom, and the harsh attack by Jumblatt. President al-Assad had reservations but didn't have any objection to Jumblatt's meeting with other Syrian officials.
The "Syrian Committee"
Al-Hayat: Jumblatt says that the current division is over a stance on the Syrian regime, and not on the Syrian people. Allow me to go further: there are those who say that Hizbullah has a program to see Syrian influence return to Lebanon.
Sayyed Nasrallah (Laughs): First of all, this a charge that has no evidence behind it. Second, if we take Hizbullah, how has it benefited from the Syrian presence in Lebanon? I'm not talking about the last 30 years, since Hizbullah didn't exist prior to 1982. From 1982 until the present, when Syrian forces exited Lebanon, how has Hizbullah benefited from the Syrian presence in Lebanon? How has Jumblatt benefited? Or the many, many others?
Let's talk about the period of Syria's presence in Lebanon. First of all, our presence in state administrations: we don't have any presence. On the contrary, the doors have been closed to us when it comes to the bureaucracy. As for the regions in which we are active, and in which we enjoy a moral and popular influence, deprivation and poverty have increased. We haven't benefited in terms of state positions, or projects, or development, or official political power, or in any domain where others have benefited. Therefore, we have no problem with whoever wants to judge this period; in fact we are comfortable about the topic because we were "outside" (the equation).
Of course, the Syrian presence in Lebanon concerned us in two respects. First, the principal factor involved securing domestic stability, due to the fragility of the situation. Second, this presence constituted a protective shield for the resistance against the Israeli occupation. Therefore, my position on Syria is subject to national and strategic considerations, and not personal calculations, or party-based calculations, or short-term interests. I didn't support Syria in Lebanon because I would receive positions in state administrations, or because it would secure projects for me, or give me a budget to work with, or ministers, or MPs in Parliament. That's how they work. On the contrary, the Syrian committee that used to manage Lebanese affairs up to 2000 would purposely ignore Hizbullah when it came to the Lebanese domestic (political) formula.
Al-Hayat: Why?
Sayyed Nasrallah: The issue involves them, I don't know.
Al-Hayat: Do you mean the Syrian committee that comprised Khaddam, Shehabi and Ghazi Kenaan?
Sayyed Nasrallah: Yes, that Syrian committee. Therefore, my considerations were strategic ones. I'm talking about security and stability in Lebanon, about protecting the resistance. Today, I'm not working to re-introduce Syrian forces in Lebanon, or re-introducing Syrian intelligence here, or Syrian influence. By the way, whether or not we like it, or whether or not others like it, Syria has influence in Lebanon that no one can eliminate, due to what is said about common factors of history and geography, and a network of interests, and the intersection of family and social relations.
There's another goal that we're working for. We reject fighting Syria from Lebanon. We reject seeing Lebanese involved in any project to bring down the Syrian regime. This is dangerous for Syria and Lebanon. Due to Lebanese, national reasons, we believe that any war, in terms of politics, security or the media, not to speak of a military war that some of them want to drag Lebanon into, represents something that is against Lebanese national interests, regardless of the pan-Arab issue, or Israel, or the strategic situation in the region, because it is a losing war, based on all criteria and balances of power. What we're saying today is that in Lebanon, there are those who want to bring down the regime in Syria.
Al-Hayat: Such as?
Sayyed Nasrallah: There are many such people, including Walid Jumblatt, who calls for US troops to occupy Syria and eliminate the regime, like they did in Iraq. This is clear. He has called on the Syrian opposition to receive assistance from outside the country. Walid Jumblatt is distinguished by the fact that he says what he wants. There are others who do things and don't say anything. Don't ask me who these people are; when they say so, I'll tell you. In our opinion, this is dangerous for Lebanon. Today, our problem is that some of them want us to be part of their open war against Syria, and we reject this. The problem isn't that they don't want Syrian influence in Lebanon, while we do. This is not true.
Al-Hayat: So, you oppose the return of Syrian influence to Lebanon?
Sayyed Nasrallah: If this means forming governments, bringing in certain people as MPs, and interfering in details, yes, we oppose it. I believe that when President al-Assad spoke of mistakes, and a new strategy (by Syria regarding Lebanon), he meant what he said. Therefore, when I said in an interview that Syria did not want to return to Lebanon in the way that prevailed in the past, I meant it, and I know this.
Al-Hayat: Do you really believe that Syria has given up its dream of managing Lebanon?
Sayyed Nasrallah: Regarding President Bashar al-Assad, I believe that yes, this is the case.
Al-Hayat: However, there are those who say that Syria wants either to run Lebanon or keep Lebanon in a state of tumult, to show that Lebanese are unable to manage their own affairs.
Sayyed Nasrallah: I don't agree with this, and I say to the Lebanese that we should get together and fix things with Syria. Of course, to avoid any confusion, and so that there is no confusion about what I am saying, the international investigation should continue, the investigation into PM Hariri's assassination should continue, until the results of the investigation appear. Mehlis himself said, before leaving, that it might require a year or two. And if there is an international court, we don't know how long it will take. During this time, we will fix things with Syria and take the opportunity, as Lebanese, to see whether or not we can manage our own affairs, and whether or not the Syrians will allow us to do so. We should try to do this, before making accusations. However, these accusations are being made against Syria today, and Lebanon is being used as a headquarters for plotting against Syria, in international terms, political terms, and when it comes to the media. Syria has entered, in one way or another, a position of self-defense. Even those with whom it holds discussions say no, we are in a defensive position and our "attack" is a defensive one. Let us stop this attack and sit down, and try. The final attempt, in Jeddah, between King Abdullah bin Abdel-Aziz and President Bashar al-Assad was an attempt to arrange things between Lebanon and Syria, in a way that puts Lebanon at ease, and puts Syria at ease as well, providing an opportunity for the investigation to be concluded. Before anyone knew what happened during this meeting, the attacks began from Lebanon, of course using language that was less (harsh) than what the secretary general of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, was subject to. I have the feeling that in Lebanon there are those who don't want any kind of understanding to be reached with Syria, under any consideration, and some of those are the most fearful about revealing the truth about the assassination of Prime Minister al-Hariri.
Al-Hayat: It's said that the truth will be too "heavy" for some of the parties - perhaps for Syria, and Hizbullah as well. What is your response?
Sayyed Nasrallah: It might be a bit too "heavy" for some of those in the 14 March movement, meaning that if the truth comes out, and it turns out that Syria has no link to the assassination of Prime Minister al-Hariri, what does that mean? It means that every political, psychological, and social foundation, and everything built on the idea of accusing Syria, will collapse in a single moment. When the court, or the investigation comes up with a hypothesis, and I am not judging here, for example, that Syria has no link to the assassination, aren't there those who fear . . .
Al-Hayat: Do you think that Syria wasn't involved?
Sayyed Nasrallah: Until now, there is no evidence of this.
Al-Hayat: When a Syrian role in the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri is mentioned, you ask for evidence. Isn't there any evidence up to now?
Sayyed Nasrallah: Yes, and I, of course, do not think that Syria had any role in the killing of Prime Minister Hariri. I know that saying this angers some people, but this is my conviction.
Al-Hayat: Who do you accuse of assassinating PM Hariri? No Israeli role has been proven, whether by the Lebanese judiciary or the international investigating committee.
Sayyed Nasrallah: No investigation of a hypothesis of an Israeli role has taken place, whether by the Lebanese judiciary or the international investigating committee. No one who has a connection with Israel or who was trained in Israel, or someone with expertise in explosives, assassinations or special operations, has been arrested. No one has been detained; instead, Israel has been dealt with as if it can help us and provide us with information.
Al-Hayat: What is your comment on the hypothesis that al-Qaida, or fundamentalists, were involved?
Sayyed Nasrallah: This hypothesis stands; it is possible.
Al-Hayat: Has this possibility grown recently?
Sayyed Nasrallah: I don't have any particular information about the investigations that have taken place with the al-Qaida group, except what has appeared in the media. However, in isolation from these investigations, I believe that a number of hypotheses remain valid.
Al-Hayat: Are they more likely than the Israeli hypothesis?
Sayyed Nasrallah: I have no evidence or special information; I cannot say anything.
Al-Hayat: We know that Hizbullah has a security organization; is the rumor true that the car used in the attempt to assassinate Marwan Hamade was filled with explosives in the southern suburbs?
Sayyed Nasrallah: Is this circulating, or "was it circulated"? Walid Jumblatt raised this in the media.
Al-Hayat: But is there information involved here, or is it just talk?
Sayyed Nasrallah: I heard about this in the media. First of all, I do not have any special information about this. Secondly, whoever says that the car was primed with explosives in the suburbs should produce a witness, or evidence. Thirdly, we have no authority over the southern suburbs, and we do not monitor everyone who comes in and out. There are many parking lots, as many as you would like. And parking lots for trucks. There are fully-fledged industrial zones, and there is heavy traffic. I can tell you that what happens between those two gates that you passed to enter here (for the interview) - this is our security zone. I am responsible for what takes place here. As for what happens in the suburbs, I cannot say that I am responsible for everything that happens. Two of our best people were assassinated in the heart of the southern suburbs, via small explosive devices. Let us assume for the sake of argument that someone came and primed a car with explosives in the suburbs - what does that have to do with Hizbullah? What was told to me was not that the car was filled with explosives in the suburbs, but that its license plate was made by a license plate shop in Ghobeiri (part of the suburbs). Investigating such a thing is not one of my tasks, but of the security forces. Anyone can bring a car (here) and make a license plate for it, whether in Ghobeiri, or Haret Hreik. What does this prove?
Al-Hayat: The country is witnessing assassinations, with a political impact, and everyone is asking if Hizbullah doesn't have information about this, or why isn't it accusing anyone.
Sayyed Nasrallah: For me to make an accusation, I require information. Where does this information come from? From penetrating a certain group, if this group carried out an operation. I am speaking here in technical terms. Fine - if the perpetrator is a Lebanese party, I do not have influence within these parties. I do not have anyone in the Phalange, or the Lebanese Forces, or the Communist Party, or the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. My activity does not involve them. Let us assume that it was al-Qaida. I have nothing to do with al-Qaida. My activities are limited to Israel, and the South Lebanon Army militia, and the networks that have a direct relationship with Israel.
Al-Hayat: Can you state definitively that Hizbullah has nothing to do with all of these assassinations?
Sayyed Nasrallah: To begin with, I reject seeing the fingers of accusation pointed at us. Of course I can deny this in definitive terms, but first of all I do not accept the accusation being made. We are the ones most hurt by what has happened in Lebanon. Imagine that I, someone who does interviews and talks about Lebanon, Palestine, the Arab or Islamic nation, imagine me getting involved in car bombs, and sectarian divisions, among Shiites, Sunnis, Druze and Maronites, etc.
Al-Hayat: Who has dragged the resistance into this domestic debate?
Sayyed Nasrallah: This is what makes us say that the assassination of Prime Minister al-Hariri is a very, very suspect event, and we should take our time before directing accusations at anyone. The target of this operation was very big, as big or important as Prime Minister Hariri himself. If, for example, a party member or MP in Parliament had been assassinated, would we say that this targeted Lebanon itself, or the region? No, it would have involved targeting this certain group. But killing Prime Minister Hariri means targeting Lebanon, and the region. In other words, there is someone who has a plan for the region. Among the basis elements of such a plan is the assassination of the martyr Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Today, if we take the repercussion of 14 February, there is no stability, no security, no reassurance, and the economic situation is not good. The state is moving from crisis to crisis. But all of this is easy - what is worse is that all of the sensitivities, hatreds, and religious and sectarian feuds and grudges have been revived. There are very sharp divisions in the Lebanese street. You began this interview with a question about whether we are on the verge of a civil war, which is a legitimate question. People are afraid. Could we have reached this point without the assassination of Prime Minister al-Hariri? Therefore, whoever carried out this assassination, and followed it up with other assassinations, is aiming to sabotage Lebanon, create religious and sectarian strife, and dismember Lebanon. This is the goal behind the assassinations. Christians have begun to feel that the state is unable to protect them, so they live in a canton - the same goes for the Druze. The Shiites are holed up in their areas, and the same for the Sunnis. This is if they do not bear arms against each other, that is. And this is very dangerous.
Al-Hayat: There is talk that if the Shebaa Farms and Kfar Shuba hills are liberated, and prisoners released, and Israel stops its aggressions, what is the justification for this arsenal? Is the arsenal of the resistance at the disposal of the Shiite community?
Sayyed Nasrallah: At that point, we can have a serious dialogue and discuss what is to be done with these weapons.
Al-Hayat: There is talk about a meeting with General Michel Aoun. Will this remain a mere idea?
Sayyed Nasrallah: At the present time, security considerations remain important. I have no reservations about going to Rabieh (Aoun's residence) at any moment. I have no protocol about this. There are some people who function according to protocol. As for me, I have no protocol or political problem because I visit someone, but I do have a security problem. Today, we are all prisoners in this country. By the way, I am a prisoner in Haret Hreik, and every time I want to go somewhere, many measures have to be taken. Walid Jumblatt is a prisoner in Mukhtara, and General Aoun is a prisoner in Rabieh. Speaker Nabih Berri visits some countries, sometimes, but he is also taking precautions, and is careful. Saad Hariri has been displaced from the country, in one way or another. The funny thing is that the only person who has freedom of movement, and comes and goes throughout Lebanon, meeting with people in complete comfort, is the American ambassador. He goes to Mukhtara, and Rabieh, and Ain al-Tineh (Berri's residence) and the Government Serail, without any problems. However, of course, he does not go to Yarze or Baabda, because of President Emile Lahoud (laughs).
The Story of Tutelage
Al-Hayat: There is much talk about exaggerating the issue of American and French tutelage, while there is no longer any objection on your part to the daily Syrian management of Lebanese affairs. There are even those who say that Hizbullah participated in the government to "detonate" things at the suitable moment, such as the issue of an international court (to try PM Hariri's killers). On the day that the (Shiite) ministers exited the Cabinet, a decision was taken regarding a court with an international character, and expanding the scope of the investigation. What is your opinion about these decisions?
Sayyed Nasrallah: I do not agree with your introduction. We took part in the government after we were told that we were partners, and that we would reach an understanding about fundamental matters, and that we had an opportunity to build the country. This is the basic consideration, and on this basis we participated in the Cabinet. We did not participate in Cabinets prior to this because we were not convinced about the way these things were being managed. Therefore, we did not vote confidence in these governments. We were requested to do so, but we did not accept. I did not attack the Syrians, true, because my relationship with them is a strategic one. As for the domestic level, I would express my convictions in the agreed-upon political fashion. When Syria forms the government and I withhold confidence, what have I done? When we entered the government, we took part with this background in mind. Even the international investigating commission, about which we had reservations from the beginning - we requested an Arab, Saudi-Lebanese committee - we voted to extend its work, out of consideration for the feelings of our brethren and our partners. When it came to the issue of expanding the investigating commission's work, and there was an assassination attempt against (LBC's) May Chidiac, Minister Marwan Hamade proposed expanding the commission's work to cover all crimes. At that time, the Progressive Socialist Party issued a statement in which it rejected expanding the commission's scope. The people in the Future Movement telephoned us and said that this was not their proposal, and if it were brought up in the Cabinet, they said they wished we would vote against it. This is in harmony with our convictions. When Tueni was killed, the matter was raised again. We replied: "you previously said that you were against expanding its scope of work to keep the focus on PM Hariri's assassination and avoid stretching the period for 20 years". Now we are going to add more tasks? What has changed? This is of course in addition to our feeling that this would be a declaration of failure (to provide security), etc.
As for the international court, we asked that we be given until Thursday, and they turned this down. We believed that our exit from the Cabinet was in the first place an objection to the principle; now it is the subject of a debate, and controversy. We have participated in the government, and voted it confidence on the basis that we were partners. It then appeared to us that we were not in agreement, and that we were not partners, and that we did not even deserve receiving a period of three days to conduct our consultations about the essence of a court with an international character. If we are not partners, why should we remain in this government? To avoid further negative consequences, we did not submit our resignations, because this would move the country toward a very highly-charged atmosphere.
Al-Hayat: But there is a kind of frozen atmosphere at present. Are we now seeing movement in the direction of your resigning from the government?
Sayyed Nasrallah: No. The door to dialogue has not been closed yet. We are waiting for answers from Prime Minister Siniora.
Al-Hayat: Do you miss Prime Minister Hariri in such circumstances?
Sayyed Nasrallah: Of course. In the end, each person has his own personality, and experience. This is not to belittle the importance of anyone else; I mean, I do not want to take anything away from the importance of Sheikh Saad Hariri, or Prime Minister Siniora, or any of the people in the Future Movement. Even Sheikh Saad says that he is not the same as his father. There is no doubt about the experience of Prime Minister Hariri, his personality, his ability to absorb things and take the initiative - all of these qualities were distinguished in him. If he were around in a crisis such as this, many things would have been different, or they would have been dealt with quickly. My experience with him, despite the fact that we experienced a period of sharp disputes, proved that he had a high degree of flexibility, and could absorb things, even at the most difficult of moments.
Al-Hayat: What is the most important quality that distinguished Rafik Hariri? Did he complain to you about his disputes with the Syrians?
Sayyed Nasrallah: He was able to tolerate things, and not despair. He would complain to me about the Syrians, and others.
Al-Hayat: Who are these others?
Sayyed Nasrallah: I will not name them, because today they are his comrades, and it is not right to discuss them. The ironic thing is that the people about which he used to complain are now in the 14 March Movement. Those who are holding up the "banner" of Prime Minister Hariri today caused him considerable damage in his life. They used to say things about him that are not lesser than what those who disagreed with him later said about him, i.e. those who are described now as "rivals".
Al-Hayat: Have you gotten to know Saad Hariri?
Sayyed Nasrallah: Of course, there was the opportunity that arose after the martyrdom of Prime Minister Hariri, and the period of the parliamentary elections and the formation of the government, when a number of meetings took place. I can say, and this is my personal belief, that if Sheikh Saad Hariri were here in Lebanon, many things would be dealt with in a better manner. I can say that through my direct contact with him, which took place before his long stay outside the country, that a kind of affection and trust arose between us; perhaps each of us could "influence the other," in a given way, in order to deal with matters. Being distant is a problem. I cannot speak on the telephone, for security reasons, and in any case, communication via mediators constitutes a type of imbalance, in one form or another.
Al-Hayat: Is the issue of the presidency of the Republic on the table?
Sayyed Nasrallah: No.
Al-Hayat: So, are we stuck with the same situation until the end of President Lahoud's mandate?
Sayyed Nasrallah: It appears so.
Al-Hayat: Are you meeting with President Lahoud?
Sayyed Nasrallah: No.
Al-Hayat: Is there something preventing this?
Sayyed Nasrallah: Only circumstances having to do with (physical) movement; there is constant communication, via MPs and ministers.
Al-Hayat: Would Hizbullah agree to a solution, if it were proposed, of shortening President Lahoud's mandate in order to defuse the tension?
Sayyed Nasrallah: Treating the situation now through partial steps does not help; it could complicate things. Any treatment must be comprehensive. For example, former Prime Minister Salim Hoss put forward an initiative, with a comprehensive proposal - he suggested that the President resign, Parliament be dissolved, that early elections be held, and that we see a new President and a new government. This is, for example, a formula that can be discussed.
President Lahoud himself accepts discussion, if we present him with a comprehensive plan. Based on my personal impression, he is not saying that he is unwilling to engage in debate in absolute terms. In the philosophy that I outlined earlier, I see, for example, that the issue of Palestinian weapons cannot be dealt with if we take the issue of military positions outside the camps, the issue of civil rights (for refugees), or other matters, as partial, separate things. We cannot treat things in this fashion. We now need to put the entire Palestinian "file" on the table, for discussion. Dialogue must take place between the Lebanese government and the Palestinians in Lebanon about all topics: weapons outside the camps, the situation of the camps, civil rights, the future of the Palestinian refugee presence. We Lebanese are concerned with this issue.
Al-Hayat: Has the issue of Palestinian weapons outside the camps caused you embarrassment?
Sayyed Nasrallah: We say that the matter requires a solution. We do not say that these weapons should remain where they are. However, we reject saying that these weapons should be removed by force, by sending the Lebanese Army in, because this will lead to a battle breaking out. With all due respect to these weapons, we do not feel that they are important enough to be worth seeing a huge problem break out in the country. The Palestinian positions in the mountains are hidden, and isolated. We say let dialogue begin with the Palestinians, and they are ready for dialogue, they do not reject the idea. The party responsible for the failure of dialogue is the Lebanese, not the Palestinians. Dialogue with them was underway, when they (the government) sent the army in, for no reason.
Al-Hayat: Is there still a possibility for seeing a meeting between you and MP Walid Jumblatt?
Sayyed Nasrallah: Of course, even if we are rivals, or if we believe that he has been unfair to us, rude to us, and insulted us. In the end, we in Lebanon are obliged to sit with each other and reach agreement, in order to solve the country's problems. No one can ignore the other. Jumblatt's saying that the forces making up the 14 March Movement alone will decide the future of Lebanon is one of his historic mistakes. This takes us back to isolation, and I do not mean the isolation of the Shiites. The Mehlis report indicated that the (demonstrators on) 8 March numbered one million, and they trust Mehlis' report. Its testimony cannot be rejected. So when Jumblatt says that the 14 March forces alone will decide the fate of the country, he is isolating one million people who were at Riad Solh square (in downtown Beirut), not to speak of those who were not able to attend.
Our conviction is that Lebanon cannot be based on two, or three groups alone - not on the "big sects," or the small ones. Lebanon needs everyone, and everyone must get along. If this is our starting-point, then we must talk to each other, even if someone acts wrongly toward me, or if I act wrongly toward them. Whether it is Jumblatt or someone else.
Al-Hayat: If the idea of meeting with Samir Geagea is raise, would you have any objections?
Sayyed Nasrallah: He is welcome, there are no objections.
Al-Hayat: Have you thought of encouraging Saad al-Hariri to return to the country, or facilitating his return, dispelling his fears?
Sayyed Nasrallah: I would like to, but I would not dare to invite him. I am not the party able to secure, in any way, protection for him or anyone else. This is just as what happened when Walid Beyk said that he requested protection for me; I am not able to do this. I protect myself and this alone is a "tall order." There are suspect parties working in Lebanon to tear the country apart.
Al-Hayat: Are these Israeli groups?
Sayyed Nasrallah: God knows. Foreign, or Israeli intelligence agencies, or groups, whose way of thinking we are unaware of. There are people of this type in Lebanon, and I hope, prefer, and see that it is in the national interest for Saad Hariri to be present in Beirut, but I cannot assume the responsibility for issuing a call for him to return.
Fears of Civil Strife
Al-Hayat: Are you afraid of Sunni-Shiite strife, and do you think that there are those pushing in this direction?
Sayyed Nasrallah: Yes, I believe that there are those who are pushing in this direction.
Al-Hayat: Do you have fears about something like this taking place in the street?
Sayyed Nasrallah: There is tension in the street, and one of the reasons we scolded Jumblatt was that his daily statements lead to this tension. For example, when he talks about me, he presents me as someone who is defending the killers, and says that I am against revealing the truth and trying the killers of PM Hariri. What is he doing here? He is inciting the Sunnis against me, and against the Shiites. He says that he does not mean to engage in incitement, but his comments lead in this direction.
What did he do when he said the weapons of the resistance are "weapons of treachery"? He incited everyone who likes the resistance and supports it against me, and against those who defend me. He says that he does not mean to engage in incitement, but he really made a mess of the situation. When he (Jumblatt) talks about car bombs, he is inciting the Druze against the Shiites regarding (the assassination attempt against) Marwan Hamade, and is inciting the Christians against the Shiites regarding the explosions that have taken place in Christian areas. When he talks about a provision regarding the resistance, which is in the Cabinet's policy statement with the addition of a text saying that the resistance is not a militia, he concludes that this is a new Cairo Accord, and incites the Christians against Hizbullah and the Shiites and likewise, when he incites Lebanese against Syrians and Palestinians, and calls for the Army to go to the south.
Thus, I can say that yes, there is a very bad climate. For example, what do we have to do with the incident at Naameh (a stand-off over Palestinians weapons outside the camps)? If we speak in sectarian terms, what do the Shiites have to do with this? There was an incident between two policemen from the Municipality of Naameh and young people from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, and they are Palestinians, not Shiites; there was a fiery confrontation. Twenty-five young people showed up and blocked the international highway for four hours, and burned tires, while tens of thousands of citizens were kept waiting on both sides of the road, on the eve of the Eid al-Adha. Fine, this is not such a big thing. Young people who were brought by Jumblatt were yelling and calling for (Abu Musab) al-Zarqawi, and (Abdel-Halim) Khaddam, and Saddam (Hussein), and cursing me, and cursing Speaker Berri. If they curse me, fine, it is not such a big thing. But to curse Speaker Berri! Fine, okay. What do we have to do with this? We say that we do not accept seeing the issue of Palestinian weapons outside the camps dealt with by force, because we are keen on security and stability. We consider the Palestinians our brothers, and soldiers in the Lebanese Army are our brothers. However, there are people who have no problem with seeing the Lebanese Army fight the Palestinians, because Palestinians and people in the Lebanese Army do not mean anything to them. But the danger lies in hearing chants calling for al-Zarqawi, because this means that they are calling for explosions, for blowing up Hussayniehs (Shiite religious centers), churches, mosques, and Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds . . . is this how we will build the country?
al-Qaida in Lebanon
Al-Hayat: al-Zarqawi declared that the launching of rockets from the south was at the directive of Osama bin Laden. What information does Hizbullah have about this?
Sayyed Nasrallah: I do not have any special information about this, but I do not rule it out.
Al-Hayat: Is it that easy?
Sayyed Nasrallah: In the south, we are the resistance, not the authorities. There is the Lebanese Army, and security forces in the south. Even in the areas of the liberated zones, there are no fighters or armed individuals from Hizbullah. There are the checkpoints of the Lebanese Army and Internal Security Forces. Thus, we are present along the borders, in positions whose location is not announced, and even if the Israelis come to commit aggression against our country, we will confront them. This is the situation. As for what takes place in this village, or city, or valley, I am not responsible for security. Therefore, anyone can show up in any orchard - and the south covers a wide area - anyone can put two rockets in the trunk of his car, bring them to a temporary battery position, and leave, and then an hour later, the rockets are launched.
Al-Hayat: Don't you find this a dangerous situation?
Sayyed Nasrallah: Yes, it is dangerous, and unacceptable.
Al-Hayat: Then, what can be done?
Sayyed Nasrallah: There is no solution for this situation, even if the Army were stationed along the borders. In the areas from which the rockets were launched, the Army was present. However, it was unable to do anything. The solution lies in bringing the domestic situation under control.
Al-Hayat: Was it proven that al-Qaida was the group that carried out the operation?
Sayyed Nasrallah: Possibly, although I cannot say this with certainty. I know that in the Ain al-Hilweh (Palestinian refugee) camp, there are some people who have pledged their loyalty to al-Zarqawi. We believe that this operation was a mistake, because we believe that the Katyusha rocket should be used as a defensive strategy. If Israel attacks us, we respond with Katyushas. However, the Katyushua is not a weapon for a jihadist operation. A jihadist operation involves attacking a military post, or vehicle, or patrol, or planting an explosive device; this is the history of the resistance. We have only used Katyushas to respond. But launching a Katyusha for no reason violates our strategy and we do not agree with it.
Al-Hayat: Do you feel that a clash could take place in the future between Hizbullah and al-Qaida?
Sayyed Nasrallah: We assume that this is unlikely.
Lebanon and Iran's Nuclear Capabilities
Al-Hayat: It seems that Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is moving Iran toward an offensive position. There is the question: If we wake up one day to aircraft bombing Iran's nuclear facilities, Hizbullah will rain down Katyusha rockets on Israel and ignite the front (between Lebanon and Israel). What do you think about this scenario, and to what degree can we link the Lebanese arena to Iran's nuclear facilities?
Sayyed Nasrallah: These are hypothetical questions. However, I ask: are we concerned with reassuring Israel to this degree? Thus, I am unable to answer this question, because if I answer in the affirmative, this creates a problem for me beginning right now. If I answer in the negative, this means that I am reassuring Israel.
Al-Hayat: There are those who believe that Hizbullah is producing burdens for Lebanon that are too heavy for it to bear, through this strategic relationship with Syria and Iran. This alliance supports the resistance, but this battle hinders Hizbullah from being a part of the formula of independence and stability. What do you think?
Sayyed Nasrallah: Let them explain to us what these burdens are.
Al-Hayat: There are people who conclude that Hizbullah's regional role prevents it from offering compromises domestically, and perhaps prevents us from seeing the completion of independence and stability.
Sayyed Nasrallah: What are the compromises that are required domestically for the national interest that Hizbullah has not offered? Hizbullah is present in the south as the resistance. From time to time, an operation takes place that reminds us that the Shebaa Farms are still occupied. There is also the issue of prisoners, which requires a solution, and the Israeli violations (of Lebanese airspace and territorial waters) with which we deal in a responsible fashion. The party is present as an element of balance, even if Israel does not commit aggression against Lebanon on some pretext, or even without a pretext. The party's role involves protecting Lebanon, with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Of course, in the media, and regarding our policies, we support the Palestinian Intifada, although all of us are with the Intifada, and not just Hizbullah. A large portion of the Arab satellite stations, and the Arab media, are with the Intifada, like we are, and they support it. This is the minimum - standing with the Palestinian people in the media, and in politics, whether or not you have weapons.
The Iranian Veto
Al-Hayat: Is there an Arab interest in seeing Iran become a superpower in the region? For example, should Prime Minister Siniora, if he wants to form a government, have to add to the Syrian veto (if there is one) an Iranian veto?
Sayyed Nasrallah: This matter involves people's understanding of Iran. We are in Lebanon, and whether we like it or not, people look at us as if we are a force for Iran, or a form of its influence. Whether or not this is true is another question. We are Lebanese, our organization is Lebanese, and our leadership is Lebanese. We enter the government and exit the government whenever we want to. Iran does not intervene with us, or with the Lebanese government, although if Iran wanted to exercise its influence, based on this theory, then this would be the time. This is because today, and there is no debate about this, Hizbullah is the biggest political party in the country, regardless of the number of MPs, since that is related to the election law. At the least, it is one of the biggest political parties and a force that cannot be taken lightly, on all levels, and it is seen as close to Iran. Let them give us a single example about Iranian intervention on the domestic scene or a single thing that required Prime Minister Siniora or anyone else to go to Iran in order to deal with. This is the reality as it exists today. I have not found that Iran behaves in this manner. Even in Iraq, it does not do such a thing. Whoever thinks that there are Iraqi political groups that carry out Iranian orders is mistaken. There is a firm relationship between us and Iran - this is one thing, while Iran benefiting from our respect in order to intervene in our affairs is something else, and this has not happened. The Unified Iraqi Coalition is a big parliamentary bloc and it is its right to nominate someone for the prime minister's post. Can you imagine Iran telling the coalition to name (Ibrahim) al-Jaafari, and not (Adel) Abdel-Mahdi, or someone else? This has not happened.
Al-Hayat: We are seeing that Iran is continuing to gather its cards: Khaled Meshaal (of Hamas) goes there to announce an alliance, and Ramadan Shallah does not need to go in order to be an ally.
Sayyed Nasrallah: The Palestinian factions have an independent decision-making ability. Are they carrying out the orders of Iran? Ask them, if you want to confirm what I have said. But even the telephone lines are bugged.
Al-Hayat: Is it possible that we will reach a point where we have to choose between the truth (about PM Hariri's assassination) and stability?
Sayyed Nasrallah: In my opinion, there is no contradiction between the two.
Al-Hayat: Even if the judicial investigation arrives at the conclusion that the perpetrator belonged to a certain organization?
Sayyed Nasrallah: If the investigation reveals who the perpetrator is, then at a minimum, there will be a Lebanese consensus against the perpetrator. When there is a true Lebanese consensus, no one can harm the country's stability. Lebanon's stability is threatened when there are divisions and disputes among Lebanese.
Al-Hayat: Does the stability of Lebanon, and Syria, and the overcoming of this crisis, deserve a search for a way out and not for the truth?
Sayyed Nasrallah: No one is raising the idea of searching for a way out. We want the truth. I am one of those who insists on revealing the truth, no less so than Saad al-Hariri. I say that this truth, when it is revealed, will have huge repercussions for Lebanon and the region.
Al-Hayat: Do you see the policy of the Iranian president as provocative to this extent?
Sayyed Nasrallah: Only regarding the Israeli issue. As for the nuclear issue, the same policy was pursued in the time of (former Iranian President) Sayyed Mohammad Khatami. There is a domestic consensus in Iran over this nuclear policy.
Regarding the Israeli issue, Iran's policy has angered some in the region, and embarrassed others. In my opinion, Ahmadinejad said what is in the hearts and minds of 1.4 billion Muslims in the world. I appreciate the fact that he talked about the Holocaust and the idea of taking Israel to Canada, Germany, or Alaska, since he expressed what is in the conscience of 1.390 billion Muslims; as for the rest, I will assume the worst and say that Ahmadinejad's remarks angered them. The majority was happy; they believed that he was expressing their feelings and convictions, which they cannot express due to international and regional conditions, and the regimes, and rulers. So what is the problem with Ahmadinejad's speech against Israel? Will this hurt the Arabs? I believe that we will benefit.
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